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 ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the relationship between a global industrial actor and its 
regional host, and what that can tell us about neoliberalism and globalisation.  
The relationship between the nuclear industry, in particular the Sellafield site, 
and the West Cumbrian region where it is located is the specific focus for the 
data collection and analysis.  West Cumbria is an isolated region in the very 
north-west corner of England.  West Cumbria was the site of the UK’s first 
nuclear reactors.  Over seven decades, as other industries have declined, West 
Cumbria has become home to, and economically dependent on, one of the 
largest and most complex nuclear sites in the world.  
The core concepts employed to analyse this relationship are power and scale.  
In particular, this thesis analyses how power is rescaled in the context of state 
restructuring and the wider changes associated with globalisation.  To be able 
to analyse power it was necessary to develop an applied understanding of the 
concept.  This is informed by a diverse literature, and takes an implicitly 
geographical and relational understanding of the exercise of power in its diverse 
forms, bases and uses.  Firstly, policy documentation is analysed to understand 
the impact of the changes to the governance and management of the UK’s 
oldest and most hazardous nuclear sites.  Secondly, survey and focus group 
data is analysed which focusses on the position of the nuclear industry in the 
local economy and specific changes made as a result of the part-privatisation of 
the industry in 2008.  Finally, an analysis of economic development plans which 
aim to grow West Cumbria’s economy, and demonstrate an increasing priority 
being given to new nuclear developments.  Finally, these three areas are 
brought together to explore how power is rescaled, its implications and the 
wider relevance of the thesis to other locations and policy areas. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 – Motivations 
West Cumbria has hosted nuclear facilities since 1947.  These first facilities 
were for the production of plutonium for the United Kingdom’s atomic weapons 
programme.  In the intervening seven decades the industry has expanded 
throughout the UK and undergone significant changes, embracing civil power 
generation, commercial spent fuel reprocessing, research, waste management 
and most recently the challenge to decommission the ageing and contaminated 
facilities from the very early days of the industry.  Many areas across the UK 
host nuclear sites which serve one or two of these purposes, but only one area 
hosts sites which include them all; West Cumbria with the Sellafield and Low 
Level Waste Repository Sites. 
West Cumbria is a geographically remote part of the North West of England. 
Bounded by the Irish Sea to the West and the Lake District and Cumbrian fells 
to the east, it is the very top left corner of England.  An area with a history of 
trade and heavy industry tied closely to the resources of the land and the sea, it 
became host to one of the most cutting-edge industries of the mid-20th century 
when the first nuclear reactors in the UK were built there.  Since then, as other 
‘traditional’ industries such as mining and steel works have declined, while the 
nuclear industry has expanded, the area has become heavily reliant on the 
nuclear industry. 
The 1990s were a high point of nuclear activity at Sellafield, with reprocessing 
and fuel manufacture expanding, this was also the nadir of potential future 
developments for the wider industry, particularly for the prospects for new 
power generation across the global industry (Nuttall 2004: 2). This is the 
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‘second phase’ for the nuclear industry, following from the technology-led 
expansions of the previous decades, where in line with the general trend across 
nationalised industries what could be privatised had been and the state was 
managing the rest (Pemberton 2014: 6).  This, however, was a short phase.  In 
the 2000s policy towards the remaining state nuclear assets changed and these 
were moved to become contracted out and an end was brought to direct state 
provision where possible (Nuttall 2004: 3).  Later in the same decade, the 
government policy towards nuclear new build became favourable (BERR 2007) 
and a new process for finding a site for the disposal of higher activity radioactive 
wastes was launched (DEFRA 2008).  In both of these two policy changes, 
West Cumbria became a candidate community for development.  Therefore 
West Cumbria is involved in every aspect of the UK nuclear industry, and has 
the prospect of continuing to be so for centuries, or more, to come. 
The West Cumbrian community have been generally very supportive of the 
nuclear industry, but critical of some individual developments (Haraldsen et al 
2011).  Previous work has been conducted to explore the underlying basis for 
public opinion towards the nuclear industry in West Cumbria, revealing a 
community-level perspective which was important to risk perceptions (Wylie 
2011).  Similar effects of place mediating risk perception have been found at 
other nuclear sites (Venables et al 2012).  Specific nuclear developments in 
West Cumbria have been studied.  This has included proposals to site a 
radioactive waste disposal facility in the area which revealed the importance of 
the long history and legacy of the industry in the area in shaping perceptions of 
current and future developments (Bickerstaff 2012).  More generally, changes in 
the way nuclear power new build is governed have been analysed (Johnstone 
2014; Baker 2015).  The effects of a dominant nuclear industry on surrounding 
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populations – the “Yellowcake towns” near uranium mines in the United States 
– revealed a level of domination of culture, social life and economy which had a 
range of impacts on different communities following the industry’s decline which 
depended on their ability to reorient to other sources of revenue (Amundson 
2002). 
My own research has analysed the nuclear industry and its relationship with the 
communities around it, in both west Cumbria around the Sellafield and Low 
Level Waste Repository sites, and in north Scotland around the Dounreay and 
Vulcan Naval Reactor Test Establishment (NRTE) sites.  This has included the 
failed bid to nominate two West Cumbrian sites for nuclear reactors away from 
the existing nuclear facilities in 2009 demonstrated that local responses to 
nuclear developments cannot be assumed, despite an overarching positive 
public opinion (Haraldsen et al 2011).  Following on from a European 
Commission project to improve the governance of radioactive waste 
management, the troubled siting process of a new low level waste facility 
adjacent to the Dounreay site near Thurso on the north coast of Scotland 
revealed the importance of both those directly affected and their relationships 
with extant lived communities at a range of scales (Wylie et al 2016). 
These studies all demonstrate the importance of the relationship between 
nuclear sites and the communities in which they are located, and the ability for 
government to enact major change in an industry which dominates its often 
isolated host communities.  This is a relationship I have experienced.  I was 
born and raised in West Cumbria, work in the area and have been closely 
involved with local politics as an elected borough councillor and parliamentary 
candidate.  My research was motivated to further explore the relationship 
between the nuclear industry, particularly Sellafield, and the West Cumbrian 
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community.  This initially took the form of an analysis of the impact of the 
nuclear industry on local perceptions of the scaling of their lived experience of 
citizenship.  However, through the process of writing a thesis and having it 
examined, wider issues of the impact the nuclear industry has upon power and 
the spatial politics of West Cumbria were identified.   
 
1.2 – Key concepts 
 
This section introduces the key concepts of scale and power which are central 
to the exploration the restructuring of the state in the context of the current era 
of technology enabled global interconnectivity where diverse mobilities of 
people, information, goods, money and so on cross national borders with 
increasing speed and volume (Urry 2010: 353-354).   The next sub-section will 
introduce the concept of power, followed by scale, which will flow into a brief 
outline of the relationship between the two, the rescaling of power, to inform the 
aim and research questions in the following section. 
1.2.1 - Power 
Power is a broad concept, with many different forms, bases and uses (Wrong 
1979).  In this thesis, which explores the consequences of state restructuring in 
a specific industry and regional, power is still about more than simply state 
capabilities which are packaged and transferred between geographical scales in 
discrete units from the national state either upwards or downwards (Allen 2003: 
2).  The political science literature on power explores its many different ‘faces’, 
where there are many different ways in which one actor can influence the 
actions of another either through direct or less obvious mechanisms (Lukes 
1974; 2005).  This relies on four broad forms of power; force, manipulation, 
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persuasion and authority (Wrong 1979: ch2-3).  Authority is what states have, 
and it exists where a power holder has the right to command and the subject an 
acknowledged obligation to obey, and the source of the power rather than its 
content determines its legitimacy (Wrong 1979: 49).  Wrong (1979: ch3) 
conceives of five forms of authority; coercive, inducement, legitimate, 
competent and personal.   
Power is therefore something which is deeply geographical.  The holding of 
capabilities or resources are not power in and of themselves, but rather these 
are things which may be used as a basis for power (see Wrong 1979).  John 
Allen argues that this use of power is not a ‘thing’ but something which emerges 
from social interaction and consequently “…geography makes a difference to 
the exercise of power” (Allen 2013: 1, emphasis added).  Resources, as one 
particular example, do not follow a linear progression which equates greater 
resources with greater power, as they may be misused or wasted (Allen 2011: 
5).  For power, it is not just about the size of resources or the legitimacy of 
authority, these things are some of the bases of power (Wrong 1979) not power 
itself.  Power occurs in their application by and in between social actors, so 
what matters is how and where these bases are used to persuade, coerce, 
manipulate, enable, persuade and generally get things done (Allen 2013: 6).  
Thus, power, authority and capabilities still matter, but their exploration needs to 
take into account their location and relations: in short, the context. 
1.2.2 - Scale 
This return to the geography of power requires a focus on scale as a key 
concept to the location and application of power.  Scale as a concept, like 
power, is a broad one. 
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Notions of scales as ontologically pre-given, things which have inherent 
qualities or a ‘rightness’ for any particular activity, have been superseded (Smith 
1992: 73; Brenner 2001: 592).  Scales are instead socially constructed and 
relational (Penning-Rowsell and Johnson 2015: 132) by the actions of 
organisations, groups and individuals (Reed and Bruyneel 2010: 651).  While 
certain scalar arrangements may be fixed for a time they are also fluid as they 
are challenged and remade (Brown and Purcell 2005: 610). Indeed, even the 
nation state scale only became the preeminent container for social and political 
activity in Europe in the 17th century, and later for much of the rest of the world.  
Other scales of social, political and economic activity have been made and 
remade with greater frequency, such as changes to local government, the 
structures of state economic intervention and so on.  This process of scaling 
and rescaling does not happen by accident; rather it is undertaken by social 
actors such as politicians, economic elites, pressure groups and so on with 
interests to preserve or advance (Sassen 2008) who deploy scale strategically  
to establish, reorganise or dismantle structures or processes at certain scales  
(MacKinnon 2011: 32).  The outcomes of processes of rescaling cannot be said 
to reflect the qualities of that scale, but reflect the political strategies of the 
actors involved in making that fix (Brown and Purcell 2005: 609).  Therefore, to 
understand how power is scaled and rescaled, the actors and coalitions 
involved, their motivations, agendas, discourse and practice around particular 
scale arrangements are of central importance (Kaiser and Nikiforva 2008: 544; 
Penning-Rowsell and Johnson 2015: 132-133).  However, despite being socially 
constructed rather than ontologically given, scale and its borders are most 
certainly still constructed (Reed and Bruyneel 2010: 651).  Scales are thus 
defined, challenged and remade based upon “power relations between actors” 
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across a range of scales (Silver 2009: 925).  Scales are therefore both fixed, in 
so far as they exist for a time, but also fluid as they are challenged and remade 
(Brown and Purcell 2005: 610). 
1.2.3 – Globalisation and the rescaling of governance 
In the era of hypermobility of people, capital, goods and so on (Urry 2010: 353) 
increasingly fragmented sub-national places (Sassen 2008: 265) seek to 
constitute themselves as ‘scapes’ on horizontally organised global networks 
(Urry 2010: 348).  In this “new spatial form” (Castells 2010: 440) sub-national 
regions seek to shape and are shaped by the economic activity within them 
(Dicken 2007: 21-23; Coe et al 2008: 279). In this context, the ability of 
governments to govern alone is challenged.  Authority has not simply been 
rescaled through a nested hierarchy of governmental scales but has rather 
been dispersed more widely “among a variety of private and public actors” 
(Kern and Bulkeley 2009: 311). Governmental authority though is “far from 
being a form of placeless power”, it has a complex spatiality where rather than 
power being “exchanged more or less in tact between scales” (MacLeod and 
Jones 2007: 1197) government has become “centralised yet dispersed” (Allen 
2004: 27).  The governance landscape is thus “fragmented or ‘splintered’” 
(Coaffee and Healey 2003: 1981) and governance may be taken to mean 
“governing mechanisms which do not rest on a recourse to the authority and 
sanctions of government” (Wilson 2003: 318) but include government among a 
wider array of actors in a “criss-crossing mix of distanced and proximate 
actions” which has “blurred” the boundary between the state and market (Allen 
2004: 29) and fundamentally “between different arenas of politics” (Kern and 
Bulkeley 2009: 311).  Indeed, the “global cities and high-tech districts” are now 
“partly denationalized strategic territorialisations with considerable regulatory 
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autonomy through the ascendance of private governance regimes” (Sassen 
2008: 54-55).  This has been characterised as a ‘hollowing-out’ of the functions 
of the nation state (Bulkeley 2005: 882). 
This nuanced exploration of power recognises that while the state may have 
changed, its authority is not necessarily diminished and indeed the power and 
control of some scales may be strengthened (Swyngedouw 1997: 142).  
Authority is “polycentric” with independent centres of decision making (Ostrom 
et al 1961: 831).  These have been manifested in the proliferation of agencies, 
arms-length bodies, and other governance structures undertaking regulation for 
the state such that now: 
[E]ach citizen . . . is served not by ‘the’ government, but by a variety of 
different public service industries. . . . We can then think of the public 
sector as being composed of many public service industries including the 
police industry, the fire protection industry, the welfare industry, the 
health services industry, the transportation industry, and so on” (Ostrom 
and Ostrom 1999, 88-89) 
In the modern era, therefore, the binary divide between public and private, 
between the public interest and the market, no longer exists but rather 
governance embraces a range of actors and institutions, with their own 
strengths and weaknesses, in many combinations (Ostrom and Walker 1997: 
36).  This did not happen by accident.  Sassen (2008: 5-6) argues that the 
global, “transboundary spatialities” which are characteristic of the current era of 
globalisation involved “the necessary participation of national states” in 
rescaling elements of their “exclusive authority”.  Complex policy issues 
“increasingly play out in multi-level and multi-scale contexts” (Lieshout et al 
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2010: 163) and where the role and power of the state is altered (Reed and 
Brunyel 2010: 251). This has given rise to new forms of “governance beyond 
the state” (Swyngedouw 2005: 1991).  It is necessary therefore, in an age 
where places have become connected through global networks to remote 
places across continents, and closeness becomes a function of network 
positionality as well as geography (Sheppard 2002: 307) that we engage with 
these diverse interests to understand who has power and how it is used.  
 
1.3 – Aim and research questions 
This thesis aims to take forward the concepts introduced in the previous section 
(and developed in much greater detail later) through an analysis of state 
restructuring in one particular industry in a specific place; the nuclear industry in 
West Cumbria.  The background of the industry and place are also examined 
later.  The aim of this thesis is ‘What is the relationship between a global 
industrial actor (Sellafield) and its regional host – and what insights does this 
relationship offer for understandings of neoliberalism/globalisation?’  Addressing 
the aim in this thesis is undertaken by addressing three subordinate research 
questions, which are: 
 RQ1 - Political: How have local, regional and national governance 
arrangements been modulated through the presence and actions of the 
nuclear industry in West Cumbria? 
 RQ2 - Social: How is the nuclear industry viewed in West Cumbria, and 
how has this changed in line with wider shifts in terms of state-industry 
relations? 
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 RQ3 - Economic: What are the implications for regional competitiveness 
arising from the changing relationship between the state and market for 
the nuclear industry in West Cumbria? 
The following section introduces the subsequent chapters of the thesis which 
take the aim and research questions forward. 
 
1.4 - Summary  
Chapter two explores the key concepts and reviews the literature relating to 
governance, power and rescaling.  It begins by considering changes which have 
occurred, enabled by technological advancement in travel and communication 
technologies, which have altered the way societies and economies are 
governed.  The applied definition of power employed in this thesis is developed 
rooted in the basis of each of the three forms of power; decision making 
authority, economic power and domination.  The chapter then explored 
literature related to several approaches to analysing the scaling of power– 
glocalisation, multi-level governance, scalar politics and post-politics.  These 
approaches are brought together into a theoretical framework which is 
employed throughout the thesis, and brought together in the conclusions in 
chapter eight. 
Chapter three describes the development of the nuclear industry, and describes 
West Cumbria, which gives the context for this thesis.  The UK military and 
civilian nuclear industry has its origins in West Cumbria, where the first reactors 
and reprocessing facilities were constructed in the 1940s to provide the raw 
materials for Britain’s first atomic bomb.  Since then the Sellafield site, as it 
became known in the 1980s, grew to include more power producing reactors, 
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fuel reprocessing and manufacture facilities, prototype reactors, waste 
management facilities and other ancillary services.  As the Sellafield site 
expanded, particularly from the 1980s, other industries in the area declined.  
This has led, particularly for one of the two boroughs in West Cumbria, to the 
Sellafield site dominating the local economy and job market.  This has 
implications, creating a two-tier labour force of very well paid nuclear workers, 
and relatively poorly paid non-nuclear workers.  This particularly excludes 
certain groups, such as women. 
Chapter four outlines the research journey and the research design from 
ontology through to methods employed to gather data.  This thesis had a 
complex journey from initial research design, through data collection to get to 
this point, following an initial submission and resubmission.  This means that the 
research question emerged from the data, but the research design did not.  My 
own position as a researcher, conducting research in an area where I had both 
grown up, lived and was also an elected borough councillor at the time, is 
discussed.  The specific details of each data collection method -survey, focus 
groups, document analysis and interview - are described.   
Chapter five is the first of three data analysis chapters.  In this chapter, changes 
to the governance of the nuclear legacy are analysed.  The legacy consists of 
the ageing facilities which were not privatised in the 1990s and are at or near 
the end of their lives and the current and future wastes arising from their use 
and decommissioning.  The moves from a nationalised but arms-length 
commercial company managing the bulk of the ageing nuclear legacy, to a 
complex system of multilevel governance with public ownership and private 
management, then to direct public control are analysed.  The moves from 
nationalisation, through part-privatisation, and back to nationalisation had a 
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range of implications for how, by whom and for what purpose state authority is 
wielded in the nuclear industry.  This has implications for the workforce and 
community, particularly with regards their term and conditions of employment. 
However, it is not the privatisation but the renationalisation which has the most 
detrimental effect on the rights of workers in the industry. The management of 
wastes and the search for an underground disposal site, which has been 
ongoing under three different policies since the 1980s, is analysed.  The failures 
of policies towards decommissioning and waste management have a similar 
basis in the overreliance on a limited, albeit different, range of tools government 
has at its disposal to achieve its aims.  In both cases power is rescaled as 
government applies different tools to the problems it faces in dealing with the 
nuclear legacy.  This has implications for West Cumbria, as the major site for 
decommissioning and the only site explored for hosting an underground waste 
disposal site in the past 25 years, which are analysed and discussed in this 
chapter. 
Chapter six takes and analyses in greater detail specific changes which resulted 
from the change in governance of the Sellafeild site in West Cumbria.  These 
changes are explored in the context of a complex, contradictory local public 
opinion towards the nuclear industry.  Despite overwhelmingly positive public 
opinion towards the industry in general, a significant minority and in some areas 
a majority of residents expressed a belief that West Cumbria does not see a 
great enough benefit from hosting nuclear sites.  The issue of corporate 
responsibility, or lack thereof, of the Sellafield site is discussed.  Changes made 
following the privatisation of the management of the site highlight the role of 
local elites in the exercise of significant economic power and suggests that they 
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have interests to serve which are contradictory to the interests of their new host 
community. 
Chapter seven analyses local economic development strategies and plans.  
Following on from the issues of responsibility and duty considered in the 
previous chapter, there is no significant attempt made to diversify the local 
economy away from one heavily reliant on the nuclear industry.  The regional 
ambitions of the nuclear industry are constrained by central government in this 
still very centrally controlled and regulated industry.  As government policy 
changes, however, plans are modified.  Domination of the economic 
development arena locally by nuclear interests leads to plans which are 
increasingly focussed on maintaining and expanding the dominance of the 
nuclear industry in the West Cumbrian economy.  Domination is not in this case 
met by resistance, despite a widespread recognition that the area suffers 
problems from its overreliance on this single industry.  There is no real 
opposition to the general trend to place nuclear at the centre of economic 
development plans and perpetuate the current skewed labour market.   
However, despite their local domination, attempts by local networks of pro-
nuclear actors to influence government and bypass economic development 
organisations at higher scales between local and national are met with little 
success.   
Chapter eight summarises the data in the thesis and resolves the three 
research questions.  Limitations of the research, particularly arising from the 
single case study, are discussed and in the context of the findings and 
directions for future research are suggested.  The lessons from this thesis which 
may have relevance to upcoming policy developments are discussed, which 
complement the potential areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW: THE SCALING OF 
POWER 
2.1 - Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the literature relating to governance, power and rescaling.  
It begins by setting out an applied and contextual understanding of power and 
scale before moving to consider what governance is and the implications of 
these changes, enabled by technological advancement in travel and 
communication technologies, which have altered the way societies and 
economies are governed.  The chapter then explores literature related to 
several approaches to analysing the scaling of power: glocalisation, multi-level 
governance, regionalism, scalar politics and post-politics.  Finally, these 
approaches and the wider theoretical and empirical context are brought 
together into a framework for the later analysis of data in this thesis.  The 
summary brings together the key elements relating to the application of these 
approaches to understanding the scaling of power – its location, content and 
outcomes.  This chapter therefore sets out the approaches to understanding 
how the state at various levels, economic and industrial actors, and regions 
interact and affect each other in the context of the changes to the structure of 
modern economies and states. 
 
2.2 – Power and scale 
 
Power is a broad concept, with many different forms, bases and uses (Wrong 
1979).  In this thesis, which explores the consequences of state restructuring in 
a specific industry and region, power is still about more than simply state 
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capabilities which are packaged and transferred between geographical scales in 
discrete units from the national state either upwards or downwards (Allen 2003: 
2).  The political science literature on power explores its many different ‘faces’, 
where there are many different ways in which one actor can influence the 
actions of another, either through direct or through less obvious mechanisms 
(Lukes 1974; 2005).  Such influence relies on four broad forms of power; force, 
manipulation, persuasion and authority (Wrong 1979: ch2-3).  Authority is what 
states have, and it exists where a power holder has the right to command and 
the subject an acknowledged obligation to obey, and the source of the power 
rather than its content determines its legitimacy (Wrong 1979: 49).  Wrong 
(1979: ch3) conceives of five forms of authority: coercive, inducement, 
legitimate, competent and personal.  As explored earlier, the restructuring of the 
state has seen a broadening of the range of actors involved in the governance 
of the state and a complex redistribution of the locus of power within and 
beyond its sovereign territory.  This has led to non-state actors and new scales 
being the locus of legitimate authority.  However, the rescaling of power is not 
something which the state necessarily has directed, but a more complex and 
place-specific set of negotiations, actions and struggles (Allen 2003). 
Power is something which is deeply geographical.  The holding of capabilities or 
resources are not power in and of themselves, but rather these are things which 
may be used as a basis for power (see Wrong 1979).  John Allen argues that 
this use of power is not a ‘thing’ but something which emerges from social 
interaction and consequently “…geography makes a difference to the exercise 
of power” (Allen 2003: 1, emphasis added).  Resources, as one particular 
example, do not follow a linear progression which equates greater resources 
with greater power, as they may be misused or wasted (Allen 2011: 5).  Power 
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is not just about the size of resources or the legitimacy of authority, these things 
are some of the bases of power (Wrong 1979) not power itself.  Power occurs in 
their application between social actors, so what matters is how and where these 
bases are used to persuade, coerce, manipulate, enable, persuade and 
generally get things done (Allen 2003: 6).  Thus, power, authority, capabilities 
still matter, but their exploration needs to take into account their location and 
relations: in short, the context. 
This return to the geography of power requires a focus on scale as a key 
concept in analysing the location and application of power.  Scale, like power, is 
a broad concept.  For this thesis, scale is conceived as a result of action, and 
any particular ‘scalar fix’ is a temporary stabilisation, not representative of any 
inherent quality or rightness of that scale (Brown and Purcell 2005: 607).  The 
remaking of different scalar ‘fixes’ is the result of successful or attempted re-
ordering of the importance of the different dimensions of spatial relations 
(Jessop et al 2008: 397).  Scale is, like networks, territory and place, just one of 
the many different forms of socio-spatial relations which do not exist in isolation 
(Jessop et al 2008: 396).  Thus, scale is not a given – it is constructed, 
contested, made and remade, by actors (individual, corporate, governmental 
etc.) with interests to serve.  These themes in power and scale, as a brief 
introduction, will emerge further through the subsequent sections of this 
chapter. 
2.3 – Globalisation 
 
Globalisation is a contested concept, where many definitions abound.  A 
simplistic characterisation places the definitions on a spectrum from the 
hyperglobalist, arguing that we are headed towards a culturally homogenous 
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borderless world, to the sceptical which contends that globalisation is merely 
increased global trade, at levels which are not novel.  Neither extreme is right, 
but nor are either completely wrong; there are elements of each which 
contribute to a more nuanced understanding of globalisation and its impacts.   
Technological changes have connected distant places, which while not at 
quantitative levels measured by trade which are historically novel (Hirst and 
Thompson 1996; Hirst and Thompson 2002), are at a speed, frequency and 
ease which is certainly different from what came before (Jones 2010: 12).  
Indeed, if the definition of globalisation was simply “growing international 
connectedness” then the latter half of the twentieth century was “not remarkable 
compared with the period 1850 to 1914” (Hirst and Thompson 2002: 247).  As in 
the period following the First World War, it is conceivable that 
interconnectedness could again reverse as a result of “national backlash 
strategies of local withdrawal from the global system” particularly given that 
“economic convergence ... was largely achieved by vast flows of surplus labour” 
which is under pressure to be restricted in the developed world (Hirst and 
Thompson 2002: 248-249).  The implication of Hirst and Thompson’s 
arguments is that while the empirical reality of increased interconnectedness at 
the end compared to the middle of the 20th century cannot be denied, it is not 
historically unknown when measured by volume of trade.  However, sceptical 
accounts fail to recognise the complex and fluid nature of social relations and 
the qualitative difference in current interconnectedness as compared to 
previous eras (Jones 2010: 52).  That is to say there is a difference between 
boats sailing the high seas at the start of the 20th century and high speed 
financial transactions at the start of the 21st.   
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The other end of the spectrum, the hyperglobalist accounts of globalisation 
argue that the nation state is undermined by changes in global politics and the 
technologies which enable movement of capital, people and so on across the 
globe.  The changes seen in the latter half of the twentieth century and in the 
1980s in particular gave rise to transnational cultural symbols; a shift from multi-
national corporations which owed allegiance to their host nation to the modern, 
footloose transnational corporation which rather than having any loyalty to a 
particular state inculcates loyalty to the company among workers, in particular 
global elite managers; and, increased global migration undermining national 
cultures and allegiances (Myoshi 1993: 248-250).  However, while these may 
all, in part, be true, their extent and impact has not proven to be dramatic, with 
the nation state remaining as a locus of identity and a significant authority within 
its borders (Norris and Inglehart 2009: 310). 
Drawing upon the persuasive elements of both these opposing accounts, 
globalisation can be understood as referring “to patterns of growing global 
interconnectedness within all the key domains of social activity” which are 
differential across different domains, and thus to understand globalisation it is 
necessary to understand the pattern in each domain, as “far from being a 
singular condition [globalisation] is best conceived as a differentiated and 
multifaceted process” (Held et al 1999: 27).  This account of global change, 
which sees technology enabled interconnectedness across vast distances, 
implies that networks and territory should not be viewed as mutually exclusive 
categories (Painter 2010: 1093), but that space and place, global and local 
interact in complex, specialised and specific ways.  This interaction creates 
‘zones of interaction’, or the ‘sites of power’ (Held et al 1999: 28), where the 
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different spatialities of the local and global interact and conflict creating novel 
geographies (Sassen 2008: 394).   
Interconnectedness in this regard refers to flows which are relayed across 
networks and akin to a global circulatory system for our economic and social 
life.  Flows refer to the movement of diverse mobilities of “peoples, objects, 
images, information and wastes” and the complex interdependences between 
them, which are to be understood as being horizontally organised into networks 
(Urry 2010: 347-348).  There are two types of mobility; the ‘global fluids’, which 
are unpredictable mobilities such as people, money, risks and so on and ‘global 
networks’  which are specific, organised networks such as production networks 
(Urry 2010: 355).  The “dominant functions and processes in the Information 
Age” are “increasingly organised around networks”, which take the form of 
“interconnected nodes” such as a stock market in a global financial network 
(Castells 2010: 500).  For economic activity the nodes, zones, sites, or however 
one classifies them, manifest themselves as specialised Global Production 
Networks (GPN), which can be characterised as - “processes of ‘placing’ firms 
and ‘firming’ places” (Coe et al 2008: 279).  Indeed, the argument that large 
firms are losing any geographical identity and place is dismissed by Dicken 
(2004: 13) as “a nonsense unsupported by empirical evidence”.  
Embeddedness, in all its physical and non-physical elements, from the site of 
the actual factory to the relationships with local communities, is part of the 
qualitative difference with earlier periods of global trade, which saw ‘shallow 
integration’ revolving around trade at arms-length between independent firms, 
compared with ‘deep integration’ today involving geographically extensive 
global production networks (Dicken 2012: 6-7).   
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A space of flows does not therefore bypass places or render places obsolete, 
but connects places together (Castells 2010: 443).  Within such sub-national 
places these “overlapping and interacting networks define an evolving structure 
which both imposes constraints on and empowers communities, states and 
social forces”, which is stratified, reflecting “existing patterns of inequality and 
hierarchy while also generating new patterns of inclusion and exclusion” (Held 
et al 1999: 28).  Inequality is reinforced and created as power is reinforced and 
redistributed due to the impact of global interconnectedness.   Existing 
inequalities are reinforced as there is a degree of path dependency 
demonstrated in the connection of “sites of power” (Held et al 1999: 28), as 
global interconnectedness is a process which builds upon “the preceding state 
of affairs” rather than causing radical change as the result of new technologies 
and opportunities (Peck and Theodore 2007: 748-749).  
This conception of global change based on the increasing flows of a diverse 
array of mobilities such as information, money, people and so on therefore 
involves the networked rescaling of economic activity as outlined.  This is only 
one aspect of the change.  Sassen (2008: 5-6) argues that the global, 
“transboundary spatialities” which are characteristic of the current era of 
globalisation did not happen by accident, but involved “the necessary 
participation of national states” in rescaling elements of their “exclusive 
authority”.   In the context of governing within the national state boundary this is 
leading to increasingly fragmented sub-national places (Sassen 2008: 265).  In 
this context, while the “discretionary powers of the state” to shape national 
economies have declined, the importance of local conditions increased 
(Swyngedouw 1989: 31). 
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This conception of globalisation’s multiple processes implies a vision of 
economic activity and regulation which sees sub-national regions as strategic 
sites and thus from this flows the rest of the chapter.  The following sections 
explore how these scales are constructed, maintained and changed – 
essentially how power is rescaled, held, employed, challenged and so on, by 
and for whom in the context of the neoliberalisation of the state.  Essentially, the 
question is, to paraphrase Ted Heath, ‘who governs, how and why?’ 
 
2.4 – Governance 
The authority we grant legitimacy, by our agreement to it freely and on the basis 
of our shared values in any given political society, is the basis of how we are 
governed in the modern (post-feudal) era in democratic countries.  However, 
this is a blanket basis for power and does not say anything about how power is 
actually wielded, which is particularly salient in the context of global change 
which has led to, and been led by, changes to the state and economic activity. 
In the current era we see state power exercised by a range of actors.  While it 
would be simple to assume this means a diminution of state power, this ignores 
that the state remains the ultimate source and guarantor of legitimate authority 
within its borders.  Thus, it is helpful to conceive of state power as a wide range 
of specific ‘capabilities’ which can be (temporarily) transferred to and exercised 
by non-state actors, where “it is not the national state as such, in its totality, but 
particular components that are undergoing denationalization” (Sassen 2008: 8).  
The partial denationalisation of the state as specific functions, or capabilities, 
which are transferred to the private sector results in the creation of markets, 
where previously there were none, which are neither fully public nor entirely 
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private (Sassen 2008: 199).  These are “novel mixes” combining public 
functions and market techniques which create “governance challenges” which 
“cannot be analysed adequately in terms of traditional categories” (Sassen 
2008: 198).  The marketization of certain state functions can impact the rights of 
citizens, depending on the function in question (Amin 1994: 99-101).   This 
impact is context specific, as not all services involve rights, and as a 
consequence context specific analysis is particularly important, especially given 
that evidence is growing to suggest that market discipline does not necessarily 
improve public services, such as in the UK context the failed privatisation of the 
railway track (Sassen 2008: 198).  Thus, to consider how power is exercised, it 
is necessary to consider how we are governed in the places that people live and 
work with a focus beyond, and below, the national scale. 
Broadly defined, governance is “the means for authoritatively allocating 
resources and exercising control and co-ordination’’ (Rhodes 1996: 653).  
However, given that in this thesis the context for the exploration of governance 
is the way in which global industrial actors interact with and affect their regional 
hosts across political, social and economic impacts, it is necessary to arrive at a 
more specific understanding of what governance means in that context.  This 
understanding will build upon the earlier exploration of globalisation, which 
covered the changes which have occurred to enable and require a move 
beyond the state in the exercise of authority.  Building on Rhodes’ (1996: 653) 
definition, it is clear that for the acts of “control and co-ordination’’ aimed at 
“`steering' a society or polity” (Lowndes 2001: 1961) which define governance 
state actors are not necessarily the most important, and rather than seeing such 
a stark state/non-state or government/governance divide, the reality is of a 
continuum with a variety of systems of governing where the various actors play 
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a diverse array of roles (Bulkeley 2005: 877).  The involvement of “quasi- and 
non-state actors in a range of public–private partnerships” can be characterised 
as the “shift from government to governance” (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999: 
506).  For its part, the state has moved on from the ‘gardening’ state, concerned 
with the careful planning of the economy and society within its borders, to the 
‘game keeping’ state, more concerned with attempting to regulate the diverse 
mobilities of people, information, goods, money and so on which cross national 
borders with increasing speed and volume (Urry 2010: 353-354). 
In the modern era therefore the state has withdrawn from certain functions, 
transferred others to private and other non-state actors, retained others and 
generally delivers functions in more complex ways which has led to different 
interpretations of the “new geography of governance” such as have variously 
been called ‘glocalisation’, or the ‘hollowing-out’ of the functions of the nation 
state (Bulkeley 2005: 882).  This implies that state restructuring and the 
rescaling of state power has increased the salience of place or territory (Painter 
2010: 1092).  Indeed, the “global cities and high-tech districts” are now “partly 
denationalized strategic territorialisations with considerable regulatory 
autonomy through the ascendance of private governance regimes” (Sassen 
2008: 54-55).  Therefore, rather than seeing state authority as merely 
diminished, the issue of how the state wields authority in the modern era and 
also how autonomous regions seek to exploit the withdrawal of the state from 
certain functions to regulate themselves takes on a particular importance.  This 
is, as explored earlier, context specific and varies from place to place. Thus, to 
understand governance it is necessary to engage with both structure and 
process to include the “rationalities, agencies, institutional relations, and 
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technologies of governing that coalesce around particular objectives and 
entities to be governed” in a particular context (Bulkeley et al 2007: 2733). 
In this context, while authority and legitimacy reside with nation-states, “social 
institutions that consist of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, decision-making 
procedures, and programmes that govern the interactions of actors in specific 
issue areas’’ (Young 2007: 5-6), are formed in a specific issue area to facilitate 
cooperation by providing information and reducing transaction costs.  These 
‘regimes’ can both strengthen the state, by ensuring a role for the inter-state 
system, and bypass the state by allowing actors beyond the state to gain a role 
in regulation of what is considered “sovereign space” (Bulkeley 2005: 878). 
 
2.5 - Glocalisation 
The dominant structure of economic activity in the post-war period up to the 
1970s was, as has been mentioned, the Fordist model of large vertically 
integrated organisations which, for the most part, were contained within nation-
states, thus economic activity and the territorially defined dominant scale of 
regulation were well matched.  This placed limits upon what was possible which 
technological and other changes overcame in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Swyngedouw 1989: 35) such as: 
 Limits to spatial market expansion in a given distribution of income 
 Limits of exploiting spatial variations in wages and labour conditions 
(especially when workforces were heavily unionised and national 
collective bargaining the normal) 
 Limits of time/space distanciation, where ultimately the time/cost savings 
of distance were ameliorated by advances in technology 
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 Limits of geo-politics, in an era of Cold War and two dominant power-
blocs, where expansion was confined ‘the west’ (prior to China, in 
particular, becoming a major economic player). 
The state in this period can characterised by the metaphor of the ‘gardening’ 
state which is concerned with the careful cultivation of many aspects of life 
(economic, social and so on) within its borders, as opposed to the ‘game 
keeping state’ which came both before and after, more concerned with 
attempting to regulate the diverse mobilities which cross its borders (Urry 2010: 
353-354).  The changes which enabled the shift from the very nationally 
organised and regulated Fordist economy, to a state concerned with the diverse 
mobilities of people, information, goods and services and so on are built upon 
modern travel and communication technologies, starting with the telegraph, the 
jet engine through to high-speed internet in the 2000s and beyond.  
Technological changes such as these were the necessary foundation for what  
Manuel Castells (2010: xvii) calls “the network society” where “a number of 
major social, technological, economic, and cultural transformations came 
together” in the latter-half of the 20th century. 
As places become connected through global networks to remote places across 
continents, closeness becomes a function of network positionality as well as 
geography (Sheppard 2002: 307).  While intrinsic characteristics of an area are 
important to becoming a node on such networks, the relative position of places 
on their global networks matters too.  Assuming that the network, flowing 
around the world from place to place, is homogenous space masks the reality 
that certain places are more central to the network than others and thus more 
powerful – such as hub airports in the global network of air traffic, for example.    
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Thus, once established on the network, the “relative location matters much 
more than territorial conditions” (Sheppard 2002: 312-317).  Positionality, like 
power, is a zero-sum game, such that if one place becomes more central to the 
network, other areas become more peripheral by default.  Thus, far from 
eradicating difference, globalisation can reinforce existing patterns of inequality 
and create new ones when the connection of places through networks and the 
position of places on each network “strengthens existing inequalities but sets in 
motion a whole series of new dynamics of inequality” (Sassen 2000: 85).  
The networked rescaling of economic and social activities has been 
accompanied by and requires the territorial rescaling of governance both 
upward to the supra-national and downward to the regional, local and individual. 
Functions which were once exercised by the nation state, particularly economic 
intervention and governance, are de-nationalised through the privatisation of 
state owned industries, and post-nationalised to self-evidently supranational 
bodies such as the European Union (Sassen 2008: 305).  These rescalings 
mean that while the “discretionary powers of the state” (Swyngedouw 1989: 31) 
to shape national economies have declined the importance of local conditions 
has increased.  Local “territorial production systems” emerge which are locally 
specialised, yet “articulated in national, supra-national and global networks” 
(Swyngedouw 2004: 38).  Local places exploit their unique characteristic for 
competitive advantage against competitor locations around the globe.  
However, this does not happen by accident, local characteristics have to be 
built upon.  In the absence of the national state planning the economy 
“economic elites shape local conditions” (Swyngedouw 2004: 38).  This has two 
main elements; firstly, there has been a territorial rescaling of welfare provision, 
collective wage bargaining and economic intervention to more local and 
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individual levels (Swyngedouw 2004: 40-41) which increases the ability to 
differentiate different local places within the same nation-state.  Secondly, there 
is the physical infrastructure required, which may be, for example, city-regions 
seeking to have hub airports, or some places may “even seek to reprocess 
nuclear waste products” (Urry 2010: 193) and thus become better connected 
and more central to particular global networks.  As mentioned earlier, Dicken 
(2007: 21-23) highlights the propensity for firms to form ‘localised geographical 
clusters’ which are ‘generalised’ or ‘specialised’ i.e. cities as an example of 
generalised clusters where the peripheral activities common to many firms and 
their employees can be located, and science parks (a classic UK example from 
the past 20 years) where closely related industries locate as an example of a 
specialised cluster (see West Cumbria and the nuclear industry in the previous 
and later chapters).  These clusters, as geographical networks and a part of the 
wider organisational network, create and rely on dependences such as the 
direct relationships between firms and the less direct benefits, such as the 
ability to meet, or the proximity of unrelated but vital elements for the workforce 
such as cultural entertainment.   
Establishing clusters and making firms embed locally requires action.  The 
devolution of governance of economic intervention to more regional levels has 
over the past twenty-five years seen many initiatives such as Enterprise Zones, 
Regional Development Agencies and now Local Enterprise Partnerships set up 
at regional and local levels to undertake activities to make their areas grow and 
be more competitive.  These partnerships between public and private sector are 
intended to undertake activities to make their local regions more competitive.  In 
a fragmented economy where mobile capital is embedded locally, these 
networks involving public and private elites, or ‘growth coalitions’ (Swyngedouw 
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and Baeten 2001: 833-834) are a key driver of local and regional growth.   
However these ‘glocal elites’ are not local and may not be willing to fully engage 
with local coalition building and network formation with existing local elites 
whose priorities may conflict with their own less local (more corporate, short—
term) ambitions, strategies and goals (Swyngedouw and Baeten 2001: 827).   
This is problematic, when economic success in the competitive, inter-local 
global economy and the recalling of state intervention involves “new global/local 
institutions, in close cooperation with private capital, [which] launch the 
redevelopment largely on the back of public funds” (Swyngedouw 1996: 1503).  
This points out a key difference between the US ideal of a private-sector led 
‘growth coalition’ and the reality in the UK and Europe where such bodies are in 
reality ‘grant coalitions’ seeking to attract state funds (Cochrane et al 1996: 
1331).  
In practice the key rescalings which Swyngedouw (2004: 40-41) argues as 
characterising ‘glocalisation’ are: 
1. Capital/labour relations devolve from national collective bargaining to 
more regional/local forms of negotiation;  
2. Welfare provision becomes less national, more local and individual;  
3. Inter-local cooperation is replaced by inter-local competition as regulation 
is devolved;  
4. Intervention in the economy by the national state decreases and is 
devolved to more regional/local levels; and, 
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5. Rescaling often takes place through authoritarian processes with issues 
around democratic deficit in any new forms of governance (at both the 
local and supra-national level).   
 
2.6 - The politics of scale and ‘scalar politics’ 
Scale is fundamental to how we conceive of social life and its spatiality (Herod 
and Wright 2002: 4).  Scale is one of the principal ways to theorise and explore 
the “spatiality of social relations” which is “mutually constitutive and relationally 
intertwined” with networks, territory and place (Jessop et al 2008: 390).  The 
classification of scale developed by Sayre (2008) recognised this complexity, 
placing scale into three categories; scale as size, as level and as relation.  The 
conception of scale as size and as level are both reasonably self-explanatory, 
something is bigger or smaller than something else or is ordered higher or 
lower.  However, scale as relation does not imply hierarchy or size, but instead 
places the focus on processes “rather than scale per se” which are 
“simultaneously spatial and temporal” (Sayre 2008: 105).  Thus, scale is neither 
pre-given, nor permanent, but rather merely fixed for a time in the wider context 
of spatial and temporal fluidity (Brenner 2001: 600).  In this sense, any 
particular scale is only the “temporarily stabilised effects” of a wide range of 
social and spatial processes (Brenner 2008: 70).  This relational conception of 
scale implies that it is not through analysis of any particular scale itself, but the 
processes of rescaling, which is important (Brenner 2009: 71).   
This conception requires that distinction be carefully made between scale’s two 
moments: the ontological moment, as differently scaled processes; and the 
epistemological moment, how scale is discussed and classified which result in 
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those processes being scale din a particular way (Sayre 2008: 105).   Any given 
scale is not “ontologically given”, having no inherent qualities of its own, but 
rather scale is made and sustained by social action, by social actors, with 
specific interests (Smith 1992: 73).  Thus the outcomes of processes of 
rescaling cannot be said to reflect the qualities of that scale, but reflect the 
political strategies of the actors involved in making that fix (Brown and Purcell 
2005: 609). 
The politics of scale is “highly contested, involving numerous negotiations and 
struggles between different actors as they attempt to reshape the spatiality of 
power and authority” (Leitner 2004: 238-239).  This process? involves the 
strategic deployment of scale to enhance the influence of certain actors and 
interests in fights and struggles (or other expressions of differing priorities) 
which are in competition (Penning-Rowsell and Johnson 2015: 131-132) for 
control over economic, cultural and political space (Leitner et al 2002: 297).  
Although the language of fights and struggles implies open conflict, this is not 
necessarily the case and the scalar interests of actors may not be explicit and 
only one part of a wider array of imperatives and drivers for change (Penning-
Rowsell and Johnson 2015: 139).   
However, just because something is organised at one or a set of particular 
scales, it does not necessarily follow that there are ‘scale effects’ (i.e. a self-
contained, localised politics of scale) and caution must be exercised in 
considering the politics of scale that other geographical concepts such as place, 
spatiality and so on which can cover the creation of space, might not be better 
suited to explaining a particular outcome, and this depends on the relationships, 
embeddedness and relations of positionality any given scale has with other 
smaller and larger scales (Brenner 2001: 600).  The politics of scale is 
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therefore, as for scale itself, a relational concept where the key is not the scale 
but the differential scaling of processes and institutions and the interplay 
between them rather than events at one particular scale (MacKinnon 2011: 22).  
Indeed, MacKinnon contends that “the politics of scale are not fundamentally ‘of’ 
(about) scale” per se but about political projects which have scalar implications 
where scale is deployed strategically by various actors, movements and 
organisations, which he clarifies in terminology as ‘scalar politics’ (MacKinnon 
2011: 32). 
MacKinnon’s (2011) clarification is not a mere point of pedantry, but rather it is a 
theorisation of the politics of scale which orients theorisation towards the politics 
and away from the scale. This is important, given the relational nature of scale 
and the lack of any particular pre-given ontological qualities as explored earlier.  
There are four key dimensions to the concept of scalar politics (MacKinnon 
2011: 29-30): 
1. The politics of scale is not fundamentally about scale, but about political 
projects which have scalar implications. Political projects are about 
controlling and influencing areas of policy and social activity, where scale 
may be an important dimension depending on its empirical significance. 
2. Scalar politics, rather than taking scalar classifications as a given, 
instead focuses on how scale is deployed strategically by those actors 
and organisations involved in political projects and initiatives. Attention 
focuses on how particular scalar classifications are naturalised and 
normalised, and challenged, by political action. 
3. The focus of attention is upon the interaction (or conflict) between 
existing scalar structures, constructed by past social action, and 
emergent social processes and activities. 
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4. Existing scalar constructions are therefore made and re-made at the 
point of interaction between existing and emergent projects and scales. 
The implication is that political projects and movements only have scalar 
implications as they deploy, or conflict with, inherited scalar constructions. 
Scalar politics clarifies the role of scale in political projects by cautioning against 
taking scale as either entirely pre-given or always emergent, and instead 
recognising it as something which is made and re-made where existing 
structures interact with emergent projects which strategically deploy their own 
conceptualisation of the construction of scale for their own ends.  As MacKinnon 
(2011: 29) cautions, it is necessary to “avoid imposing scale as a conceptual 
given upon particular research problems, letting it emerge as a dimension of 
contentious politics according to its empirical significance”. 
Employing this approach in practice involves exploring the ways in which actors 
invoke particular scales strategically, to what end and how this is achieved 
through relational networks and coalition building.  As a result, scalar politics is 
“an integral part of strategies of empowerment and disempowerment” 
(Bickerstaff and Ageyman 2009: 797) central to glocalisation and territorial 
rescalings of power.  In short, theorising and exploring how scale is deployed, 
by whom and what implications this has for existing scalar structures is the 
purpose of approaching political projects in this way to enrich our understanding 
of how empowerment and disempowerment are realised in practice.  
Specifically for this thesis, hazardous land uses such as nuclear sites are 
inherently scalar as the costs and benefits have an uneven spatiality where, for 
example, “locally experienced sources of pollution are inevitably rooted in 
political–economic relations and processes distributed across far-reaching 
spatial networks” (Bickerstaff and Ageyman 2009: 784). 
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2.7 - Multi-level governance 
 
Originating out of attempts to understand the operation of European Structural 
Funds (Faludi 2012: 200) multi-level governance focussed on the “multi-level 
polity” (Marks 1992: 233) and could more accurately be called “multi-level 
government” due to a focus on constituted forms of government at a range of 
scales from sub- to supra-national (Jordan 2001: 201).  The reform of Structural 
Funds in the European Community, and the direct linkages between the 
European Commission and sub-national authorities challenged the view of the 
European Community as an intergovernmental “club of member states” (Faludi 
2012: 201).  The approach has since broadened to include state and non-state 
actors and the complex networks by which governance is achieved (Marks et al 
1996: 346). 
While multi-level governance can be interpreted as simply the “shifting [of] 
competencies between local, national and supranational governmental 
institutions”, it is also open to a more complex interpretation taking into account 
the “entire range of institutions and actions which provide order (including 
public-private partnerships, non-state actors and so on)”  (Kern and Bulkeley 
2009: 311). This interpretation recognises that authority has not simply been 
rescaled through a nested hierarchy of governmental scales but has rather 
been dispersed more widely “among a variety of private and public actors” 
(Kern and Bulkeley 2009: 311). The governance landscape is thus “fragmented 
or ‘splintered’” (Coaffee and Healey 2003: 1981) and governance may be taken 
to mean “governing mechanisms which do not rest on a recourse to the 
authority and sanctions of government” (Wilson 2003: 318) but include 
government among a wider array of actors.   
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The location of power involves financial constraints, distant shareholder 
interests, complex incentives resulting in a “criss-crossing mix of distanced and 
proximate actions” which has “blurred” the boundary between the state and 
market (Allen 2004: 29) and fundamentally “between different arenas of politics” 
(Kern and Bulkeley 2009: 311).  In this context, while “far from being a form of 
placeless power”, authority has a complex spatiality where rather than power 
being “exchanged more or less in tact between scales” (MacLeod and Jones 
2007: 1197) government has become “centralised yet dispersed” (Allen 2004: 
27).  This nuanced exploration of the rescaling of power recognises that while 
the state may have changed, its authority is not necessarily diminished and 
indeed the power and control of some scales may be strengthened 
(Swyngedouw 1997: 142).  The enduring strength of the state within this 
complex transfer of powers and responsibilities lies in the way authority is 
transferred between scales as a “capability” (MacLeod and Jones 2007: 1187) 
which both has the state in the background as its ultimate guarantor and the 
potential to be recalled and exercised by the state itself. 
This does not preclude the importance of territory in multilevel governance: 
 It would be wrong to assume that existing territory dictates governance.  
Territoriality is “a spatial strategy to affect, influence or control resources 
and people, by controlling area” (Slack 1986: 1).  So, as far as physical 
geography may dictate the territoriality of governance, it is also the case 
that boundaries are the “outcome of efforts to achieve particular ends 
with concrete implications for how things are organised and how people 
think about the world around them” (Murphy 2008: 91).  Therefore while 
administrative boundaries are important, they are also permeable, so 
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while people or companies may have a physical address which locates 
them within a certain scale, they also participate or establish networks 
which cut across these administrative boundaries (Faludi 2012: 205). 
 The conception of multilevel governance as a nested hierarchy of distinct 
territorial scales while simplistic is borne out by empirical investigation of 
local services where the impact of regulation emanating from each scale 
on service delivery was ranked in the order expected (Entwistle et al 
2014: 321).  Additionally, in terms of the interaction between levels in 
Europe, the state retains an “extended gatekeeper role” preventing local 
government from affecting the European level by “scale jumping” and 
bypassing the national state (Entwhistle et al 2014: 322).  This begins to 
introduce the importance of distinguishing between different types of 
multilevel governance. 
While governance involves a range of actors at a range of scales operating with 
differing spatial extents, it is still the case that “every citizen is located in a 
Russian doll set of nested jurisdictions where there is one and only one relevant 
jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale (Hooghe and Marks 2010: 17-18).  
These distinct jurisdictions, with specific competencies reserved for each scale 
are Type I multi-level governance.  Recognising that this is not always the case, 
Type II multi-level governance is characterised by jurisdictions which are 
“flexible and task specific” with memberships which “criss-cross judicial 
boundaries” such as issues of river basin management, highways management 
and hospital administration (Faludi 2012: 203).   It has been argued that under 
this wider conception of what constitutes multi-level governance “boundaries 
between different arenas of politics have been blurred to the point of 
insignificance” with policy actors not being confined to any single level, with 
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phenomena such as “venue shopping” (Kern and Bulkeley 2009: 311-312) 
under conditions of territorial competition and hyper-mobile capital.  However, 
while boundaries themselves are less relevant as a barrier, the territories they 
define are still important, particularly as Armitage (2008: 8) argues that any 
consideration of governance in a multi-level world must “incorporate […] 
underlying social processes and values” particularly when for those at a local 
level the “historical-cultural experience” is important (Armitage 2008: 24). 
As a result of viewing governance as a multi-levelled phenomenon, we can see 
that it includes not only the provision but also the “catalysts for governance 
[which] may come from a formal policy or law, or emerge as a result of wider 
social/political pressures” (Armitage 2008: 11).  In practice this is seen in the UK 
where, for example, local authorities and government agencies may have both 
statutory duties they must undertake and discretionary ones they may choose to 
undertake, resulting in a mixture of “specific competencies and local discretion” 
(Bulkeley and Kern 2006: 2239) to respond to issues and needs at a local level.  
Service delivery in this context is less about direct provision and more focussed 
on commissioning services from an array of providers from different sectors 
(Leach and Percy-Smith 2001: 29). 
Consequently, in the modern era, authority is “polycentric” with independent 
centres of decision making (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961: 831).  For Type 
II governance which is of very specific interest to this thesis later, decision 
making authority and implementation is shared among an array of actors, 
including government, such that the binary divide between public and private, 
between the public interest and the market, no longer exists but rather 
governance embraces a range of actors and institutions, with their own 
strengths and weaknesses, in many combinations (Ostrom and Walker 1997: 
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36).  Type II governance is therefore about being specific to a task rather than 
having multiple competencies within a certain territory.  Each Type of 
governance is not mutually exclusive, but good at different things, where Type II 
in particular can be specific to a policy problem and flexible enough to be 
brought into existence and modified as required (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 28).  
As a consequence, “industries” emerge: 
 [E]ach citizen . . . is served not by ‘the’ government, but by a variety of 
different public service industries. . . . We can then think of the public 
sector as being composed of many public service industries including the 
police industry, the fire protection industry, the welfare industry, the 
health services industry, the transportation industry, and so on” (Ostrom 
and Ostrom 1999: 88-89) 
One of the major drivers of Type II governance is changes to the way in which 
government exercises its authority through privatization, outsourcing, 
administrative decentralization and other diversification of modes of governing 
(Marks and Hooghe 2004: 25).  However, the assertion that this necessarily 
diminishes the role of government (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 25) is contested.  
Baker (2015: 250-251) argues that “the notion that government has become a 
diminished entity … whose powers have been constrained or transferred” is 
overly simplistic and that government retains a “peculiar position” as “the actor 
of last resort who determines the rules of the game whilst guaranteeing the 
integrity of the network”.  A weakness of MLG is its poor account of “the practice 
of governance” which reveals the unique role government can still play (Baker 
2015: 250).  Rather than being simply diminished by a shift to governance, 
government still possesses a range of ‘tools’ by which it can achieve its aims 
from its unique position. 
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The ‘tool of government’ approach (Hood 1986; Hood and Margetts 2007) 
proposes a framework of four ‘tools’ by which government achieves change: 
nodality, authority, treasure and organisation (NATO). Nodality involves 
information and the ability of government to persuade.  Authority is the ability of 
government to arrange, instruct and enforce structures and rules.  Treasure 
based tools, or “chequebook-government” (Hood 1983: 40) involve government 
incentivising actions.  Finally, organisation tools relate to the ability of 
government to provide directly through, amongst other elements of state 
organisation, its “stock of people” (Hood 1983: 6).  So, even for diverse type II 
governance arrangements decisions are able to be countermanded by the state 
at its ‘higher level’ of authority, as well as being able to be contested by 
stakeholders at lower levels (Baker 2015: 250). 
In practice, an example which is later very similar and applicable to nuclear 
decommissioning in the UK is the system for private involvement in the railway: 
… public ownership of the rail system in Britain has been replaced by 
private provision organized on a contractual basis with central 
government. This is Type II governance, not market competition. Central 
government remains accountable for the quality of service, but private 
firms contract with the government to provide it and, for the duration of 
the contract, they exercise considerable autonomous authority in doing 
so. (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 25) 
There is of course market competition for the contracts, but it is not a wholly 
market led process.  Capabilities (i.e. government authority) are transferred to 
private agents, within certain confines but with considerable freedom. 
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2.8 - Regionalism 
‘Old’ regionalism was a top-down approach to sub-national economic and social 
life which mobilised the regional scale as part of the wider Keynesian approach 
to correcting uneven regional development in an overwhelmingly national 
economy (MacLeod and Jones 2007: 1180; Amin 1999).  The changes which 
have since occurred in advanced economies, such as deindustrialisation and 
the mobility of capital, make regions compete on a global stage for economic 
activity and growth.  Consequently, regionalism is concerned with (MacLeod 
and Jones 2007: 1178): 
 The economic success of some regions (and thus conversely the 
comparative lack of success of other regions and scales) 
 The mobilisation of sub-national regions as political territories in a multi-
scaled governance environment 
 Identity driven (re-)emergence of some regions (e.g. Scottish devolution 
and nationalism) 
Regions may therefore emerge, broadly speaking, for two reasons (MacLeod 
and Jones 2007: 1181): 
1. Politico-administrative action, which seeks to restructure existing political 
and administrative landscape to address challenges such as the difficulty 
of state intervention in economic activity at the national scale, or 
pressure from regional movements.  Examples include the rise of 
devolved administrations and of imposition of Regional Development 
Agencies by central government. 
2. Economic developments, where regional convergence of firms into 
clusters is driven by the benefits of doing so such as sharing the costs of 
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infrastructure and ‘untraded interdependences’ which can’t be traded but 
are essential to business and are rooted in relational networks between 
firms (Amin 1999: 369).  Examples include the emergence of regions 
such as Silicon Valley in the USA. 
While interest in regions as sites for economic intervention can be a further 
development of advantage seeking capitalism (i.e. aiding clustering) it could 
also be interpreted as the failure of the state to evenly manage economic 
development and a way of normalising unequal growth (Brenner 2003: 306).   
The contribution regionalism brings is in seeing the regional scale not as a 
given, but as an emergent category; something which has to be made and is as 
such an “inherently political act” which forces us to consider “whose region is 
actually being constructed” (Söderbaum 2003: 7).  In the context of a political 
environment in which the state is not the only actor, there may be competing 
regionalisms emerging from a complex milieu of competing actors (Söderbaum 
2003: 8).  In regions which are “institutionally thin” in particular, governance has 
been dominated by “elite coalitions” which rather than seeking to unlock new 
routes to development, build on reinforcing existing dominant interests and 
eschew “new institutional practices” which might widen participation in local 
decision making and regional development (Amin 1999: 373).  Thus as a 
discourse and practice regionalism may be “instrumentally attractive to powerful 
interests” (Lovering 1999: 392). 
The regionalism approach helps explore how the rescaling of economic activity 
and governance is enacted in practice, by whom and to what end in a multilevel 
world.  One of the realities of regionalism, particularly in the UK, is the 
remaining role of central government.  Localism in the UK is an “uneasy 
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relationship between centralised powers, conditional decentralisation and 
fragmented localism” where central government constrains the freedoms of 
local areas to “undertake innovative actions” (Bentley and Pugalis 2013: 257).  
Therefore in practice localism involves negotiation with the central state in many 
cases to be allowed to undertake actions deemed locally necessary. 
 
2.9 – Post-politics (and nuclear planning) 
The “democratic character of the political sphere is increasingly eroded” 
(Swyngedouw 2005: 1993) by the replacement of ‘dissensus’ with ‘consensus’ 
driven politics based upon the dominant, neo-liberal accumulation strategy 
(Swyngedouw 2010: 38).  Rather than beginning with disagreement on 
ideology, problems or issues, politics is reduced to settling the detail of solutions 
to commonly agreed challenges and thus becomes managerial and technocratic 
(Žižek 1999: 236).    This is achieved through appeal to “comfort terms” which 
mean “everything and nothing” (Gunder and Hillier 2009: 1 in Johnstone 2014: 
702).  Sustainable development is a key example of such a term where 
scientific evidence and expertise is employed to take the issue beyond dispute 
with the result being a politics confined to solutions rather than challenging their 
underlying or overarching basis, such that for sustainable development the 
solutions are aimed at finding ways to continue the conspicuous consumption of 
neo-liberal capitalism rather than questioning whether that is in fact the cause of 
the problem which apparently needs to be addressed (Swyngedouw 2007: 27).   
Achieving the post-political condition requires action to prevent debate.  In land 
use planning this has been achieved through rescaling the opportunities for 
debate through the abolition of planning enquiries and their replacement with 
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consultation at national and local levels (Johnstone 2014).  In the case of 
nuclear power and other projects designated as ‘Major Infrastructure Projects’ 
under the provisions of the Planning Act (2008), the practical outcome of the 
separation of consultation on the need for such infrastructure and the 
implications of their construction to national and local scales respectively is to 
prevent issues ‘scale jumping’ (MacKinnon 2011: 24).  Under the old system of 
planning inquiries national and local issues could coalesce and combine to form 
‘subversive coalitions’ and shift the scalar politics of the issue, whereas now 
national and local campaigns and issues never meet and are strictly limited by 
the terms and timings of the consultation (Johnstone 2014: 704).   
In West Cumbria, debate around new nuclear power stations at three sites did 
lead to the rejection of two of them, but in opposing those two sites at public 
meetings the majority of those speaking in opposition still supported nuclear 
power in the area, albeit at only one site adjacent to Sellafield (Haraldsen et al 
2011).  This argument on the specifics of what to site and where does not 
demonstrate the return of politics to the issue.  It is exemplary of the 
‘displacement of politics’ which leads to the post-political condition, where 
questioning of the overarching issue new nuclear was framed as addressing 
was long since passed in previous consultations at the national level and the 
only option left was for the return of politics “via other channels of engagement” 
such as legal challenge and direct action (Johnstone 2014: 698). 
 
2.10 – Theoretical framework 
The thesis explores the political, social and economic implications of state 
restructuring, using the nuclear industry in West Cumbria as the case-study.  
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The key concepts, introduced earlier, are power and scale.  The exploration of 
power demonstrated that it is much more than just state capabilities or 
resources, it is a result of how those bases of power are applied in specific 
settings.  The recognition of the importance of geography to any consideration 
of power reveals the importance of the issue of scale, particularly in the wider 
context of the restructuring of the state, which has moved from the gardening, 
paternalistic, interventionist nation state, to one in which policy aims are 
achieved by less direct provision.  The consequence of this has been that to 
understand how power is used in an applied way, we need to do that in full 
understanding of the wider conception of governance which involves a much 
broader range of actors from public, private and social sectors and a range of 
policy tools operating at a much more diverse set of scales.  The relationship 
between state, industry and region, and how each affects the other in the 
control over space and the impact that has is therefore what this thesis is 
seeking to analyse.   
Following on from that exploration of scale and power, and the several 
approaches to exploring elements of the scaling and rescaling of power covered 
in this chapter, it is necessary to bring these all together in one framework for 
the thesis.  The theories and approaches each shed light on different aspects of 
the scaling and rescaling of power in contemporary society.  The core of the 
issue is that the state has been restructured, and continues to restructure, but 
that rather than this being either placeless or accidental, it occurs in a multitude 
of different ways in a multitude of different places as a consequence of the 
actions of various actors with a range of interests.  This requires the application 
of a range of approaches to specific instances of restructuring, as in this thesis 
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to the issue of state restructuring in the nuclear industry and the effects on West 
Cumbria. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Theoretical framework 
As Brenner (2001; 2008; 2009) argues and as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
to understand the scaling of power requires an investigation of the 
transformation from one scaling to another, to reveal the competing interests 
which underlie the temporary fixes which constitute any particular scalar 
arrangement.  The transformation of state structures as part of the wider shift to 
a neoliberal economic order as the dominant accumulation strategy (Jessop 
1997: 61-62; Swyngedouw 2010: 38) did not happen by accident nor was it 
placeless, but required actions (Sassen 2008) in specific places (Allen 2003).  
This transformation leads to many ‘public service industries’ and new structures 
specific to certain policy functions, employing a range of different ‘tools of 
government’ to attempt to meet policy objectives (Hood 1983; Hood 1986; Hood 
and Margetts 2007). 
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The rescaling of the elements of the state is both demanded by, and enables, 
the networked rescaling of economic activity.  This is itself, as explored earlier, 
enabled by technology which has overcome to an extent the barrier of 
geographical distance to economic activity and therefore opened up sub-
national places to a wider array of industrial interests than previously the case.  
Capital can go ‘venue shopping’ for the most favourable local conditions and 
therefore the highest returns on investment across most of the globe 
(Swyngedouw 2004: 40-41).  In the context of state withdrawal from detailed 
economic planning sub-national regions have to compete for economic activity, 
based on exploiting their unique assets and characteristics (Swyngedouw 1989; 
1996; 2004).  The other side of this freedom, or burden, is that areas are also 
subject to a wider array of actors from distant places with diverse personal and 
corporate interests to serve, perhaps in positions of control over significant 
resources.  These are the ‘glocal elites’ (Swyngedouw and Baeten 2001: 827; 
Swyngedouw 2004: 38).                        
The restructuring of the state which has led to a proliferation of scales of 
regulation and of the actors involved in governing has introduced a much 
greater range of interests, geographical, industrial, and personal, into the 
process and practice of governance.  The increased salience of sub-national 
places, which are charged increasingly with securing their own economic 
prosperity in the absence of the national state planning the economic activity 
within its borders, has also increased the range of opportunities for these 
interests to shape the lives of people and communities.  However, in any given 
economic order, there are those who will benefit and those who will lose out.  
The ability to imagine and shape local economic conditions and establish new 
regulatory structures at favourable scales – in short undertake the ‘visioneering’ 
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(Paul 2005) of the future of regions – requires consent, or the lack of successful 
dissent. 
The visions which drive economic intervention and new structures of regulation 
are built around hegemonic projects, deeply rooted in local conditions, within 
constraints of a multi-level polity, which are negotiated and contested.  These 
‘hegemonic projects’ are the vehicle around which support can be galvanised 
for a certain set of actions and a future direction “that asserts a contingent 
general interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly advance 
the long-term interests of the hegemonic class (fraction) and thereby privileges 
particular economic-corporate interests compatible with this program while 
derogating the pursuit of other interests that are inconsistent with the project” 
(Jessop 1997: 62).  Paul (2005) argues that social support for the hegemonic 
project, which is inherently unequal, requires the stressing of shared cultural 
and ideological beliefs.   The pursuit of already dominant economic and political 
interests leads to “the systematic exclusion or further disempowerment of 
politically and/or economically already weaker social groups” (Swyngedouw 
1996: 1499).  In an effort to overcome the opposition from such groups, issues 
are ideally rendered ‘post-political’, and taken out of contestation all together 
through endless consultation, the privileging of expert opinion and other barriers 
to entry into debate (Johnstone 2010; Swyngedouw 2014). 
However, while the local conditions of economic development and governance 
have been granted more salience by the withdrawal of the state from these 
areas of planning, that is not to say the state has completely diminished in its 
ability or power to act in sub-national places or policy areas.  The freedom to 
‘visioneer’ is not total, particularly in the UK.  Freedoms are granted by 
government, which does not do so for all policy areas, as experience of 
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‘localism’ in the UK has demonstrated (Baker 2015: 250-251).  Thus, power 
remains something to be imposed, withdrawn, negotiated and contested from 
above and below by various groups; it is varied by its geography (Allen 2003).   
The state, industrial actors and regions thus all interact with each other at a 
variety of levels to each seek to advance their particular interests and maintain 
or gain control over space.  This has economic, political and social implications 
at a range of scales.   
 
2.11 - Conclusion 
This chapter has developed practical approaches to understanding an applied 
interpretation of power in its various forms, bases and uses; particularly 
legitimate authority, economic power and domination.  In understanding the 
application of power, there are three separate issues of location, content 
(enactment, for whom by whom) and outcomes when considering power and its 
use.  They are related issues, such that the location of power is intrinsically 
linked with the aims and both influence the outcomes, for example.  The various 
approaches to theorising and exploring power in this chapter offer perspectives 
on these three issues.  In all cases what is being explored is the attempt at 
exercising control over space and the outcomes that may have for the wider 
public.  With regards to the location of power, multi-level governance, 
regionalism, glocalisation and scalar politics share a focus on spatiality, 
although the dimension, structuring principles and resultant patterning of social 
relations differ (Jessop et al 2008: 393).  It is in this difference that they can 
become complementary approaches for the exploration of the complex issue of 
the rescaling of power in west Cumbria and the role of the nuclear industry.  
Location is, though, only one aspect of power.  Identifying how power is 
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rescaled is important, but it is enriched by, and can require, understanding the 
interests of actors involved (Cox 2013: 55).  This means not just understanding 
what the holder of power would aim to achieve in its exercise, but also 
understanding the conditions which need to be maintained or created for the 
successful exercise of power for those holding or seeking it.  
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CHAPTER 3 –THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY AND WEST CUMBRIA 
3.1 – Introduction 
This chapter provides context for this thesis in three key areas.  Firstly, the 
development of the nuclear industry in the UK will be explored, from the atomic 
weapons programme in the 1940s to the withdrawal of the state in the 1990s.  
Secondly, and more specifically, the twin development of West Cumbria as both 
central to, and dominated by, the UK nuclear industry is examined.  Thirdly, the 
chapter explores the effects of this domination on the general social, political 
and economic context of west Cumbria.   
  
3.2 – The history and context of the nuclear industry 
3.2.1 – The development of the military and civil nuclear industry 
This section explores the development of the nuclear industry in the UK, 
including the wider international drivers.  The section describes the origins of 
the nuclear industry, the major expansions and changes since the 1940s, and 
highlights the long shadow which the original military impetus for the 
development of the industry has cast over its behaviours and actions for many 
years. 
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Phase 1 
 
Phase 2 Phase 3 
 Development of 
atomic weapons  
 Innovative use of this 
technology to 
generate electricity  
 Strategic national 
interests shaping a 
new industry and 
major UK research 
organisation  
 Development of a 
nationalised 
electricity supply 
industry (ESI)  
 Development of an 
organisation to 
manage the nuclear 
fuel cycle, British 
Nuclear Fuels 
(BNFL)  
 
 New government 
policies see the 
privatisation of 
nationalised 
industries and 
marketisation of the 
public sector  
 ESI broken up and 
sold off where 
possible  
 PWR and AGRs 
allocated to a new 
company, British 
Energy subsequently 
sold off  
 Policy leaves 
residual nuclear 
organisations in the 
public sector  
 Nuclear incidents 
and the increasing 
costs of UK nuclear 
industry effectively 
mean further 
investment is 
unlikely.  
 
 A different approach 
becomes evident to 
the management of 
the publicly owned 
elements of the 
nuclear industry.  
 The approach is 
based on the 
concept of 
partnership with the 
private sector  
 A new NDPB inherits 
the Legacy assets 
and liabilities, the 
Nuclear 
Decommissioning 
Authority (NDA).  
 
Table 3.1 - Summary of the Legacy’s three phases and key events 
(Pemberton 2014: 6) 
 
The origins of the global nuclear industry lie in the military imperative for atomic 
weapons.  In the UK, work began on an atomic bomb in 1941, before being 
subsumed into the much larger allied joint venture, the Manhattan project (MoD 
2005: 1).  Following the Second World War, which saw the deployment of two 
atomic weapons against the Japanese population, the American government 
published the Atomic Energy Act 1946 which significantly reorganised the US 
atomic industry including, amid fears for the proliferation of atomic weapons, 
provisions preventing the sharing of atomic intelligence, even with close allies 
such as the British (MoD 2005: 1).  As a result, the British government had to 
develop its own weapons programme and technologies from scratch.  This 
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required a range of facilities, technologies and materials, the most important of 
which was the production of the fissile material, plutonium.   
The development of the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent required three 
principal sites, for research, production and assembly.  The research was based 
at Harwell in Oxfordshire, the production of plutonium was based in Cumbria at 
Windscale and the assembly of weapons was at Aldermaston in Berkshire (see 
map 3.1).  The development was led by the Ministry of Supply, which 
established the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) in 1950.  
The structure changed in 1954, with responsibility for the development of 
nuclear technologies moving from the Ministry of Supply to the United Kingdom 
Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA).  The UKAEA was “semi-autonomous” and in 
contrast to the structure in the United States, which separated civilian and 
military elements of the atomic industry, the UKAEA was charged with the 
delivery of both military and civil nuclear projects (Hance 2006: 125).  The 
weapons programme placed a high demand upon the technology available.   
While the UK’s original Windscale pile reactors were probably capable of 
providing enough plutonium for about “a hundred bombs by 1957”, pressure 
was placed by the Chiefs of Staff for double that (Durie and Edwards 1982: 18). 
It was clear that a new technology was required.  The replacements for the 
initial pile reactors were another British design.  The first of the new MAGNOX 
reactors were constructed approximately one-mile south of the initial Windscale 
piles at Calder Hall, and were opened by Her Majesty the Queen in 1956.  
These were the first reactors in the world to supply commercial electricity.  
However, particularly for the initial two sites at Calder Hall and Chapelcross, the 
design of the MAGNOX reactor was specifically intended to be “of interest to 
those intending weapons manufacture” (Gallacher 1983: 227).  The fleet of 
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MAGNOX reactors spread eventually to include eleven stations at sites across 
England, Scotland and Wales.  The later stations were more productive.  The 
last MAGNOX station constructed at Wylfa, on Anglesey in North Wales, has 10 
times the electrical output of those at Chapelcross, opened 15 years earlier.  
However, despite an outward appearance of civilian application in the 
commercial production of electricity, the legacy of a military origin cast its 
shadow over the operation and behaviour of the industry going forward, where 
operations were considered secret until formally declassified (Cravens 2008: 
xiii).   
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Map 3.1 – Map of UK nuclear sites 
The second generation of reactors in the UK, the Advanced Gas Cooled 
Reactor (AGR), followed the MAGNOX fleet and ultimately resulted /in seven 
twin reactor sites at six locations around England and Scotland (EDF 2016).  
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The development of this fleet was different from the MAGNOX fleet in many 
ways.  The AGR itself from a technical standpoint was another gas-cooled 
reactor, in contrast to the American use of pressurised water reactors.  In this 
second round of power reactor development the choice of reactor was between 
the AGR and the PWR, where the developer of the AGR design was also the 
reviewer of the designs for government, the UKAEA.  This slight conflict of 
interest led the government to favour the AGR, a decision which was “the 
greatest misallocation of public funds in British industrial history” as not one of 
the reactors ever lived up to the anticipated performance (Durie and Edwards 
1982: 28).   
Despite the difficulties in expanding the power generating fleet, expand it did, 
which had further implications for operations relating to the nuclear fuel-cycle.  
In 1967 the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology 
recommended a separate fuel cycle organisation to service the growing 
domestic and international demand for nuclear fuels.  The Atomic Energy Act 
1971 vested a new organisation, British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), with the fuel 
services elements of the UKAEA.  BNFL took on the entire nuclear fuel cycle 
services, becoming the sole customer for fuel and reprocessing for the entire 
UK nuclear fleet.  The power stations themselves were operated by the 
nationalised Central Electricity Generating Board (until the 1990s) with the 
exception of Calder Hall (in Cumbria) and Chapelcross (in Dumfries and 
Galloway), just over the Scottish border, which were the two original dual-
purpose MAGNOX reactor sites involved with the production of plutonium and 
tritium for the nuclear weapons programme.  BNFL took on uranium enrichment 
at Capenhurst in Cheshire, nuclear fuel manufacturing at Springfields near 
Preston in Lancashire and the Magnox fuel reprocessing and waste 
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management facilities at Windscale in west Cumbria.  The civil nuclear industry 
in the UK from 1971 comprised four large nationalised companies: the UKAEA 
conducting research, BNFL handling fuel manufacture and reprocessing, the 
CEGB owning and operating English and Welsh power stations and the SSEB 
(Scottish and Southern Electricity Board) doing the same for Scotland.  This 
remained the stable arrangement for nearly twenty years.  However, there was 
by no means a lack of developments, or planned developments, in the industry 
during that time. 
Although the composition of the industry became stable after the establishment 
of BNFL, this was manifestly not the case for the wider political situation, 
particularly with regards to energy.  The 1970s saw trades’ union militancy at 
home, particularly from the coal miners, and political pressure from oil exporting 
countries of the Middle East.  In the 1970s the uranium supply was, wrongly, 
thought to be scarce (Word Nuclear Association 2017).  These events 
combined to make greater domestic energy security in the UK more attractive, 
and the nuclear industry provided some options.  
These wider events, coupled with an accident in the B204 facility at Windscale, 
made BNFL (Blowers et al 1991: 56), made BNFL draw up plans for a new 
facility to reprocess oxide fuels from the second generation reactors in the UK 
and overseas.  BNFL submitted plans to that effect in 1977 which were granted 
permission in 1978 (Wynne 1982 [2011]).  Construction of the Thermal Oxide 
Reprocessing Plant (THORP) was begun in 1984 and fuel from British and 
foreign reactors was reprocessed from 1994 onwards (Sellafield Ltd 2016a: 10-
11).  BNFL built the economic case for the plant upon international contracts, 
however by the time the plant was operational in 1994 the case had altered 
radically, such that “one of Britain’s largest industrial facilities was being turned 
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on to provide plutonium which was no longer needed or wanted [and] whose … 
operation would be funded through surcharges and taxes on electricity 
consumers and publics in the UK and especially in Japan and Germany” 
(Walker 1999: 113-114). 
At the same time as the expansion of reprocessing in the UK, there were plans 
for the expansion of power generation in the UK.  In 1981 the Government 
published a White Paper, “Nuclear Power: The Government’s response to the 
Select Committee for Energy’s review of nuclear power”, which called for an 
additional 15GW of nuclear generating capacity.  Ultimately, however, only one 
reactor was built, Sizewell B.  This reactor, however, was unique in the UK not 
only for being the first, and so far only, Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) in the 
UK, but for the public inquiry which examined the proposal.  This right of public 
participation was not something which had been granted to previous 
expansions of nuclear power in the UK, and it became one of the longest public 
inquiries in British history, from 11th January 1983 to 7th March 1985, with a total 
of 340 working days (Blowers and Pepper 1987: 85).  As will be seen later, this 
was not the last time that public opinion would play a role in shaping the actions 
of an industry which still felt the effects of its military and secretive origins. 
This point, starting in the 1980s, is where the transition from the first to second 
phase occurs.  At the same time as the industry was reaching the last of its 
major expansions in the mid-1980s with the construction on THORP and the 
last new reactor in the UK at Sizewell B, the nuclear generation capacity was 
subject to an attempted privatisation.  In 1988 the White Paper ‘Privatising 
Electricity’ was published.  The Electricity Bill in November of the same year laid 
out the legal basis for privatisation of the electricity industry.  After the 1988 
White Paper had proposed that the nuclear fleet – owned by Nuclear Electric 
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Ltd and Scottish Nuclear Ltd – be privatised, concerns for the cost of 
decommissioning, waste management and the generally favourable cost of 
coal, oil and gas generation by comparison at the time prevented this taking 
place.  Government overcame this problem in the 1990s, by privatising the 
more modern AGR and PWR reactors as British Energy and the first generation 
fleet remained state owned as Magnox Electric, later transferred to BNFL (HoC 
Research Paper 14/61 2014: 10). 
The nuclear industry, and BNFL in particular in the UK, were at their largest size 
in the 1990s which was also the nadir of potential future developments for the 
wider industry, particularly for the prospects for new power generation across 
the globe (Nuttall 2004: 2). This is the transition from the second to the third 
‘phase’ which Pemberton refers to (Pemberton 2014: 6) where what could be 
privatised had been and the state was managing the rest.  In the early 2000s a 
significant shift in policy towards the remaining state nuclear assets occurred, to 
bring their management more closely in line with the privatisation of other state 
industries, and their operation moved to being contracted out with an end to 
direct state provision where possible (Nuttall 2004: 3).   
The move towards private sector management and accounting in the early 
2000s for the nuclear industry reflected a well-known approach to public service 
reform following the mass privatisations of state owned companies in the 1980s 
by the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and then continuing 
under the governments of John Major.  However, as described, the nuclear 
industry did not have a straightforward path to the private sector.  After the 
privatisation of the AGR and PWR reactors, the remaining legacy, mostly BNFL, 
joined this ‘third phase’ in the 2000s.  Changes to the management of the state 
owned elements of the nuclear legacy, aimed at bringing in the private sector 
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and involving major structural change to the governance of the publicly owned 
industry, began in 2002 with the government publishing a White Paper, ‘Dealing 
with the Nuclear Legacy’’ (DTI 2002).  This led to the establishment of a new 
non-departmental public body (NDPB), the Liabilities Management Authority 
(LMA) that became the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) following the 
Energy Act 2004.  This body owns the assets, sets the strategy for their 
operation, and has responsibility for contracting out the management of the 
sites.   The key relationships for the various bodies in this governance structure 
are outlined below, using the example of Low Level Waste Repository site in 
Cumbria, which was the first site to be contracted out: 
  
Figure 3.1 – Example of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority/Parent 
Body Organisation/Site Licence Company relationship (for the national 
Low Level Waste Repository). 
The original timeline for contracting out of the management of the state owned 
nuclear liabilities was to begin with the smallest site, the Low Level Waste 
Repository (LLRW) and end with the largest and most complex, Sellafield (NDA 
2006).  A change in strategy by BNFL forced this plan to be modified, with 
Sellafield becoming the second site tendered by the NDA (NDA 2007: 32).  
Ultimately, all the sites were grouped into a smaller number of separate 
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companies, initially comprising the research sites (Harwell and Winfrith), the 
Magnox sites across the UK and Scotland, Dounreay, Sellafield and LLWR.  On 
the 1st April 2015, Research Sites Restoration Limited and Magnox Limited 
merged to form one company after Cavendish Fluor Partnership became the 
new Parent Body Organisation for both companies in 2014. 
Thus, in 2015, there were four main Site Licence Companies and Parent Body 
Organisations: 
 Sellafield Ltd, owned by Nucelar Management Partners, a consortium of 
URS, Amec and Arriva. 
 Dounreay Site Restoration Ltd, owned by the Cavendish Dounreay 
Partnership, a consortium of Cavendish Nuclear, a subsidiary of 
Babcock International, CH2M and AECOM. 
 Magnox Ltd, owned by the Cavendish Fluor Partnership, a joint venture 
between Cavendish Nuclear, a subsidiary of Babcock International, and 
the Fluor Inc. 
 Low Level Waste Repository Ltd, owned by UK Nuclear Waste 
Management, a consortium of AECOM, Studsvik UK and Areva. 
The failure of the tender process for Magnox Ltd in 2017 has led to the NDA 
considering a replacement contracting structure and direct costs in settlements 
to the failed bidders from 2012 of approximately £12.5 million (WNN 2017).  
This may result in a direct ownership of the site, as has happened for Sellafield 
after that contract failed.  The implications of the failure of the Parent Body 
Organisation model are analysed in detail in chapter 5 in relation to Sellafield 
Ltd for the Nuclear Management Partners contract and subsequent direct 
ownership by the NDA. 
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As old sites were engrossed in decommissioning, and over thirty years since 
the last decision was taken to build a new nuclear reactor in the UK, in 2008 the 
government signalled its support for a new generation of nuclear reactors (DTi 
2008).  This new policy was very different in some ways, but also remained 
similar in others, to what had come before.  Under the current policy, the capital 
costs of construction of any new plant are the responsibility of the developer.  
However, recognising that the capital costs are high, the government subsidises 
the electricity produced, by guaranteeing a minimum price for a certain number 
of years.  The minimum price, called the ‘strike price’, becomes the ‘contract for 
difference’ when taken with the duration of the contract and other specifics 
(DECC 2015).  Under this arrangement, the government agrees to guarantee a 
minimum price for the electricity produced, and pays the supplier the difference 
when the wholesale price falls below that level, and conversely when the 
wholesale price is higher than the strike price, the government receives the 
difference.  Thus, in one way the current policy is a very different approach from 
the past, as in this case government is not directly financing the capital costs of 
construction.  On the other hand, the state is still guaranteeing the whole 
scheme out of ongoing revenue budgets for the 30 years following the plant 
becoming operational.  The movement of the burden on the state from one-off 
capital construction to long-term revenue support is a significant change, but it 
reflects the fact that the state remains in a unique position with considerable 
authority and involvement in the energy market.  This is in line with the broader 
shift in the role of the state, from one of direct provision of services to that of a 
guarantor and commissioner, explored in the previous chapter and applied in 
relation to the specific west Cumbrian context later in chapter 5.  
 
61 
3.2.2 – The Achilles heel: Radioactive Waste  
The nuclear industry creates wastes, like most if not all industrial activity.  Much 
of this waste is again, like for any activity, essentially municipal waste requiring 
no treatment different to household wastes.  However, the industry also 
produces wastes that require special treatment and are to varying degrees 
hazardous for varying lengths of time.  Radioactive waste is particularly 
important to the nuclear industry, as it has been for a long time the unresolved 
element that could impede development of new reactors and other facilities.  In 
the mid-1970s, a Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution looking at the 
topic of new nuclear power stated: 
“…it would be irresponsible and morally wrong to commit future 
generations to the consequences of fission power on a massive scale 
unless it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that at least 
one method exists for the safe isolation of these wastes for the indefinite 
future.” (RECP 1976: 81) 
Following this report in 1976, AGR reactors continued to open and new reactors 
have been planned at various points since.  As a result of the increasing 
pressure to deal with the growing volume of waste, combined with these 
repeated governmental initiatives to expand the nuclear industry, there have 
been a number of attempts to find that method for disposing of radioactive 
waste in the very long term. This applies to some forms of radioactive wastes 
more than it does to others.  For some types of waste, the least radioactive, 
disposal methods and sites do exist but for others there is no accepted method 
of long-term disposal.  Very broadly, there are three classifications for 
radioactive waste (Hore-Lacy 2006: 78-79): 
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 Low level wastes come from a variety of sources, including hospitals, 
universities and wider industry, including nuclear, and require little 
special attention forming only 1% of the total radioactivity but 90% of the 
volume of all radioactive wastes 
 Intermediate level wastes are primarily from the nuclear industry and do 
require special shielding such as concrete to protect people and the 
environment. These usually arise either as by-products of operation, or 
during decommissioning, for example as contaminated used 
components. They make up make up approximately 7% of the volume 
and 4% of the radioactivity of all wastes. 
 High level, or higher activity, radioactive wastes are those that generate 
heat, such as used fuel or reprocessing by-products, and while only 
accounting for 3% of the volume, these make up 95% of the radioactivity 
of all radioactive wastes. 
The choice of whether or not to reprocess fuel has a direct impact on the waste 
problem.  While used fuel elements are high level wastes, for oxide fuels they 
can be stored for long periods, whereas the liquid high-level waste from 
reprocessing wastes has to be further treated through processes like vitrification 
into glass blocks and then cooled for many years (Hore-Lacy 2006 79-81).  This 
requires further plants and processes that generate further volumes of 
intermediate and low level wastes when they operate and are decommissioned. 
Given the UK has since 1976 built more reactors, more reprocessing plants, 
and new fuel manufacturing facilities, it has continued to generate more and 
more waste.  Consequently, there have been repeated attempts to find a site to 
bury intermediate level wastes in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and both 
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intermediate and high level wastes in the 2000s and 2010s.  It is not necessary 
to explore every attempt to find a site, but instead simply contrast the key 
elements of the most recent policies with approaches taken in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
The approach taken from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s by an organisation 
called NIREX (the Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive) was to 
initially cast a net across the UK to find the most suitable site on technical and 
geological criteria, but ended up seeking permission to construct an 
underground Rock Characterisation Facility in Cumbria very close to Sellafield.  
This strategy adopted by NIREX was later reviewed by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA 2007), which found many shortcomings: they judged that 
it 
 Was not transparent 
 Was not developed in consultation with all interested and affected parties 
 Did not have clear decision points 
 Did not explain how decisions had been taken 
 Did not provide opportunities for interested and affected parties to 
provide inputs. 
The approach was very reminiscent of the general approach taken by the 
industry to siting of facilities from its early development and military origins, 
where, as explored earlier, information was considered secret unless very 
specifically designated otherwise.  The lack of openness and transparency were 
fatal for NIREX, which never succeeded in finding a site for intermediate level 
wastes. 
64 
In 2001, the government began a four-stage process to develop a new policy for 
the long-term management of the ‘higher-activity’ intermediate and high-level 
radioactive wastes.  From 2001-2002, stage one looked to define the scope of 
the problem and how stakeholders wanted to be engaged.  Stage two, from  
2002 to 2006, saw government establish  the  independent ‘Committee on   
Radioactive Waste Management’ (CoRWM) which  considered all potential  
long-term waste management options and screened them with public 
involvement, eventually settling on deep geological disposal.  During stage  
three, from 2006 to 2007,  the  UK  Government  consulted  on  the framework  
for  implementing geological disposal  in the UK, at which point the Scottish 
government withdrew and stated a preference for near site, near surface 
disposal instead of one central, deep disposal site.  Finally, government 
consulted on that framework and published the ‘Managing Radioactive Waste 
Safely’ White Paper in 2008.  It is clear here that there is a significant shift 
towards greater public consultation than was ever the case in the history of the 
industry.  However, this is a complex issue and is analysed in detail in chapter 
5. 
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3.3 - West Cumbria 
3.3.1 – The home of the UK nuclear industry 
The research underpinning the first UK atomic weapon may have come from 
Harwell, but West Cumbria was and remains the home of the nuclear industry.  
In the 70 years that the UK has had an atomic industry almost all developments 
have involved or impacted West Cumbria.  The nuclear industry has come to 
dominate West Cumbria, particularly economically but also socially and 
culturally (Wynne et al 2007).  This section will describe the specific nuclear 
developments in West Cumbria, before moving on to the a wider examination of 
the characteristics of the area, to demonstrate how West Cumbria relies on the 
nuclear industry, and how the nuclear industry in turn relies on West Cumbria.  
The atomic weapons programme required plutonium, and it is for this purpose 
that West Cumbria became involved in the atomic weapons programme.  This 
was one of the three key activities, alongside research and weapons 
manufacture.  The first activity was built at Windscale in West Cumbria and the 
other two at Harwell in Oxfordshire and Aldermaston in Berkshire respectively.  
Windscale, which had been a Royal Ordinance Factory during the war, became 
the site for the UKs first atomic reactors, Pile 1 and Pile 2, and associated 
reprocessing facilities.  These reactors produced the plutonium for the first 
British atomic weapon, which was detonated on 3rd October 1952 in Australia.  
In the following years, demand for fissile material increased as the United 
States and the Soviet Union advanced their atomic weapons programmes into 
the thermonuclear age.  This demand in the UK was to lead, on 10 October 
1957, to the Pile 1 reactor catching fire and becoming the only significant 
nuclear accident in the UK, and the most significant nuclear accident in the 
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world until the Three Mile Island partial meltdown in the United States in 1979 
(Sellafield Ltd 2013).   
At the time of the Windscale accident, the first four MAGNOX reactors were 
being constructed nearby at Calder Hall.  These were the first atomic power 
stations to supply commercial electricity in the world, but this was only one-half 
of their dual purpose, which was to provide plutonium and tritium (much more 
efficiently than the Windscale piles) to meet the military demand for weapons in 
the context of a Cold War arms race.  Once again, West Cumbria became the 
home of the manufacturing elements of the nuclear industry, but in addition the 
region was playing a role in the geo-politics of the mid-20th century.  
Up to this point the nuclear industry remained, despite providing electricity from 
Calder Hall, a very military affair.  Pile reactors, reprocessing facilities and even 
these new dual-purpose reactors were all serving an atomic weapons 
programme.  While the Magnox fleet expanded for commercial production of 
electricity elsewhere in the country, it was not until the 1960s that this 
commercially focussed industry came to Windscale.  The prototype for the 
second-generation reactors, built at Windscale in West Cumbria, provided 
electricity from 1963 until 1981, but on a much smaller scale than the reactors in 
the later fleet (Collingridge 1984: 58). 
The expansion of the commercial Magnox fleet created a problem.  As a result 
of the intended purpose of the prototype, to provide plutonium for the atomic 
weapons programme via reprocessing, the fuel they use is clad in a magnesium 
oxide alloy (hence the name) which was never designed to be stored, and 
corrodes when left in contact with water.  Additional reprocessing facilities were 
needed to deal with the increased demand and B205 was constructed in West 
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Cumbria in 1964 as the world’s first commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plant 
(Sellafield Ltd 2004).   
Following the construction of the AGR prototype and the B205 facility, the 
Windscale site settled into a steady operation during the 1960s and 1970s.  
However, just as the expansion of the Magnox fleet created a problem for the 
reprocessing of their fuels, so too did the expansion of the oxide-fuelled AGR 
reactor fleet as detailed in the earlier section.  The eventual construction of the 
THORP plant at Windscale in the 1980s was a massive civil engineering 
project, especially striking in its impact in the context of an isolated area 
experiencing a decline in traditional industries.   
It was at this point, in the 1980s, that the site changed its name.  The site 
became Sellafield in 1981.  This was the first of a number of changes in the 
1980s in the way the site presented itself to, and dealt with, the community 
around it.  The need to do so was reinforced by two major incidents in 1983.  
One was the allegation, made in a Yorkshire Television Documentary 
‘Windscale – The Nuclear Laundry’ broadcast on 1st November 1983, that there 
was a link between the Sellafield site and clusters of childhood leukaemia in the 
local population as a result of radioactive discharges to the air.  The second 
incident was the closure of local beaches from St Bees in the north to Eskmeals 
in the south (approximately 10 miles) for nine months as a result of an 
accidental discharge of radioactive effluent into the Irish Sea (CORE 2013).  
Notices were posted and the public advised not to swim in the sea or handle 
materials which had been washed up (HC Deb 22 December 1983, c343-4W).  
The incidents led to the Government replacing the Chairman of BNFL with 
Christopher Harding, who transformed the site’s approach to the public with the 
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opening of a visitor’s centre and a general tendency to openness which 
contrasted with the prior history of the industry. 
As has been demonstrated in the previous section, the 1990s were a high point 
of nuclear activity, particularly at Sellafield with reprocessing and fuel 
manufacture expanding.  It was also, as mentioned earlier, at this time that the 
future prospects for the nuclear industry both nationally and globally were at 
their lowest. 
The last major capital expansion of the UK nuclear industry took place in 
Cumbria.  The first MOX facility in the UK was a small demonstration plant at 
Sellafield which produced fuel from 1994 to 1999, until it was revealed workers 
had falsified measurement records for fuel pellets and orders were cancelled 
(ONR 2016b).  A full scale commercial facility at Sellafield, which BNFL 
completed in 1997, operated until orders ceased as a result of the Fukushima 
tsunami in Japan, upon which the Japanese government closed their reactor 
fleet.  However, the Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) only produced less than 14 
tonnes in a decade compared to the 120 tonnes per year predicted by BNFL, at 
a cost of £1.4 billion compared to an estimated £280 million in 1993 (Brady 
2013).  The further implication of this, aside from the cost to the taxpayer and 
the further expansion of Sellafield, is that the MOX option was in part justified as 
a way of dealing with the world’s largest civil stockpile of plutonium (at 
Sellafield) which was a recognised international proliferation risk (Walker 1999: 
113), and still has no settled option for its future use or disposal (NDA 2014: 3).  
The two major expansions in Cumbria in the 1980s and 1990s, THORP and 
MOX, were as we have seen, justified partly on their relationship to the status of 
spent fuel.  The UK government saw spent fuel as an asset for re-use.  
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However, as shown earlier this never went as planned.  The result is that the 
industry’s problem with radioactive waste is a problem which is physically 
located in West Cumbria. 72.2% of radioactive waste is the result of spent fuel 
reprocessing, all of which has been generated and is stored in West Cumbria 
(NDA 2013: 8).  While by volume the majority of waste is not particularly 
radioactive, and that gets disposed of at the national Low Level Wat Repository 
in West Cumbria, the high level radioactive wastes which account for only 
0.02% by volume account for 95% of the radioactivity of all wastes, and all of 
this is at Sellafield (NDA 2013: 11).  Overall, the majority of the radioactive 
waste by radioactivity is therefore in west Cumbria, along with a significant 
proportion of the intermediate level wastes which have been generated or will 
be as decommissioning of old facilities continues, and the national repository for 
low level wastes is in the area.  West Cumbria is, depending on your 
perspective, a centre of excellence in the handling of radioactive wastes or the 
UK’s radioactive waste dump, something which will be returned to in chapter 
seven in relation to the most recent processes for attempting to find a site for 
underground disposal. 
This section has sought to outline the expansion of the nuclear industry over the 
course of sixty years.  In specific relation to West Cumbria, it has narrated the 
developments whereby Sellafield came to employ so many people in West 
Cumbria.  This section has also attempted to underscore the extent to which 
West Cumbria has been central to the military and civil nuclear industry since its 
very inception in the UK.  Finally, it has given the necessary context of the scale 
and complexity of the nuclear industry in the area, which is important to frame 
the analysis in later chapters.   
70 
3.3.2 – Geography and demography 
 
 
Map 3.2 – Location and physical and administrative geography of West 
Cumbria  
West Cumbria is not itself an official administrative area, such as a town, 
borough or county, rather it is the geographical area covered by the Allerdale 
and Copeland Borough Councils on the Western side of Cumbria in the north-
west of England.  These two boroughs share a number of common 
characteristics in their physical and economic geographies, history and culture.  
The area is isolated, made remote by its physical geography which is bounded 
by the coast to the west and the Lake District fells to the east.  These two 
characteristics make challenging terrain for transport links.   As a result the 
major towns in West Cumbria are approximately an hour by car or train from a 
motorway or mainline railway.  The nearest large cities, such as Newcastle in 
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the north east of England or Manchester in the north west are at least two to 
three hours travel, on a good day.  
The two local authorities, Allerdale and Copeland Borough Councils, whose 
areas make up West Cumbria are relatively recent creations.  They were 
formed by the reorganisation of English local government in 1974, covering the 
majority of what was previously the county of Cumberland (which included the 
city of Carlisle and the Eden District Council area).  The area covered by the 
two authorities is of 1,500km2 and is home to 157,500 people, with 96,400 in 
Allerdale and 69,100 in Copeland1.  This gives a population density of 87 
people per square kilometre, compared with 371 for the whole of England and 
Wales (see Table 3.1). 
As the data in table 3.1 shows West Cumbria is a sparsely populated and rural 
area.  It is also isolated as is shown in Map 3.2 which illustrates the location of 
West Cumbria in relation to the rest of the UK and its physical geography, 
clearly showing that West Cumbria is one of the most isolated parts of England 
from both London and the regional centres of population such as Manchester or 
Liverpool.  The population is, despite being in a very rural area, concentrated in 
several towns.  Table 3.2 shows the populations for each of the ‘Key Service 
Centres’, which are the larger urban areas (i.e. towns) in the two boroughs. The 
urban population can be seen to be 63,374 in Allerdale against a total 
population of 96,400 and in Copeland the urban population is 48,301 against a 
total population of 69,100.  Thus in both cases roughly 2/3 of the population live 
in towns.  In Copeland over half of that is accounted for by Whitehaven, the 
                                                          
1 Demographic and geographical information is obtained from the Cumbria Atlas, an online interactive 
data tool from the Cumbria Intelligence Observatory, a part of Cumbria County Council, available at 
http://www.cumbriaobservatory.org.uk/Atlas/CumbriaAtlas.asp  
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principal town of the borough.  Indeed, a significant minority of the population, 
over 63,000 people out of 167,000 live in just three towns – Workington, 
Whitehaven and Maryport.  West Cumbria therefore, while clearly a sparsely 
populated and isolated rural area, has significant urban populations.   
The age structure of West Cumbria shows a sharp decrease between the 2001 
and 2011 census in the proportion of the population accounted for by the 0-15 
age group, down 7.6% in Allerdale and 12.3% in Copeland, compared to a 
slight increase nationally of +0.9%.  The working age population grew in all 
cases, but the West Cumbrian increase of a little over 2% is small compared to 
the national increase of 9.1%.  As a result the retired account for an increasing 
proportion of the population, growing over 6% more than nationally in West 
Cumbria over the 10 years.  In short, the population of west Cumbria is 
becoming older at a faster rate than the rest of England and Wales. The decline 
in the proportion of the population accounted for by young people may be a 
result of low levels of immigration into West Cumbria, as immigration accounts 
for a proportion of the increase in young and working age people nationally 
(Bastland 2009).  On all measures, the proportion of persons from outside the 
UK is lower for both Allerdale and Copeland than for the rest of England and 
Wales.  Given their proximity to Scotland, it is not surprising that there are a 
higher proportion of Scottish people in Cumbria than in the rest of England and 
Wales.  Crucially, the figure for immigration from outside the EU stands at 9% 
for the rest of the country, compared with less than 2% for Allerdale (1.4%) and 
Copeland (1.7%).  West Cumbria is a particularly mono-cultural area, with a 
vast majority of the population being White British. 
This isolated area, with previously shared governance (former Cumberland 
County Council until 1974), a generally similar economic history of extractive 
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and heavy industry, followed by its decline, and the vast majority of the people 
of the same ethnic background, may be treated as having a common identity.  A 
survey conducted in 1995 by Newcastle University revealed that as a focus for 
identity, West Cumbria clearly exists and resonates with the population.  In 
terms of belonging, West Cumbria is on par with home town and Cumbria, and 
running second for being most proud to belong to.   
 To which of these 
geographical groups do 
you feel you belong? % 
Which one do you feel 
closest to? % 
Home Town 40 37 
Allerdale or 
Copeland 
20 7 
West Cumbria 39 22 
Cumbria 39 19 
England 24 6 
Great Britain 24 4 
Table 3.2 – Closeness to geographical groups (Hague and Wylie 1996) 
Later evidence from the survey and focus groups conducted as part of this 
thesis reinforce these findings, and secondary evidence suggests that there is a 
distinct and strong West Cumbrian identity.  Reaction to the proposed 
reorganisation of parliamentary boundaries in 2010 reinforced the trends 
evident in the data above.  Currently, the parliamentary boundaries are almost 
coterminous with the borough council areas (see map 3.1).  Proposals to extend 
Copeland east and include Windermere were met with near universal opposition 
during public hearings and through written representations to the commission.  
Alternative proposals were drawn up which saw a single West Cumbria seat 
proposed.  The commission, in revising the proposals, stated that the physical 
barrier of the mountains which their original proposed Copeland and 
Windermere constituency included would serve to divide the constituency and 
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that the proposals for a West Cumbria constituency enjoyed cross-party political 
support to “unite the industrial communities across the coast” (Boundary 
Commission for England 2012: 75) and that a West Cumbria seat would strike a 
suitable balance between geography and local ties.  Challenges and 
disagreements over decisions made at various levels of local government in 
Cumbria have raised arguments for a reorganisation of the structure of councils 
in Cumbria.  Councillors from across political divides in West Cumbria have 
advocated, as with the parliamentary boundaries covered above, a single West 
Cumbrian council (Whitehaven News 2014). 
The physical characteristics of the area in particular have had, and continue to 
have, effects for the economic activities in the area and social issues related to 
the structure of the local economy.  In the 1800s, extractive industries and those 
using the ports, such as fishing and shipping, were dominant.  During the 
twentieth century related secondary industries grew such as chemical works, 
steel works, and others which used the products extracted from the earth.  From 
mining under the land to fishing the sea, and using these products, these are all 
a result of the physical geography.  In the second half of the 20th century its 
isolation, distance from major centres of population, and sparse local population 
(table 3.3) led to the area being selected to host the first generation of British 
atomic reactors at Windscale, adjacent to the village of Seascale.  Over the 
course of the next sixty years the nuclear industry expanded, with the world’s 
first commercial power producing atomic reactors, spent fuel reprocessing, fuel 
manufacture, research and waste management.  While the nuclear site 
expanded other industries declined, with almost all the mining and heavy 
industry closing between the 1980s and early 2000s.  This fall and rise has led 
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Sellafield and the wider nuclear industry to have a dominant position in the 
labour market (Bickerstaff 2012: 2616). 
  Allerdale Copeland 
West 
Cumbria 
England 
& Wales 
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Population 96,422 70,603 167,025   
Urban population  
(in key service centres) 63,374 48,301 111,675  
% Urban (in key service 
centres) 65.7 69.9 68.7  
Population density  
(people per km2) 77.6 96.4 87 371 
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0 to 15 3.1 1.9 2.5 7.8 
16 to 64 -7.6 -12.3 -10.0 0.9 
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% England 94.0 94.1 94.0 80.0 
% rest of UK 3.3 3.0 3.2 6.6 
% EU 1.3 1.2 1.3 4.3 
% rest of world 1.4 1.7 1.6 9.0 
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) Full-time 64.5 72.8 69.1 68.8 
Part-time 34.6 27.2 30.9 31.2 
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) All full-time workers £465.20 £653.70 £559.45 £508.00 
Male £523.50 £736.30 £629.90 £548.80 
Female £381.70 £588.40 £485.05 £449.60 
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) Professional 28.0 41.5 34.8 43.7 
Skilled 31.5 25.7 28.6 21.7 
Service 21.4 13.2 17.3 17.3 
Elementary 19.1 19.6 19.4 17.3 
N
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Proportion of Sellafield 
Ltd workforce in the 
area (%) 21.5 58.4 79.9  
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Total claimants  
(all benefits) 13.2% 14.7% 14.0% 12.7% 
Employment Support 
Allowance and 
incapacity benefits 6.6% 7.6% 7.1% 6.3% 
Key out-of-work benefits 
 10.0% 11.2% 10.6% 10.0% 
Table 3.3 – Key population and economic data for West Cumbria 
Sources – Population, Pay, Benefits Age and Place of birth obtained using the Cumbria Atlas interactive on-line data 
tool from Cumbria Intelligence Observatory from Cumbria County Council with age and place of birth being 
information from the 2011 census.  Jobs data from the Office for National Statistics annual business inquiry 
employee analysis (ONS 2014); Nuclear data from Sellafield Ltd (Sellafield 2011);  
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Table 3.3 details the effect that the dominance of one industry has on the local 
labour market and economy.  The data for full-time pay in Copeland, where 
nearly 60% of the Sellafield workforce reside, show a? higher than average 
proportion of full-time jobs, and average gross weekly pay for full-time workers 
substantially higher than for the rest of the country.  In contrast, Allerdale, where 
only 20% of the Sellafield workforce lives, shows pay below  the national 
average.  The industry breakdown, showing a greater proportion employed in 
the higher occupation class groups (Groups 1-3, which are managerial and 
professional) in Copeland, demonstrates the effect that Sellafield has on the 
local economy.  It has created a highly paid workforce in an area of otherwise 
below average pay, with a greater than average proportion of those being full 
time, professional jobs.  However, despite the clearly privileged opportunities 
afforded by the Sellafield site and the nuclear industry for West Cumbria and 
Copeland in particular, the data for benefit claimants shows that it is not 
opportunity for all.  In Copeland, an area where average full-time pay for men is 
nearly £200 per week higher than the national average, an additional 2% of the 
working age population are claiming state benefits, an increase of 15.7% over 
the national rate.  The increase in benefits is accounted for by the higher 
proportion of the working age population in particular in Copeland who claim 
out-of-work benefits, such as employment support allowance.  There are two 
groups in West Cumbria, and most starkly in Copeland where the majority of the 
very highly paid Sellafield workers reside, those who can and do work at 
Sellafield and in the nuclear industry and who are paid very well, and those 
excluded for various reasons from accessing jobs in the nuclear industry.  
Despite the polarised local job market, the social issues that this exacerbates, 
and the environmental incidents (detailed earlier), public opinion towards the 
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nuclear industry in West Cumbria is very positive as the data in table 3.1 
demonstrates.  In the mid-1990s national public opinion was at its lowest level 
of support, in part as a result of the Three Mile Island partial meltdown in 1979 
in the United State and the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 in the Ukraine.  
However, despite national opinion being very unfavourable, in West Cumbria 
public support for the nuclear industry remained high.   This is perhaps in part 
due to the centrality of the industry to the local economy, also the decades of 
association and familiarity and the lack of any apparently realistic alternative for 
the area.  A local economy which is dominated by one employer is inevitably 
going to have insiders who benefit and outsiders who are disadvantaged in a 
way that a diverse job market would be less prone to.  As will be explored later 
in chapter seven, in the contemporary global economy, there are risks that 
attempts to ‘go global’ and compete based on the unique characterises of an 
area can serve to reinforce existing power inequalities.  The opposition for the 
industry locally is more complex than simply not biting the hand that feeds West 
Cumbria, and support is strong despite the obvious side-effects, and this is 
explored in greater detail in chapter seven. 
Table 3.4 – Public support for the nuclear industry at national and local 
levels 
 
 
Favourable 
% 
Neither or don’t 
know % 
Unfavourable 
% 
West Cumbria (2012)* 60 10 30 
National (2010) 34 23 41 
National (1997) 23 18 58 
West Cumbria (1996) 60 19 18 
1996; 1997 (Wylie 2011) 
2010 (Ipsos MORI 2010) 
2012 (Ipsos MORI 2012) 
*Support for the continuing the process to find a site for the most hazardous radioactive wastes in the area 
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3.4 – Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated the ways in which the West Cumbria area is 
unique in comparison to the rest of the country, through demographic, economic 
and other data.  The chapter has also explored the development, growth and 
change in the nuclear industry as it has applied to the region.  It has shown the 
isolation of West Cumbria and its specific and unique demography and 
economy.  I have also highlighted briefly the complexity, scope and scale of 
nuclear activities, both in the present and past, which have come to dominate in 
the area, particularly Copeland, in terms of the economy.  I have further 
demonstrated how the combination of the physical social geography of the area, 
with the dominance of the nuclear industry, has created a polarised social 
outcome of significant wealth and poverty in the same region.  These are all 
issues which are analysed in detail later in the thesis.  Their exploration above 
was necessary to provide some of the key background to the development of 
the research question, which is further elaborated in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 – RESEARCH STORY AND DESIGN 
4.1 – Introduction 
This chapter describes how this research developed, initially from a personal 
standpoint, and then moves on to consider the foundations for this research in 
terms of ontology and epistemology, and the relationship these all have with the 
methods employed and data gathered.  This is a particularly complex journey 
for this thesis, combining a very personal, embedded research story with a 
slightly convoluted path from data collection, through an examination and 
resubmission, to this thesis.  The chapter starts with the personal story of the 
researcher and the research, before turning to the aim of the research which 
flowed from this, then considering the foundations of the data in terms of the 
underpinning philosophy of research, before turning to consideration of how 
these influence, and are influenced by, types of data.  The chapter ends by 
describing the details of the data collection. 
 
 
4.2 - My story of the research 
This research has had a long and slightly convoluted path to this thesis.  I will 
explore that journey in this section.  The primary driver for the research was my 
own position in the case-study area. 
I was born, grew up, was educated, lived and worked in Whitehaven, the 
principal town of the Copeland Borough in West Cumbria.  I worked here during 
and after my undergraduate degree, and still do, although no longer living in the 
area, having moved to Cumbria’s only city, Carlisle.  I was elected to Copeland 
Borough Council in 2011 to represent the Hillcrest ward.  This is the area in 
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which I was born, raised, and educated, and the majority of my family still live.  
This was a position I held until 2015, when I stood as a candidate for the 
Copeland parliamentary constituency at the general election.   
My time as a borough councillor in particular is very important to this research.  
During my four years as a borough councillor1, the local authority and wider 
region faced a number of issues.  There were, during those four years, three 
major nuclear issues which were described earlier and are analysed later, and 
these were debated locally: the contract to manage the Sellafield site, the 
process to find a site for an underground waste disposal facility for higher 
activity radioactive wastes, and the potential siting of three new nuclear reactors 
and their associated infrastructure and development.  Controversially among 
members of the authority at the time in 2013 the Sellafield site management 
contract was re-let to the international consortia which had held it since 2008.  
The contract was then subsequently terminated in 2015 before the end of this 
five year extension.  Secondly, in 2013 Copeland Council (and Allerdale 
Council) voted to continue with the search for a local site for higher activity 
radioactive wastes, while Cumbria County Council vetoed the process, forcing 
government to change its policy, and creating tension locally for some time 
leading up to and following the vote by the three authorities.  Thirdly, the 
Moorside site adjacent to Sellafield progressed towards potentially hosting three 
nuclear reactors.  All three of these issues had their own specific debates and 
arguments, in the council chamber and beyond, but they also prompted an 
                                                          
1 In that time I served on the development management committee, was vice-chair of the strategic 
planning policy committee, vice-chair of the committee which established a town council for 
Whitehaven, vice-chair of the constitutional reform working group, a member of the personnel panel, a 
director of the company which managed local leisure services, and then played a key role in the 
reorganisation of those leisure and cultural services in the borough and took part in a number of other 
committees and groups.   
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overarching conversation about the relationship between West Cumbria and the 
nuclear industry, particularly in relation to the benefits the area should receive.  
This was given greater salience by the changes to local and central government 
spending brought about following the 2010 election and emergence of the 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government, which locally saw council 
budgets reduced by approximately 50%.  I do not go through this for reasons of 
self-gratification, but because it is important in understanding why I had an 
interest in exploring the impact that the nuclear industry has upon West 
Cumbria and the people who live here. 
Indeed, growing up in West Cumbria it is impossible to escape Sellafield.  In a 
large part of the borough of Copeland it is visible; special buses would run 
workers around the region to and from work; the site sponsors local clubs and 
teams; you would know someone who worked there, quite likely to be a family 
member, as my father, brother, two uncles and other family members all did; 
local newspapers would carry stories about Sellafield most weeks, both ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ news items; the Sellafield visitors centre (no longer open) was a 
popular visitor destination2; Sellafield staff would give talks in schools; in the 
1990s Nirex had an education centre which schools, including mine, visited; 
Sellafield site sirens can be heard nearly 20 miles away; radioactive waste 
shipments travel by road and rail through the area.  This is just a small pen-
picture of the closeness of the nuclear industry to the local community from my 
own personal perspective. 
My own long term familiarity, having grown up in the area, became a much 
more focussed concern once returning to West Cumbria in 2008, after my 
                                                          
2 Until 2001, there were even regular bus tours around the Sellafield site. 
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undergraduate degree, to work as a consultant in the public aspects of 
radioactive waste management.  Over this time, conducting research and 
visiting other nuclear sites around the European Union, it became clear to me 
that the relationship between Sellafield and West Cumbria was not common to 
all nuclear sites: although elements were found at others in similarly remote 
areas such as Dounreay in Scotland, the scale of the west Cumbrian nuclear 
industry was just so different.  I began to wonder what effect this had on the 
people in the area.   
I found that the economic and social effects of the polarisation of the local 
labour market became much more apparent to me during my time as a borough 
councillor.  The fact that there were people with more or less money than others 
was, of course, not lost to me up to that point.  However, it was at this time that 
the complex relationships between geography, economy and the implications of 
policy started to become clear.  Until that point I had believed that the nuclear 
industry had only a positive social and economic impact on West Cumbria.  I 
still believe that, in and of itself nuclear is not necessarily a bad option for the 
area, but rather that the economic domination of one industry has unfortunate 
side-effects due to the lack of diversity in the labour market.  This is a theme 
which is explored in this thesis. 
My initial line of inquiry focussed on the relationship between the nuclear 
industry and the local to global outlook of people in terms of their lived 
experience of citizenship.  This theme was prompted by changes in the nuclear 
industry from 2008 highlighting the paradox of an area so isolated, yet so 
globally connected as having been for several decades the home of the UK 
nuclear industry (as described in chapter three).  However, the focus in this 
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work shifted to the wider relationship between a global industrial actor and its 
regional host, and what this can tell us about neoliberalism and globalisation. 
 
4.3 – Aim and research questions 
As outlined in the introductory chapter, the central aim of this thesis is: ‘What is 
the relationship between a global industrial actor (Sellafield) and its regional 
host – and what insights does this relationship offer for understandings of 
neoliberalism/globalisation?’  Addressing the aim in this thesis is undertaken by 
addressing three subordinate research questions, which are: 
 RQ1 - Political: How have local, regional and national governance 
arrangements been modulated through the presence and actions of the 
nuclear industry in West Cumbria? 
 RQ2 - Social: How is the nuclear industry viewed in West Cumbria, and 
how has this changed in line with wider shifts in terms of state-industry 
relations? 
 RQ3 - Economic: What are the implications for regional competitiveness 
arising from the changing relationship between the state and market for 
the nuclear industry in west Cumbria? 
The aim is informed by my research story and informs the research approach.  
This chapter explores the type of data and approach taken to address these 
questions, the details of what data was gathered and how and ethical concerns 
which are raised.   The research questions do not dictate a specific approach, 
but as will be explored the combination of the questions, data and the 
preferences of the researcher do combine to tend towards an interpretivist 
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approach, focusing on analysis of discourse and a focus on context and 
meaning in a specific case. 
 
4.4 - Going from ontology to method: the research approach 
There are two ways of approaching this section.  There is the potential to 
pretend that a burning desire to be an interpretivist directed everything which 
followed, or the honest answer that the approach was for the most part directed 
by the problem which emerged during the examination and resubmission of the 
first thesis, and in part by the data, which was consequently extant by the time 
this resubmitted thesis was begun.  As will be described in greater detail later, 
the data in this thesis is predominantly drawn from analysis of discussion and 
text, and supplemented by survey data.  This mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative data presents a challenge to ensure there is an “internal coherence” 
(Della Porta and Keating 2008: 38) from ontology to method.  Some data can 
quite clearly lend itself to a certain methodology and approach, while some 
research uses multiple sources of data, as this thesis does, to “triangulate” 
findings (Della Porta and Keating 2008: 34) and this has implications for the 
ontological and epistemological approach, which is less clear.   
At an ontological level, the key distinction to make is between the view that 
“categories are there to be discovered” and the view that “categories only exist 
because we create them”, the realist and nominalist positions respectively 
(Della Porta and Keating 2008: 21).  Della Porta and Keating (2008: 23) take 
the two ontological positions to identify four epistemological approaches from 
positivist to humanistic which form “positions on a spectrum” rather than hard 
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and fixed categories, each with their own ontological and epistemological 
issues.  These are reproduced in table 4.1. 
 Positivist Post-positivist Interpretivist Humanistic 
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 Empiricist, 
aiming at 
knowing the 
reality 
 
Mainly 
empiricist, 
recognising 
context 
Relative focus 
on meanings, 
context 
Focus on 
values, 
meanings and 
purposes 
W
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o
d
/s
 Imitating the 
natural method 
(experiments, 
mathematical 
models, 
statistical 
analysis) 
Based upon 
approximations 
of the natural 
method 
(experiments, 
statistical 
analysis, 
quantitative 
interviews) 
Seeking 
meaning 
(textual 
analysis, 
discourse 
analysis) 
Empathetic 
reactions 
between 
researchers 
and object of 
research 
Table 4.1 – How many methodologies in the social sciences? (della Porta 
and Keating 2008: 32) 
 
Ontologically, this research draws upon both realist and nominalist positions.  
This is a “critical realist” epistemology, which attempts to be an “alternative both 
to naïve realism and to radical constructivist views that deny the existence of 
any reality apart from our constructions” by accepting an “an ontological realism 
(there is a real world that exists independently of our perceptions, theories, and 
constructions) while accepting a form of epistemological constructivism and 
relativism (our understanding of this world is inevitably a construction from our 
own perspectives and standpoint)” (Maxwell 2012: 5).  Critical realism shares 
this recognition of the existence of an objective reality with social 
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constructionism, where it is recognised that this world and the categories which 
are assigned to it filter knowledge and these two epistemological positions are 
thus similar and consequently tend towards the interpretivist approach (Della 
Porta and Keating 2008: 24).  Therefore, while “there is no possibility of 
attaining a single, “correct” understanding of the world” (Maxwell 2012: 5) it is 
recognised that it is “impossible to understand historical events or social 
phenomena without looking at the perceptions individuals have of the world 
outside” (della Porta and Keating 2008: 24-25).  Following on from this 
ontological middle ground and epistemological critical realism, this thesis 
follows an interpretivist approach which seeks explanation for observable social 
outcomes, similar to positivist approaches, but rather than use external and 
universal rules to arrive at explanation, draws on the motives of social actors to 
explain outcomes (Ferejohn 2004: 146).  In seeking to explain the motivations 
of social actors, research must seek to understand their “situational self-
interpretation” (Flyvbjerg 2001: 47) or “cultural perspective” (Della Porta and 
Keating 2008: 26). 
The key concepts in this research, power and scale, lend themselves to being 
studied in this way.  Power differences between different actors are an 
observable fact, in so far as some people and groups will be stronger than or 
dominant over others, but the situations in which this matters and the outcomes 
it affects are socially constructed and situational.  Scale, likewise, is both a fact 
(e.g. individual versus group) and a construction (e.g. multi-scalar governance) 
where the importance attached to scales and their change is determined by the 
priorities of situated actors.   
There are implications for the conduct of research from the interpretivist 
approach.  The path from theory to data, or from data to theory in this case, 
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does follow to some extent the path laid out by the “grounded theory” approach, 
in which theory is built up during the research and, as a consequence of this 
and the focus on specific contexts and meaning as explanations for action, 
research “then takes the form of specific explanations of cases” and provides 
refinement of theories for later cases (Della Porta and Keating 2008: 27).  In 
such a grounded theory approach, the “generation of theory occurs around a 
core category” without which the research “will drift in relevancy and workability” 
(Glaser 1978: 93).  The core categories in this thesis are scale and power, 
which emerged from the data. 
 
4.5 - Learning to ride the bicycle: Data collection and analysis 
In this section I will explore and justify the data collection for this thesis.  There 
are four principal sources of data collected for analysis, in addition to some 
secondary quantitative data, particularly related to the demography and 
economy of the focus group area.  These principal sources of data for analysis 
are: 
 Documents relating to policy, such as white papers, council papers, and 
press statements made regarding issues at national and local levels 
relating to the nuclear industry and economic development; 
 Six semi-structured focus groups carried out in West Cumbria; 
 A representative sample postal survey to 4000 households in West 
Cumbria; and, 
 Interviews with, and public statements by, seven key individuals. 
The two key sources of data among those were the documents relating to policy 
at national and local levels and the six focus groups conducted in West 
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Cumbria.  My situation in West Cumbria had substantial benefits for the 
collection of the qualitative data which is highlighted through the course of this 
section as the justification and mechanics of the data selection and collection 
are be explored in detail.  However first I want to briefly outline my experience 
of managing a complex array of mixed methods research.  In the course of 
writing this chapter, I came across an interesting metaphor: 
Analysis of discourse is like riding a bicycle compared to conducting 
experiments or analysing survey data which resemble baking cakes from 
a recipe … it is not a case of starting first you do this and then you do 
that.  The skills required are developed as one tries to make sense of 
transcripts and identify the organisational features of documents (Potter 
and Wetherell 1987: 169) 
I find this statement fascinating, going from strongly agreeing to very strongly 
disagreeing with it before the end of the first sentence.  Explaining why provides 
me with the opportunity to explain my own experience of how this research was 
conducted in practice.  The two metaphors, of riding a bicycle and baking a 
cake, are both on the face of it very apt.  For exploration of qualitative data, 
where the text is the material conditions (the bicycle and ground), riding it is a 
long process of trial and error.  Policy documents, focus groups, interviews, 
statements and so on represent changing terrain and conditions.  For this 
research, just as I begin to become familiar with one document, then the next is 
very different, and the challenge continues.  The point of this laboured metaphor 
is that for this research, the range of different types of discourse being analysed 
presented a challenge, as the skill has to be constantly learned and re-learned.  
However, the baking a cake from a recipe metaphor does not work for my own 
experience of quantitative data analysis.  I found that while analysing survey 
89 
data could be compared to baking, it was more like having a diverse array of 
ingredients, a desire to make some sort of pudding, but having through trial and 
error to attempt many different recipes using different combinations of 
ingredients.  This process would yield disappointing failures and exciting 
surprises.  There were many ways in which analysis of survey data followed a 
set plan, but also many times where merely trying new combinations would 
yield unexpected, significant and interesting results.  This is how I approached 
the analysis of the quantitative survey data.   
 
4.5.1 - Qualitative data collection  
Policy documentation and interviews 
The point at which documents are selected for analysis in the empirical 
chapters is 1983.  This date is selected for two reasons.  The first a national and 
the second a locally specific reason for West Cumbria.  The first reason for 
selecting 1983 was this was the year that Yorkshire Weekend Television 
broadcast the documentary ‘Windscale: Britain’s Nuclear Laundry’, alleging 
links between the industry and clusters of childhood leukaemia in the nearby 
village of Seascale.  From this point, following inquiries into the matter, nuclear 
sites began to engage with their communities across the UK with the 
establishment of independent scrutiny committees.  The second reason, 
specific to Cumbria, was that the last remaining deep mine had closed in 1981 
(Haig Pit in Whitehaven) and other industrial concerns were facing closure.  
Consequently, initiatives were set up, and in 1983 the West Cumbria Leaders 
Board was formed as a way to explore how to use the presence of the nuclear 
industry as a catalyst for economic development to offset the decline in other 
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industries. Thus, prior to 1983, nuclear sites like Sellafield were in their first 
‘phase’ (Pemberton 2015); inward looking, isolationist and secretive.  While they 
clearly still had a great impact on the communities in which they were hosted, 
this date is the first time they actively sought to affect the future of their 
communities.  This is why that date was chosen for this thesis.  These themes 
are explored further in chapters three and seven. 
The selection of documents themselves however was not necessarily 
straightforward. National and local policy presented different barriers.  At a 
national level, the issue was volume of documents, and at a local level the 
opposite was the case, with little written on policy towards the nuclear industry.  
The Local Government Act (1999) moved councils to a Westminster-style 
legislature and executive cabinet, rather than the traditional committee system 
of local governance.  This is part of the wider shift from legislatures to 
executives seen across the developing world (Sassen 2008).  In the case of 
nuclear issues in Cumbria, the local authorities class this as an executive 
function.  Despite stating they would develop a suite of nuclear policies while I 
was a councillor, Copeland Borough Council never did so.  The council’s 
position on nuclear issues is hard to determine from records where many 
meeting minutes simply record decisions, not discussion content.  However, 
many documents do make reference to the council’s position on nuclear issues 
in justification for related decisions, such as in economic development and 
planning decisions.  This leads on to the documents actually selected for the 
study, as detailed in table 4.2.   
The way to take on the selection of documents at both the national and local 
levels was to establish a rough timeline of key events in the period from 1983 
locally and for policy at a national level and gather any associated documents.  
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While analysing these, further suggestions would emerge in related documents.  
This was essentially a snowball sampling of documents.  Table 4.2 lists all the 
documents used, principally in chapters five and seven, as primary material for 
this research. 
Year 
National Local 
1987   WS Atkins Report – West Cumbria 
Joint Initiative  
1992   
2001  DTI - Managing the Nuclear 
Legacy - whitepaper 
 
2002  DLTR – Regional Whitepaper  
2003  DTI - Our Energy Future: 
creating a low carbon 
economy - whitepaper 
 
2004  Energy Act  
2005   Report to Cumbria County Council 
Regeneration Scrutiny Panel on the 
Cumbria Vision Board 
2006  DTI - Energy Challenge 
Energy Review Report 
 NDA Strategy 2006-2011 
 Cumbria Vision Strategic Plan 
2006-2016 
 North West Development Agency – 
The North West Plan 
 North West Regional Assembly - 
Submitted Draft Regional Spatial 
Strategy for the North West of 
England 
2007  BERR – Energy Whitepaper 
 NDA Annual Report and 
Accounts 2006/07 
 Britain’s Energy Coast Masterplan 
 Copeland Council – Report to 
Executive on Energy Coast 
Masterplan 
2008  BERR – Nuclear Whitepaper 
 DEFRA - Managing 
Radioactive Waste Safely: A 
Framework for Implementing 
Geological Disposal 
whitepaper 
 Allerdale Council - Report to the 
Nuclear Issues Task Group 
2009   Copeland Council - Report to 
Executive - Nomination of the 
Sellafield site for new nuclear 
power stations.   
 Cumbria Vision Cumbria Economic 
Strategy 2009-2019 
   
2011  NDA Strategy 2011-2016  Sellafield socioeconomic 
development plan 
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 NDA Contracting and 
Incentivsation policy 
2012  Public Accounts Committee 
report on Sellafield 
 Britain’s Energy Coast Economic 
Blueprint 
 Local opinion poll – radioactive 
waste disposal 
2013  DECC - Press Release – 
Energy Secretary Responds to 
Cumbria Nuclear Vote 
 KPMG review of performance 
at Sellafield 
 NDA – Operating Model 
Guidance on Roles of SLC 
and PBO 
 NDA – Guidance on SLC 
handover between PBOs 
 BBC News – Report on new 
reactors 
 BBC News – Report on waste store 
rejection 
 Copeland Council Local Plan 
 North West Evening Mail – News 
Report – Britain’s Energy Coast 
blueprint 
 
2014  Letter from CEO of NDA to 
DEC Permanent Secretary re 
nationalisation of Sellafield 
 DECC - Implementing 
Geological Disposal: A 
Framework for the long-term 
management of higher activity 
radioactive waste – whitepaper 
 NDA – Position paper - 
Progress on plutonium 
management 
 NDA - Sellafield Options – 
Outline Business Case 
 Allerdale Council Local Plan 
 Britain’s Energy Coast Press 
Release 
 Sellafield Procurement plan and 
contracting strategy 
 
2015   Whitehaven News – NMP stripped 
of Sellafield contract 
2016  ONR – Nuclear site licence 
conditions handbook 
 ONR – History of MOX fuel 
manufacture at Sellafield 
 Cumbria Local Enterprise 
Partnership Skills Investment Plan 
2016-2020. 
 Sellafield – Internal Magazine – 
Issues 3 and 5 
 Whitehaven News report – Job 
lossed in Sellafield supply chain 
Table 4.2 – Sources of documentary data   
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 Nuclear Economic development 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
Legislation 
White papers 
Strategies, plans and reports 
Parliamentary (e.g. transcripts of 
debates, written answers) 
Correspondence 
Press statements 
Legislation 
White papers 
Strategies, plans and reports 
Parliamentary (e.g. transcripts of 
debates, written answers) 
Correspondence 
Press statements 
L
o
c
a
l 
 
Council meeting items 
Policy documents (i.e. 
development management 
policies) 
Meeting minutes 
Correspondence 
Press statements 
 
Council meeting items 
Council policy documents (i.e. 
development management 
policies) 
Strategies, plans and reports from 
councils and agencies 
Press statements 
Table 4.3 – Data types 
This table divides – somewhat misleadingly, particularly for the local level, given 
their close relationship – the types of nuclear and economic development 
documentation analysed as separate bodies of material.  There is not such a 
clear split when the nuclear industry is the largest employer in the region.  
However, for the purposes of illustration here the binary distinction is useful.  
The selection of these sources was not pre-determined, but initially directed by 
my own familiarity with the two subjects and institutions involved, as explored 
earlier.  Interviewees also provided direction to documentation.  Obtaining 
historic documents relating to the local level was assisted by interview 
participants and others, particularly including multiple versions of documents 
and historic and current correspondence.  Also, as it was read, the key 
documentation, such as white papers, was broadened out to include more 
diverse sources as shown.  However, particularly for policy decisions at the 
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local level, much is not written.  Council meetings, for example, do not have 
transcripts, merely records of decisions taken.  In addition, for some decisions, 
there is no formal record or documentation at all.  To bridge any gaps, it was 
necessary to conduct interviews with key participants and for the most up to 
date information also to attend a number of public events.    
Interview participants were selected based on my own knowledge of those with 
the information required towards the later part of the research.  There were two 
interviews conducted with persons whom I know personally.  The two 
participants were very closely involved in the initial set-up, and operation of the 
West Cumbria Partnership which is central to economic development of West 
Cumbria analysed in chapter seven.  These interviews were not recorded, but 
written notes were taken, as agreed with both participants. 
Further qualitative data, particularly for ongoing developments and new 
announcements, was gathered from the public statements of key individuals, 
both locally and nationally.  Public events attended were as follows: 
 Copeland Growth Strategy launch, 27th May 2016, at Muncaster Castle, 
near Ravenlgass in West Cumbria.  The elected Mayor and Managing 
Director of Copeland Borough Council, Mike Starkie and Pat Graham, 
and the local Member of Parliament for Copeland, Jamie Reed MP, all 
spoke regarding economic development in the region.  I was able to be 
invited to this event as a result of the people I knew, and who knew me, 
from being an elected member of the borough council.  This event was 
not recorded, but notes were taken. 
 Conference on Public Value Management, held at the University of 
Central Lancashire’s campus on 8th July 2016, where among others, Meg 
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Hillier MP, Chair of the House of Commons Public Accounts committee 
spoke about Sellafield. I organised this event as part of my employment. 
This event was recorded. 
 Cumbria Nuclear Conference, on 22 September 2016, where Professor 
Paul Howarth, the Chairman of the Centre for Nuclear Excellence 
(CoNE) and Managing Director of the National Nuclear Laboratory spoke 
about the CoNE, and Tom Samson, the CEO of NuGeneration Ltd spoke 
about the nuclear reactors they plan to build in West Cumbria.  These 
contributions covered nuclear and economic developments in West 
Cumbria.  I was assisting in the running of this event due to my knowing 
the organiser, John Stevenson MP, the Member of Parliament for 
Carlisle3.  This event was not recorded, but notes were taken. 
 
Focus groups 
Ideally, focus groups would have been selected because they were thought to 
be the best way to explore the scaling of power and spatial governance in West 
Cumbria.  However, the relationship between the data and the final aim of the 
thesis was more symbiotic, with the data collected leading the research in that 
direction.  However, despite this journey, the focus group participants were 
selected based on their unique perspective on the relationship between 
Sellafield and West Cumbria, which has been a constant thread throughout the 
project.  As a consequence, these groups were selected by purposive rather 
than representative sampling.  The aim of the focus groups was not to seek 
findings generalisable to the entire population (Smith and Morrow 1991).  The 
                                                          
3 In addition, my wife works in his parliamentary office. 
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six groups were chosen for their different perspectives on the relationship 
between West Cumbria and the nuclear industry.  The six groups were varying 
in their proximity to the nuclear industry, and could give a perspective on the 
past, present changes and future issues in the area and industry.  
Table 4.4 – Focus group details 
Two groups from Sellafield were recruited to reflect the major distinction 
between workers on the site, staff and industrial workers.  Two groups of young 
people were recruited, those undertaking A-levels and intending to study at 
university, and those in education at the local college and intending to stay in 
West Cumbria.  Borough councillors and senior officers were intended to give a 
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1 
Tuesday 
24/09/2013 
12.00-14.00 
Sellafield 
professional 
workers 
6 
University of 
Central 
Lancashire 
Campus, West 
Cumbria 
Lunch 
Middle 
class 
2 
Monday 
02/12/2013 
15.00-17.00 
Copeland 
Borough 
Councillors and 
senior officers 
5 
Copeland 
Borough 
Council 
Tea, 
coffee 
and 
cake 
Mixed 
3 
Friday 
13/12/2013 
12.20-13.00 
Whitehaven 
School sixth 
form pupils 
15 
Whitehaven 
School 
Credit 
within 
school 
Middle 
 
4 
Wednesday 
05/02/2014 
12.00-14.30 
Sellafield 
industrial 
trades’ union 
leaders 
3 
University of 
Central 
Lancashire 
Campus, West 
Cumbria 
Lunch Working 
5 
Thursday 
20/02.2014 
12.30-13.30 
Lakes College 
West Cumbria 
students 
5 
Lakes College 
West Cumbria 
Lunch Working 
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broad overview of changes in the area.  One group was attempted to be 
recruited from parish councils, via the Cumbria Association of Local Councils, 
but insufficient responses were received. 
Focus groups were preferred over interviews for several reasons.  The group 
interaction which characterises the focus group is much less reliant on specific 
questions for yielding valuable data.  This was particularly important given my 
own position in the area.  Consideration was given to having an independent 
person facilitate the groups, but the nature of focus groups was thought to be 
sufficient to ensure reasonably self-sustaining discussion which was not going 
to be unduly influenced by the researcher’s own perspective.  These were also 
not the first focus groups that I had conducted, having been a commercial 
contract researcher for several years prior to this research.  At no point did it 
appear that the presence in the room of someone, particularly for the council 
and industrial trades’ union groups, who had a clear political affiliation, had any 
impact on the discussion being free and open.  In addition, for very practical 
reasons, the geographical size of West Cumbria makes interviews more 
challenging to conduct, given the time, cost and travel involved.  
Recruitment of these groups was in all cases, except one, through gatekeepers 
in organisations.  The recruitment of Copeland Borough Councillors was 
conducted by e-mail to the councillors and senior officers e-mail group to which 
I had access personally as a councillor.  For each of the remaining groups an 
individual who was known to me prior to this project was contacted requesting 
their assistance, and in each case except the trades’ union group the request 
was passed on to a colleague who arranged the group.  For the industrial 
trades’ union group, I knew each of the three union leaders personally and my 
father had been a shop steward with one of the unions, the General and 
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Boilermakers Union (GMB), at Sellafield for approximately 25 years.  This 
enabled me to contact one directly, who recruited the others. 
4.5.2 - Analysis of the qualitative data 
Focus groups were recorded and transcribed by the researcher, which better 
enabled the principal data source to be both accurately recorded, and through 
transcription, have the researcher fully immersed in and knowledgeable of the 
data.  Interviews, of which there were only two, and public events were 
recorded in notes and typed up.  This was added to by documents, which in this 
project are used as primary data. 
Selection of quotes from focus groups focussed on highlighting key points.  
Discussion did include many other issues, which were related to varying 
degrees, but the quotes selected were not covering every issue raised.  On a 
practical level, the coding itself was done in both hard-copy first and software 
later, to enable easier access to the data.  The coding went through stages, 
focussing first on identifying large sections of any relevance to the research 
questions, then over time condensing the size of the quotes and their number 
by adding additional coding sub-categories.  From these the selected quotes 
were picked from the transcripts.  This approach was the same used for the 
analysis of documents. The codes used related to the key elements of the 
theories and approaches outlined in chapter two, such as where the role of 
elites, barriers to regionalism and so on were mentioned, along with quotes 
providing the wider context of the restructuring of the state and nuclear industry. 
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4.6 – Research ethics 
The intention in any ethically sound research is to maximise the benefits of the 
research while causing the minimum harm.  The whole study was approved by 
the UCLan ethics committee, but it will be useful to highlight a number of ethical 
issues that are particularly important to the research design  
This project does not cover any sensitive, personal or other ‘at risk’ topics, and 
does not engage with any groups deemed to be particularly relevant to greater 
ethical scrutiny of the project, with the exception of two focus groups with 
children between the ages of 16 and 18.  These participants were in a school 
environment.  The issue of consent is complex here.  The recruitment of 
participants was undertaken by a teacher, and in such circumstances there may 
be an expectation placed upon the participant or even a risk of coercion.  This 
was minimised by the briefing of the teacher before recruitment, distribution of 
consent forms and other information to participants before the focus group 
began.  As with all other research in this project, withdrawal by participants was 
a permanent option and there no sensitive topics covered. 
My position as a situated researcher, being an elected councillor in the area 
under investigation, was a potential ethical issue.  The practical benefit it 
brought, in knowledge and contacts, could have been outweighed by problems 
when dealing with people who did not share my own political views.  However, 
this was not the case, as while the issue was never raised in any group nor did 
it appear to have any detrimental effect on recruitment, the issue was still 
considered.  A condition common in any research is that data collected must 
only be used for the research project it was collected for which was the case in 
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this project.  I believe, rather than being an ethical challenge, my status and 
background gave me credibility and authenticity. 
4.6.1 - Anonymity 
This research has gathered information from people through survey, focus 
groups and interviews, and each has their own specific issues to address 
relating to the protection of personal data and the maintenance of strict 
confidentiality and anonymity.  For survey data, this challenge relates to the 
traceability of the person from their participation.  The only link between 
responses and personal data is a unique code on the consent form and survey, 
which are stored separately in hard copy.  No electronic link can be made 
between survey data and participant details.  This is therefore a challenge of 
storage of data, and is undertaken in line with the University’s policies on data 
storage and retention.  There is absolutely no possibility to link survey results to 
any person from this thesis document, as no individual responses are used.  
The hard copies are securely locked for five years from the point of collection 
prior to secure disposal via confidential shredding. 
For focus groups and interviews, the potential for the participant to be identified 
from what they have said is much greater.  In the case of the focus groups, no 
names are used at all, but the broad category of the group is used to identify 
each quotation.  For the interviews, the same approach is taken, but only to the 
fullest possible extent.  The description of the interviewee must be suitable to 
give the necessary context to the quotations used and someone very 
knowledgeable about the subject might be able to identify the participant.  
However, no personal names are used, and care is taken that the material 
quoted must not be sensitive, inflammatory or derogatory.  This is in line with 
what was agreed with participants and approved by the ethics committee. 
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4.7 – Case study selection 
As the title of this thesis makes clear, West Cumbria is the unit of analysis for 
this research.  The area is defined geographically as the extent of the Allerdale 
and Copeland Borough Councils on the west coast of Cumbria, in the North 
West of England.  The selection of this area for study is based on the fact that 
the nuclear industry “dominates the whole area not only economically, but also 
socially and culturally” (Wynne 1992: 284).  This was described in chapter 
three, and as is analysed later in this thesis, West Cumbria is both very isolated 
and very globally connected and it supports the nuclear industry despite 
recognising its negative impacts.  These “surprising value[s]” make West 
Cumbria a “deviant case” (Gerring 2007: 105), which is unique and justifies the 
selection of a single-case design for this research (Yin 2009: 49).  The 
methodology, outlined earlier, seeks to explain the impact that the nuclear 
industry has upon the scaling of power in West Cumbria.  In practice this means 
“attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them” which is a “situated activity” (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2000: 3) where rather than for generalisability and comparison, cases 
are selected “on the basis of their inherent interest ... not because they are 
typical of a category but for what they tell us about complex social processes” 
(Della Porta and Keating 2008: 29).  This is why West Cumbria is chosen as a 
single, complex case. 
However, given this is a mixed methods study with a quantitative element, for 
the analysis of that data the single case in this research, West Cumbria, is the 
primary unit of analysis.  Studying only one area prevents across case 
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comparisons from being made with other case study areas, but this design does 
not however preclude within case analysis.  To achieve comparisons, the 
quantitative element of this research employs an embedded case-study 
approach involving more than one sub-unit of analysis (Yin 2009: 50).  This 
involved splitting the sample into two particular “sub-units” of the overarching 
case, which are ‘nuclear’ and ‘non-nuclear’ groups.  The nuclear sub-unit is 
defined as any individual who either themselves works in the nuclear industry or 
lives in a household with someone who works in the nuclear industry.  Work in 
the nuclear industry permeates households given the dominant position of the 
industry in the area, and the high wages offered mean the single wage earning 
household is still viable in this area.  This is the basis for the sub-unit definition 
employed. 
There is then a potential for tension between the qualitative and quantitative 
data, where if the quantitative data was seeking to explain the phenomena 
under analysis (power) it would have to be fairly rigidly defined and 
operationalised from the outset.  Clearly defined concepts are central to 
comparative research (Della Porta 2008: 29; Vennesson 2008: 230).  However, 
in this thesis the quantitative data provides context, and concepts for the 
qualitative data analysis are “orientative” and refined as the research 
progresses, as is common in the interpretivist approach (Della Porta and 
Keating 2008: 30) 
 
4.7 – Summary 
This chapter has described the process of the research in this thesis.  It has 
included the mechanics of data collection in the latter sections of the chapter, 
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but has also attempted to place the thesis in its wider context.  For this 
research, given the case-study area and my own situation in the area, it is 
impossible to separate the two and consequently difficult to establish exactly 
where the imperative for the research emerged.  Clearly the journey from initial 
data collection to this thesis, as described earlier, was not straightforward.  The 
process of allowed the data to be very rigorously examined and to point towards 
something more meaningful and worthwhile of a PhD thesis. This chapter has 
put that story together and outlined how this was then taken forward, and 
situated the whole project within a certain methodological approach. 
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CHAPTER 5 – NUCLEAR LEGACY: CREATING COMPETITION 
5.1 – Introduction 
In this chapter, changes to the governance of the nuclear legacy are analysed.  
The legacy consists of the ageing facilities which were not privatised in the 
1990s and are at or near the end of their lives and the current and future wastes 
arising from their use and decommissioning.  In this chapter the changes in the 
nuclear industry which were introduced and described briefly in chapter three 
are analysed in terms of their implications for power at multiple scales.  For the 
decommissioning of the nuclear legacy, the moves from a nationalised but 
arms-length commercial company managing the bulk of the ageing nuclear 
legacy, to a complex system of multilevel governance with public ownership and 
private management, then to direct public control are analysed.  The moves 
from nationalisation, through part-privatisation, and back to nationalisation had 
a range of implications for how, by whom and for what purpose state authority is 
wielded in the nuclear industry.  This has implications for the workforce and 
community, particularly with regards their term and conditions of employment. 
However, it is not the privatisation but the renationalisation which has the most 
detrimental effect on the rights of workers in the industry.  The management of 
wastes and the search for an underground disposal site, which has been 
ongoing under three different policies since the 1980s, is analysed.  The failures 
of policies towards decommissioning and waste management have a similar 
basis in the overreliance on a limited, albeit different, range of tools government 
has at its disposal to achieve its aims.  In both cases power is rescaled as 
government applies different tools to the problems it faces in dealing with the 
nuclear legacy.  This has implications for West Cumbria, as the major site for 
decommissioning and the only site explored for hosting an underground waste 
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disposal site in the past 25 year, which are analysed and discussed in this 
chapter. 
 
5.2 – ‘Creating a Market’: Privatising the Nuclear Legacy  
As was described in chapter three, the 1999s were the “true nadir of nuclear 
power” (Nuttall 2004: 2).  In the UK and elsewhere the days of engineering-led 
innovation were replaced with a desire to de-regulate, contract out and move 
away from state provision (Nuttall 2004: 3).  The civil nuclear industry in the UK 
had been though attempted privatisation, along with many other state assets, in 
the 1980s with little success1.  By the early 2000s, with the second generation 
of reactors were privatised as British Energy, the state was left with the first 
generation fleet which was either shut-down or near to shut-down, a plethora of 
facilities related to fuel services in various states of age, condition and use and 
the reactor research sites.  These facilities are spread art various sites across 
England, Scotland and Wales.  Sellafield contains every type of facility, from 
fuel manufacture, through reactors, prototypes, waste facilities and so on.  
Many of these facilities were nearing the end of their lives by the 2000s.  
Consequently, Sellafield and much of the early nuclear estate had either 
reached, or was close to their transition from commercial operation to 
decommissioning.  The high cost to the taxpayer of decommissioning, which 
had been the barrier to the privatisation of these early facilities in the 1980s and 
1990s, had not disappeared.  The need to decommission ageing facilities was 
                                                          
1  In 1988, the White Paper ‘Privatising Electricity’ had proposed that the nuclear fleet – owned by 
Nuclear Electric Ltd and Scottish Nuclear Ltd – should be  privatised, but concerns for the cost of 
decommissioning, waste management and the generally favourable cost of coal, oil and gas generation 
by comparison at the time.  This was overcome in the 1990s, when the more modern AGR and PWR 
reactors were privatised as British Energy and the first generation fleet remained state owned as 
Magnox Electric, later transferred to BNFL. (HoC Research Paper 14/61 2014: 10) 
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however only becoming more pressing.  As was clear from the experience of 
the 1980s though a straightforward privatisation of was not an option to which 
the markets would flock.  A new governance arrangement for the nuclear legacy 
was required, and in 2002 the White Paper ‘Managing the Nuclear Legacy’ set 
out the approach to ‘creating a market’ for nuclear decommissioning in the UK. 
“Competition will be central to the LMA’s approach. Developing 
competitive markets for clean-up contracts will help to stimulate 
innovation and improvements in safety and operating standards and 
enable the LMA to make the best possible use of the best available 
skills.” (DTI 2002: 13) 
 
The new policy has two clear implications.  Competition for the contracts to 
manage state owned sites, which the government believe will bring innovative 
practice to improve the decommissioning performance of those sites.  In order 
to make this happen, a new arms-length body, the Liabilities Management 
Authority2, would assume ownership of the state’s nuclear liabilities and 
oversee the process for letting these new competitive contracts.  This marked a 
completely different way of operating for these sites and, as will be seen 
throughout this thesis, this has implications for the communities in which they 
reside. In this section, I will explore the way in which this new model was 
implemented, before turning to look specifically at the privatisation of the 
management of Sellafield and its implications for power in West Cumbria. 
5.2.1 – Public ownership, private management 
The new arrangement for the state nuclear liabilities transferred the 
management and operation of public-owned nuclear sites and their workforces 
                                                          
2 Which later became the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority following the Energy Act 2004 
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to private companies.  The new model for management of the nuclear legacy 
involves three key organisations in a contractual relationship with income 
earned through management fees and performance incentives.  The key 
relationships are illustrated below, using the example of the Low Level Waste 
Repository in west Cumbria (Figure 5.1).  
  
Figure 5.1 – Example of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority/Parent 
Body Organisation/Site Licence Company relationship (for the national 
Low Level Waste Repository). 
The three key organisations for nuclear sites are the Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority (NDA)3, who own the sites and let the contracts; the Site Licence 
Company (SLC), who employ the workforce and hold the nuclear site licence; 
and, the Parent Body Organisation (PBO) who own the SLC shares and provide 
the senior management to the SLC.  In this sub-section each organisation’s 
role, and how they relate to each other will be explored.  This is necessary to 
understand impact that this governance arragement had at the Sellafield site. 
                                                          
3 A non-departmental public body (NDPB) 
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The roles of each organisation in this new model are straightforward, and 
detailed in figure 4.1. The key relationships are between the PBO, SLC and 
NDA.  These relationships are governed by two different contracts between the 
three organisations; the ‘Management and Operations Contract’ between the 
NDA and the SLC; and, a contact between all three parties called the ‘Parent 
Body Agreement’ (Leech 2016: 5).  The NDA owns the sites, sets the strategy 
and contracts private organisations to undertake work at each site.  The Site 
Licence Company is the holder of the licence and environmental permits, and 
retains a suitably qualified workforce.  The PBO, which is the most novel 
element of the new structure, owns the SLC and provides its senior 
management.  The contract for the PBO is competitively let by the NDA and can 
change, in contrast to the SLC which endures.   
There are two principal regulators, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and 
the Environment Agency (EA).  Their roles relate to nuclear safety and 
environmental discharges respectively.  Of particular interest is the nuclear 
safety regulator, which only interacts with the SLC.  It does so in six different 
ways: Directions, consents, approvals, notifications, specifications, and 
agreements (ONR 2016a: 2).  These six different forms of interaction, ranging 
from having to be notified by the SLC to directing its activities, cover 36 
conditions which the regulator places upon the licensee.  The majority of these 
relate to nuclear safety, plant operations and so on.  The final condition which 
the ONR places on the SLC relates to the model of contractorised ownership.  
While the regulator does not directly interact with the PBO, in condition 36 the 
“Organisational capability” of the licensee is regulated, such that “The licensee 
shall provide and maintain adequate financial and human resources to ensure 
the safe operation of the licensed site” (ONR 2016a: 22).  In doing this the ONR 
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can regulate organisational changes within the SLC by the management (the 
PBO), thus in theory limiting the influence any incoming PBO has over its newly 
acquired subsidiary company.  A condition with a similar aim is imposed through 
the contract between the NDA and the PBO: 
“The SLC should not be immediately vulnerable to management changes 
or loss of key knowledge and skills that could arise from a change of 
ownership resulting implementation of the NDA’s contract options or the 
PBO’s withdrawal or default”  (NDA 2013a: 6) 
This implies that the operational role of the PBO is limited, however, their 
influence over the operation and direction of the SLC is in fact extensive.  Within 
the confines of the contract between the PBO, SLC and NDA, the parent 
organisation is incentivised to ‘change’ the SLC: 
“The PBO has no direct operational responsibilities for the sites operated 
by the SLCs.  However, through its secondees into the SLC, the PBO 
provides the vision, leadership and change to translate its tender 
commitments into operational reality” (NDA 2013a: 9) 
This new model uses a contract to govern the relationship between the NDA 
and PBO.  There are eleven elements of the contract, but none of them relate to 
socio-economic concerns (NDA 2013a: 10-11).  The closest the NDA comes to 
providing the guidance for the PBO in social concerns is in the handover 
between outgoing and incoming PBOs where “unions and labour relations” are 
considered a key part of PBO transition, and “Stakeholder Support” is classified 
under “other matters” and relates to “defining an understanding of Regulator 
Support and Public Affairs/Public Relations” (NDA 2013b: 8-9).  This to some 
extent goes against the principals outlined in the original 2001 White Paper and 
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the later 2004 Energy Act which stated that the new governance arrangements 
for the nuclear industry could only work if they had the “ability to command 
public confidence” (DTI 2002: 13). 
There are two ways in which staff from the PBO work in the SLC.  The first is 
that the PBO provides, through secondment, the senior leadership for the SLC.  
These staff “become SLC staff for legal and employment purposes” (NDA 
2013a: 7) and as such have to act primarily for the benefit of the SLC.  Other 
staff, on a more ad hoc basis, can be brought into areas where the SLC 
requires specific expertise, through a process called ‘reachback’.  The 
combination of these staff, but in particular the seconded senior leadership 
team, are tasked with leading the SLC by designing plans to deliver on the 
contract and strategy of the NDA.  The issue of the role of senior executives 
being seconded in will be explored in more detail in specific relation to Sellafield 
later, particularly the issue of secondment and loyalties.  However, first it is 
necessary to continue to explore the new model by turning to the contracts for 
the management of sites. 
 
5.2.2 – Competitive Contracts  
In the initial period following the creation of the LMA and through the 
establishment of the NDA in 2005, the future arrangements for the management 
and operation of the state owned nuclear sites was not clear.  The 2002 White 
Paper had set a course for BNFL (and UKAEA) to move into the private sector, 
and potentially compete for the new contracts to operate the LMA/NDA sites 
(DTI 2002: 13).  These are two very separate issues.  Firstly, that the former 
state companies would be sold, and secondly that they then would be in a 
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position to compete, on a level playing field, with other private companies rather 
than demonstrating that they might merely continue to operate the sites if they 
were to improve.  Indeed, the idea of public sector even being able to bid was 
not on the table 
“The Government does not consider that it would be appropriate for 
UKAEA as a public sector body to compete for additional site 
management contracts against firms from the private sector.” (DTI 2002: 
50) 
BNFL, comprising mostly of the site management contract for Sellafield, but 
also research activities, uranium processing and other various companies, was 
to become a private entity as one company4 either through sale or as a public-
private partnership  (DTI 2002: 5, 49).   The prospect of moving into the private 
sector for BNFL and the staff at Sellafield, while a significant change after 
decades of being publically owned, was not necessarily feared.  The actual end 
result of the privatisation of the workforce at Sellafield (along with the rest of 
BNFL/BNG) was neither of the options which were originally planned.  Firstly, 
the option of a public-private partnership was ruled out in 2006 by Mr Phil 
Woolas, Minister of State, Department of Trade and Industry in a statement to 
the House of Commons: 
“Public-private partnership was not pursued ... because BNG would not 
have the required critical mass” (HoC Deb 18 May 2006: C1179) 
The remaining option therefore was the sale of British Nuclear Group (BNG) by 
BNFL, which was pursued.  To aid the sale, and with little other option available 
to the NDA, BNG was granted a guaranteed initial five year contract to manage 
                                                          
4 Prior to this BNFL was restructured to facilitate this sale, with the overarching group being BNFL and 
the companies below it being British Nuclear Group, but these were merely internal organisational 
changes with no external effect. 
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the Sellafield site (Griffiths 2006).  However, during the summer of 2006, the 
BNFL board decided to break up BNG and sell the assets off individually5, 
forcing the NDA to accelerate their plans to let the contract for the Sellafield site 
(Parkinson 2006).  The sale of BNG in its constituent companies ended the 
prospect of BNG becoming a globally competitive company in the nuclear 
decommissioning field.  The remaining option for the NDA was to let the 
contract for BNG Sellafield Ltd to a private company, and this effectively ended 
the prospect of BNG competing for and undertaking work overseas (Griffiths 
2006), which had been the intention since the 2001 White Paper: 
“What is now important is that BNFL’s management and staff have the 
opportunity to deliver on the good work already begun to improve the 
company’s performance... and demonstrate that it can continue to 
compete successfully in the global market place.” (DTI 2002: 49) 
The move to find a private-sector owner of Sellafield by competition – 
precipitated by “the change in strategic approach by British Nuclear Fuels 
Limited (BNFL) regarding the future of British Nuclear Group Sellafield Limited 
(BNGSL)” (NDA 2007: 32) – which had led the NDA to “agree and favour an 
early competition for Sellafield” (NDA 2006: 151).  Rather than have to sell 
BNGSL as was planned for the other parts of BNG as part of a competitive sale 
process, the option was taken to bring forward the five year contract competition 
to find a parent body organisation for the Sellafield site.   
 
For SLC contracts, which are “typically high value, high risk” contracts, the 
overarching aim is to maintain and enhance the capability of the SLC as an 
                                                          
5 This was due to fears that the private companies interested in BNG, principally Fleur and Bechtel from 
the United States, were planning to buy BNG and then break it up themselves, making a significant 
amount of money (Parkinson 2006) 
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enduring entity (NDA 2011a: 2.2) which aids later re-contracting and the 
operation of the sites.  However, ownership of the SLC is intended to give the 
necessary level of control to provide the “direction, leadership and 
management” (NDA 2011a: 2.2) to implement significant change as envisaged 
by the PBO/SLC model (NDA 2013a: 9).  The NDA contracting principles 
actively encourage a significant level of control for the PBO over the SLC.  
Three of the seven principles are relevant.  The way in which contracts are let, 
particularly the high value and high rick critical contracts for site management, is 
intended to give the longest possible term and greatest possible freedoms 
within the constraints of ensuring operational endurance of the SLC.  The 
contracts thus have long durations and wide scope, specifically to give the PBO 
the greatest level of influence over the SLC: 
1 Incentivise delivery of outputs and performance. This means contracting 
for key deliverables (the ‘what’) which allows the supplier wider scope 
to find more effective and efficient solutions for delivery (the ‘how’);  
2 Incentivise long term SLC thinking, planning and delivery through letting 
of longer duration contracts or incentivise multi-year performance for 
existing annualised contracts. This will allow the supplier to address 
longer term perspectives and avoid short-term solutions. 
7 Encourage innovation and transfer of best practice. Incentivise 
knowledge transfer and sharing from parent companies, across the 
NDA estate and wider supply chain. 
Table 5.1 – Three of the seven NDA Contracting Principles (NDA 2011b: 
2.3) 
To incentivise the delivery of the contracting principles, the NDA employs what 
it terms “Trust with Consequences”, which means that by default both internally 
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and externally its stakeholders and suppliers are given “the responsibility, 
autonomy and authority within delegations to deliver the required performance 
in the way they see most appropriate” (NDA 2011b: 2.4).  The clear implication 
of the NDA approach to contracting and incentivisation is to give as great a 
scope as possible to the contractor in the day-to-day operation of their contracts 
for the longest practical time.  In seeking to create and sustain a demand from 
suppliers to participate in the market for clean-up contracts, these principals and 
incentivisation methods make sense.  Suppliers are more likely to bid for 
contracts where they are given certainty as to the funding.  However, the wide 
scope granted by ownership and secondment of the senior management leads 
to a greater uncertainty in the specifics of the delivery of the contract and the 
way in which sites are managed.   
As explored earlier, the primary aim in moving to public ownership and private 
management though competitive contract tendering was to bring outside 
expertise to bear upon the complex problem of nuclear decommissioning. 
Innovation would then lead to cheaper, in time and/or cost, decommissioning of 
sites.  The key mechanism by which innovation is deployed and costs reduced 
are the new organisations (and their people) bringing new ways of working.  
This means that significant change at nuclear sites and within SLCs is a desired 
effect of the contractorised governance arrangement for the nuclear legacy.  
This means that the model intends significant change for the workforce and by 
extension, given the isolated areas in which nuclear sites are located, change 
for the wider community too.   
Harold Bolter (a former BNFL director) recognised that the geography of West 
Cumbria had an effect on the management of the Sellafield site.  Over the 
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course of a number of years, the site and the area had grown accustomed to 
BNFL and vice versa: 
“It is still a hard two and a half hours drive away from Risley6. Getting to 
and from London was even more difficult…In this situation, it is easy for 
senior management at Sellafield to see them as separate…” (Bolter 
1995: 45) 
The senior management are replaced as the contract to manage the Sellafield 
site was transferred to private, potentially foreign companies.  Given there were 
no plans that the wider workforce would significantly alter compared to what 
was already forecast by BNFL, local councils focussed their concern regarding 
the new model on the impact that change in senior management could have in 
the three local authorities join response to the NDA strategy in 2006: 
“Whilst probably a relatively small number will be affected … they will 
often be people who are well assimilated into local society, and make a 
significant community contribution … facilitated by the attitude and 
encouragement of BNG … [a new contractor] may have a different 
attitude to their supporting their staff’s engagement in local volunteering 
etc … which is one of the strengths of the west Cumbrian scene” 7 
 
However, while it was only the senior management of the Sellafield site that 
were likely to be replaced, the wider workforce would still be affected by the 
contractorisation of the Sellafield site.  The ambition for BNFL in moving from 
state ownership was for it to become a global provider of decommissioning 
services.  This would draw upon the experience at Sellafield of 
                                                          
6 The location of BNFL’s headquarters in Cheshire. 
7 Joint Response by Copeland and Allerdale Borough Council and Cumbria County Council to the NDA 
2006 Strategy 
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decommissioning reactor, fuel reprocessing and waste treatment plants.  The 
outlook for Sellafield would have therefore been one of going out to the world. In 
this scenario, the staff would have been an asset to BNFL.  However, in the 
contracted model the staff are a transferrable asset of the site licence company.  
Given the short term contracts (5-17 years) there is little incentive for the parent 
companies to view the staff, who do not and will not ever work for them, as an 
asset in the long-term.  This created potential problems, some envisaged in the 
original 2002 White Paper, relating to the training of the workforce for example, 
which stated that the LMA must: 
 
“ensure through our site contracts that contractors continue to train and 
reskill their workforces, thus promoting both sustainable employment and 
the maintenance of high levels of marketable skills” (DTI 2002: 84) 
 
Of course, there is a less than altruistic reason for the LMA/NDA to incentivise 
the training of the workforce – they are central to the safe and cost-effective 
operation of the state owned sites, and the contracts and staff do have to at 
some stage be re-let and transferred to another parent company.  However, in 
the same white paper the incentive to retain a trained workforce is specifically 
linked to the potential for the companies in the UK to be “credible and 
competitive players for clean-up work” (DTI 2002: 54) where “a stronger nuclear 
skills base can only increase the competitiveness of UK firms overseas” (DTI 
2002: 77).  However, this was written in the context of a less rigidly applied 
procedure of contractorisation of every nuclear licence site, where the existing 
state companies may have been able to compete for work, rather than the 
breakup and sale of every state operator which occurred.  The implication for 
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staff is that, whereas BNFL was looking to take forward opportunities to 
decommission sites, particularly in the Former Soviet Union countries, following 
competition, these opportunities would lay with the PBO companies.  The 
workforce at Sellafield and other sites would not be the beneficiaries, 
necessarily, in the context of multi-national ownership. 
 
5.3 - Sellafield: The Fall and Rise of State Management 
The contractorisation of the management for nuclear sites which may, like 
Sellafield, be significant in the social and economic life of their communities, 
clearly gives a huge scope to those private sector interests which would come 
in to the sites to deliver on the contract aims.  Unfortunately, the contracts 
themselves for each site are commercial in confidence, so it is not possible to 
actually see the contract.  However, the Sellafield case went through the ‘new’ 
model and came back to nationalised management over the course of eight 
years, to public scrutiny in parliament and government.  This journey highlights 
important issues for power in West Cumbria, as explored in general terms in the 
previous section. 
The competition for the Sellafield contract involved nine large multi-national 
companies submitting four different bids (one single and three consortia bids) 
and in 2008 Nuclear Management Partners took ownership of the Sellafield site.  
The organisation had its contract extended in 2013 after the first five year period 
of an up to seventeen year contract, and then in 2016 that contract was 
terminated and the ownership and management of Sellafield Ltd transferred 
back to the NDA.  It is not my intention to provide an account of the 
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performance of NMP at Sellafield8, which would not contribute to the aim of this 
thesis.  However, there are specific issues in the way in which the site operated 
and the reasons for the contract being terminated which are important for 
understanding why the governance model for the nuclear legacy failed at this 
site and rescaled power again. 
At Sellafield, up to the change of ownership in 2008 the site had been owned 
and operated by companies owned or directly controlled by the UK government.  
Initially the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, then British Nuclear Fuels.  
Following changes in 2005 the site became owned by the NDA, and the site 
licence company (i.e. the workers and movable assets) became owned and 
managed separately by a Parent Body Organisation (PBO).  In the case of 
Sellafield a new company, Nuclear Management Partners (NMP), was set up 
specifically for the purpose of bidding for the Sellafield contract in 2008 by a 
consortium of large multi-national companies, which are URS from the United 
States, Areva from France and AMEC from the UK.   
As explored in general earlier in this chapter, specifically at Sellafield the 
contract for management was supposed “to improve performance through 
innovation, greater incentive arrangements and a higher risk/reward profile” 
(NDA 2006: 63).  For the NDA the contractorisation would bring “UK and 
international best practice to bear on our mission” by “specifying the outcomes 
we seek rather than the work to be performed and rewarding cost effective 
delivery” (NDA 2011b: 13).  As such, the operator is paid a fee based on 
meeting targets for programme delivery and shares any efficiency savings 
achieved on the budget with the NDA. However, the structure of the contract 
                                                          
8 For NMP’s account of their record see Nuclear Management Partners website, and for their failings see 
KPMG (2014), PAC (2012; 2014) and NAO (2014). 
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between the NDA and the parent body which incentivises efficiency savings has 
been problematic.  For the parent companies the focus on cost reduction as a 
means to increased earnings has not been a great success either, with 
“undesirable consequences” on the site which have resulted in a “lack of focus 
on schedule performance, particularly for major projects” which “ultimately cost 
more than the efficiency savings” (KPMG 2013: 110).  The rationale, to bring 
“managerial and technical expertise and a private sector mentality” (KPMG 
2013: 21), certainly brought a private sector mentality – the operators focused 
on making as much money from their contract as possible, which is their duty to 
their shareholders 
There have been both cost reductions and cost increases as a direct result of 
the post-nationalisation of the management of Sellafield, which are specifically 
explored in the next chapter.  The site has attracted criticism for spending 
money on staff from overseas.  In one specific case, the ‘Reachback’ scheme 
brought staff from the parent companies (in particular from the United States) 
with the aim being to bring their expertise to bear upon the challenges of 
decommissioning and thus make the process faster, safer and cheaper.  
However, in a review of risk management at Sellafield, the Public Accounts 
Committee of the House of Commons found that the £17 million per year “costs 
of seconding staff from Nuclear Management Partners’ parent companies 
appear excessively high, especially given the wage rates in the local economy” 
(PAC 2012: 3).   The bringing of temporary ‘outsiders’ at great expense was 
resented locally, and as is clear in parliament too.  This is significant as the 
Government recognised in 2002 that their new approach, ‘creating a market’ for 
decommissioning and clean-up services in the UK could only work as long as 
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the process was open and transparent, and where the public were confident 
that it was the best option for handling the nuclear legacy: 
“The LMA will be publicly accountable for its performance and operate on 
an open and transparent basis. It will be judged not just on its operational 
performance and cost effectiveness but also on its ability to command 
public confidence.” (DTI 2002: 13) 
While NMP took the fall, it is clear that the contract drawn up and managed by 
the NDA was significantly to blame for the issues at Sellafield, the transfer of 
wide-ranging, ill-defined powers, through a contract incentivised in ways which 
had unintended consequences, to a conflicted group of seconded senior 
executives led to the loss of public support for the contract model at Sellafield 
among both the public locally, but crucially among those in positions of authority 
such as the parliamentary public accounts select committee.  The return of that 
contract to the NDA, in its infancy at the time of writing, has however raised a 
whole new array of issues for the scaling of power in west Cumbria.  The ‘direct 
rule’ by central government through the NDA is by no means a return to the 
BNFL days.  In their own way, BNFL was a very arm’s length organisation, 
particularly at Sellafield (Bolter 1996: 45).   The direct ownership and 
management by the NDA of the Sellafield site transforms the status of the SLC 
and its holdings.  The status of assets, raised previously in relation to the 
workforce, changes when they become a direct part of central government.  The 
change in ownership, which occurred on 1st April 2016, has not at the time of 
writing had much chance to alter practice at the site.  However, there have been 
some indications of how this new relationship has impacted the location of 
power, in a centralising way. 
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Figure 5.2 – Contrasting old and new models of Sellafield ownership and 
operation 
 
 
5.3.1 - New model – ‘Market Enhanced SLC’ 
The formal case for change in the model for the operation of Sellafield was 
made in a letter dated 17 December 2014 from John Clarke, the Chief 
Executive of the NDA to Stephen Lovegrove, the Permanent Secretary of the 
Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to seek ministerial 
approval for the model change.  The letter covers the issues with NMP, the 
problems of the complex Sellafield site, the new model, alternative options and 
other justificatory details.  The move to a new model of governance for 
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Sellafield is significant in what it says about the previous model, and the 
implications for the future for Sellafield and West Cumbria.  There are three key 
themes in the letter which are relevant here: 
 The performance issues of the old model; 
 The importance of public confidence; and, 
 The future governance of the Sellafield site. 
The aim of old model, as covered earlier, where a parent body organisation 
owns the site licence company, was to bring outside expertise and private 
sector discipline to bear on the complex issues of decommissioning.  Classic 
New Public Management, but it also suffered the same classic fate of much of 
the changes associated with New Public Management approaches public 
service delivery, a technique and orthodoxy more rigid than anything which 
came before and which takes little account of differences (Farazmand 2006: 
368).  Over time the PBO model has, slowly, been changed at a number of 
sites, in fact remaining only in its original form at the “small scale” and “simple” 
LLWR site (Clarke 2014: 2).  For these sites where the PBO model has worked 
or been able to be modified the scope and task to be performed are specifiable 
and the SLC itself has not major capability issues as Sellafield has (Clarke 
2014: 2). 
At Sellafield the experience of the PBO model was, as explored earlier, poor.  
The actual performance of the contrast is not in itself interesting to this thesis, 
but some of the detail as to why the model was a failure are.  From the outset, 
the NDA found it impossible to manage the PBO as well as it anticipated.  As an 
example, the competition process by which the four potential PBOs were 
evaluated resulted in commitments being made which the NDA found were not 
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able to be transformed into contractual commitments9, and as a consequence 
these were not delivered (Clarke 2014: 5).   The issue this confirms, one which 
was explored in abstract earlier when considering the PBO model for Sellafield, 
is that significant power is transferred to the private sector without satisfactory 
control.   Indeed, the conclusion of the NDA was that to transfer the entire 
scope of the operations of a site as large as Sellafield violated “good 
commercial practice” as the NDA has a sole purpose, to decommissioning its 
sites and Sellafield Ltd also has a sole purpose, carry out the NDA mission at 
Sellafield, but the PBO was only aligned with this in so far as it could be 
specified in a contract, which as has been seen, was not always possible 
(Clarke 2014: 5).  The result was a private sector body operating with little 
recourse to effective management from their client – the government. 
The old model was recognised by the NDA to lead to a situation where, despite 
secondment being seen specifically as a way to avoid this problem by making 
individuals “SLC staff for legal and employment purposes” (NDA 2013a: 7), the 
executives brought in by the PBO to Sellafield had spit loyalties: 
“the leadership team will be SLC employees rather than secondees … 
whose loyalties are evidently to Sellafield Ltd rather than to a third party 
organisation [and] SLC staff are more likely to get behind a leader from 
their own company rather than a leader seconded from elsewhere and 
this respect and support is key” (Clarke 2014: 6) 
The original 2001 White Paper was clear that the new approach to creating a 
market could only work so long as public confidence was maintained (DTI 2002: 
13).  In the case of NMP and Sellafield, the NDA considered that as a 
                                                          
9 Unfortunately, the original commitments and the contracts are unavailable due to their commercial 
sensitivity.   
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combination of poor performance and issues more inherent with the model 
considered here “stakeholder dissatisfaction … has reached a critical point” 
(Clarke 2014: 8) and change was unavoidable.  The new model (see figure 4.2), 
while seeing Sellafield return to direct ownership and management in the public 
sector, does not see an end to private sector involvement.  Indeed, for the NDA 
“private sector approaches and disciplines will add value” (Clarke 2014: 3) but 
through a “conventional” approach rather than the “bespoke PBO model” 
(Clarke 2014: 4), where the private sectors is engaged below the level of the 
SLC, rather than above it as either a ‘strategic’ or ‘programme partner’.  These 
are two new types of role where the strategic partner is aimed at addressing site 
wide organisational capacity deficiencies, a role which is established in large 
scale public projects – see Crossrail – but for the Sellafield site the programme 
partners are more specifically interesting, not actually for their role but for what 
they signal for the site.  Specifically, the new model seeks to disaggregate the 
site into “separate major programmes” (Clarke 2014: 4) and acquiring 
programme partners in these areas.  This means, in essence, the breakup of 
the site which was so opposed when BNFL was being broken up in 2006, as 
summarised by local MP Jamie Reed in the Commons: 
“I could not support the break-up or carve-up of the Sellafield site.  That 
has been done before – notably by BNFL during the 1990s – and it 
resulted in a deterioration in working practices and managerial 
accountability structures” (HoC Deb 18 May 2006, C1175) 
The new model is still in its infancy.  At the time of writing neither the strategic 
partner nor the programme partners have been identified and no disaggregation 
has actually occurred.  The direction for the site is however clear; smaller units 
operating more independently within the overarching site.  The potential for 
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differential terms and conditions, opposed in 2006, is real.  Indeed, a key 
element of the new model is “workforce reform” (Clarke 2014: 5).  New terms 
and conditions are being introduced which include lower pay and longer hours 
for new starters as well as other internal changes to pay, grading and so on 
(Sellafield Ltd 2016b: 26).   The driver for this change is twofold: firstly, there is 
the imperative to reduce costs and increase productivity; secondly, and more 
significantly, the status of the site as a wholly owned subsidiary of the NDA 
places exemptions which Sellafield has to wider public sector pay and 
conditions standards are placed at risk10.  The outline business case for the 
transition recognised that “increased proximity to government in the market 
enhanced SLC model” placed these exemptions at risk (NDA 2014b: 78).  
Specifically, the exemption on remuneration and pay was based on the private 
sector ownership (NDA 2014b: 78).  The specific case made for these 
exemptions to continue is redacted from the business case, but the implication 
is that these exemptions were only allowed on the basis of workforce reform: 
It should be clear that the NDA is not seeking any further exemptions 
than those currently in place, and we fully understand the need to 
improve efficiency at Sellafield, including through workforce reform, 
which the NDA has committed to carry out within three years of 
model change (Clarke 2014: 5) 
The new model, in bringing the site out of private ownership and into a closer 
relationship with government than it even had in the days of BNFL has therefore 
significant implications for the workforce, and consequently the wider 
community.  The potential changes of workforce reform will be, as the local MP 
                                                          
10 These are specifically the Expenditure Review Group (ERG) Controls which aim to reduce wasteful 
government spending, the public pay policy which deals with public sector workers’ pay, and the caps 
placed on senior executive remuneration 
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Jamie Reed argues, “significant” and have a “ripple effect” due to the 
dominance of the site in the total local workforce (Sellafield 2016b: 37). 
The model change has affected the way in which supply chain procurement is 
presented.  Issues relating to supply chain procurement, in particular a 
perceived the lack of local procurement, is a long-standing issue for the local 
area (Whitehaven News 2015).11  One effect of the model change has been in 
to emphasise value for money for the wider UK taxpaying public.   In its 
procurement strategy, Sellafield Ltd argues that as it is funded by the UK 
taxpayer there is consequently an obligation placed on Sellafield to base 
decisions on what achieves the greatest “value for money for the UK taxpayer” 
at large (Sellafield 2014: 3).  An example can be drawn from one procurement 
decision made after the model change where a local supplier lost a contract to a 
national bidder.  This was justified on the grounds that: 
“Sellafield Ltd is owned by the UK taxpayer and we have a duty to seek 
value for money in the contracts we let” (Whitehaven News 2016, 
emphasis added) 
The actual behaviours have not necessarily changed in supply chain 
procurement, and at the time of writing it is too early to tell given many contracts 
take significant amounts of time to award. However, it is interesting that the 
status of the site as wholly owned company is invoked for the first time in public.  
The rescaling of the ownership of the site has had both concrete impacts to 
terms and conditions, but the model change has also altered how the site 
presents itself and its actions to the local community. 
                                                          
11 Whether or not the support given to the local area is ‘fair’ is a substantial question which is not in the 
scope of this thesis, but the perception of what the community feels it is ‘owed’ for hosting Sellafield is 
addressed in the next chapter. 
127 
 
5.4 - Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste 
This section is not intended to analyse several phases of policy towards the 
long-term disposal of radioactive waste, but rather to explore the key 
differences between each which are relevant to the issue of the scaling of 
power in west Cumbria.  In order to achieve this it is necessary first to very 
briefly outline each of the three recent phases and their key features as they 
relate to the issue under examination.  There have been three different attempts 
to find an underground disposal site for the most radioactive wastes in the UK 
since the 1990s; the’ Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive’ (NIREX) in 
the 1990s, ‘Managing Radioactive Waste Safely’ and the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority’s Radioactive Waste Management Directorate’ in 
the 2000s and early 2010s and most recently ‘Implementing Geological 
Disposal’ and Radioactive Waste Management Limited from 2014.  
The attempt by NIREX to find a site for the disposal of wastes began in the 
1980s with the publication of a series of white papers and the attempted pursuit 
of potential sites in Lincolnshire, Humberside, Essex and Bedfordshire which 
were ultimately unsuccessful and abandoned in 1987 (Hetherington 1998: 19).  
Following this experience NIREX committed to an open and transparent 
process, where the details of its site investigations would be public, but contrary 
to that commitment in 1989 following a shortlisting of sites, two remained, 
Sellafield in Cumbria and Dounreay in Caithness which became just Sellafield in 
1991 (Hetherington 1998: 19).  Issues with the study of geology with boreholes 
alone led to the application by NIREX for permission to construct a ‘Rock 
Characterisation Facility’ near Sellafield, which was the subject of a public 
inquiry in 1995/96, but this was ultimately rejected by the Secretary of State in 
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1997, with a particular focus on the deficiencies in the site selection process 
noted by the Secretary of State as a major contributory factor in his decision to 
refuse permission (Hetherington 1998: 27).  Murray (2003) for the International 
Atomic Energy Agency summarised the issues with the NIREX approach, where 
in the years leading up to the public inquiry the process was not transparent, 
was not developed in consultation with all interested and affected parties, did 
not have clear decision points, did not explain how decisions had been taken 
and did not provide opportunities for interested and affected parties to provide 
inputs. 
The Managing Radioactive Waste Safely policy, began in 2001, resulted in the 
publication of a white paper in 2008, which took into account the issues with the 
NIREX approach, and resulted in a very different policy.  The key difference 
was that in the new policy “…communities voluntarily express an interest in 
taking part in the process that will ultimately provide a site…” (DEFRA 2008: 
47).  This led to a five stage process, where local ‘Decision Making Bodies’ (i.e. 
councils) make an “Expression of Interest” to government in taking part in 
without commitment discussions with government and initial geological 
screening (DEFRA 2008: 7).  Following this and each state the Decision Making 
Body would have to vote to continue, with each stage gradually narrowing the 
search for a site within the area, with a final vote before underground works 
began on the repository (DEFRA 2008: 7).  Three decision making bodies made 
an ‘expression of interest’ to government – Copeland Borough, Allerdale 
Borough and Cumbria County (for the areas of the Copeland and Allerdale 
boroughs) – which all voted on participation in stage four on 30th January 2013.  
The two borough council executives voted to proceed and the county council 
voted against proceeding.  The county council cabinet which voted on the 
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decision to not proceed to stage four did so by a 7 to 3 majority, with the 
majority of its councillors representing divisions outside the proposed search 
areas in Copeland and Allerdale12.  The vote by the county council led 
government to terminate the MRWS process in west Cumbria (DECC 2013).  
While committing government to continuing with the approach set out in the 
MRWS policy, it was never revived and a new approach was published the 
following year. 
There are great similarities in the approaches taken in MRWS and the more 
recent (and still current at the time of writing) process for finding a site for the 
underground disposal of higher activity radioactive wastes, but there are some 
key differences.  The principal of communities volunteering remains as the 
method for the initiation of the process, but the staged decision making model is 
removed and the timings of key decisions is reordered slightly and a new 
innovation – the ‘test of community support’ (DECC 2014: 27) – is introduced.  
The updated framework, accounting for lessons learned from the abortive 
MRWS process, introduces desk-based national geological screening of the 
type done for potential host communities following an expression of interest in 
the old process (DECC 2014: 29).  Government believed the old process “overly 
prescriptive about procedural arrangements” and instead of staged decision 
points, allows councils to vote to end the process at any time prior to the 
submission of a planning application to the National Infrastructure Planning 
Commission (DECC 2014: 30).  The process to be followed locally makes no 
mention of the requirement for both local authorities in two-tier areas (such as 
Cumbria), and does not elaborate on what the “test of public support” might look 
like in terms of process and scale (DECC 2014: 44).  In both the case of the 
                                                          
12 I attended the Copeland meeting as a councillor and watched live coverage of the Cumbria County 
Council meeting. 
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MRWS process and this modified process government “reserve the right” to 
“explore other approaches” should the process look “not likely to work” (DEFRA 
2008: 47; DECC 2014: 31).  In both cases too there are unspecified community 
benefits to be negotiated with a host community for providing “an essential 
service to the nation” (DEFRA 2008: 6; DECC 2014: 45). 
 
Figure 5.3 – The scaling of key points in the three most recent higher 
activity radioactive waste siting processes (Purple = NIREX; Yellow = 
MRWS; Red = Implementing Geological Disposal) 
The most significant changes to have occurred are summarised in the three 
stages in the diagram above.  They are the selection of a site, the way in which 
development consent is undertaken and the making of the final decision to 
proceed.  The volunteerism approach in principle opens the whole site selection 
process up to a wide range of potential communities, however in practice it 
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ensures that areas with existing nuclear facilities come forward of their own 
accord.  This is an established trend in other radioactive waste siting processes 
across the world.   The desire to host a disposal facility for highly radioactive 
wastes is not common, demonstrated by the lack of any other communities, 
especially those not near to an existing nuclear site, coming forward – a 
characteristic common of many radioactive waste siting processes around the 
world (Bickerstaff 2012: 2616).  Therefore, in practice, the approach to site 
selection based on volunteerism has the effect not of broadening the number 
potential sites but overcoming any suggestion of imposition by the state and a 
lack of transparency in the initial site selection.   
The changes to the development control stage are not unique to radioactive 
waste, but common provisions of the Planning Act 2008 which apply to many 
types of infrastructure, such as power generation and transport. The move from 
local planning inquiries to consultations has been explored in detail in relation to 
nuclear power developments (Johnstone 2010; 2014).  It is argued that the 
rescaled public participation from a set-piece showdown at a planning inquiry, 
where the scope is open to alteration, to the strict separation of issues and their 
confinement to different scales (such as local consultations considering only 
local issues) has “diminished the ‘political opportunities' available for certain 
nongovernmental actors to intervene in the policy process” (Johnstone 2014: 
697).  These alterations to public participation in the planning process are 
symptomatic of the “post-political and the post-democratic” turn in governance, 
in which the idea of a process structured around competing visions is 
superseded and debate becomes “reduced to managerial and technocratic 
particularities” such that experts hold the greatest sway and nuclear 
developments become “an ‘inevitability’” (Johnstone 2010: 91).  This is not to 
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say that planning inquiries were ideal and their failings are multiple and well 
known, such as being exclusory of non-experts, but they at least allowed for 
actors and issues from a range of scales to coalesce unofficially in a way that 
has been structured and confined out of existence by the Planning Act 2008 
(Johnstone 2014: 699).  In the case of nuclear waste in the UK, the planning 
inquiry in 1995/96 was successful in having the NIREX application for a Rock 
Characterisation Facility refused by the Secretary of State.  Achieving this was 
in part down to the combined efforts of NGOs, such as Friends of the Earth, and 
both local authorities, Cumbria County Council and Copeland Borough Council, 
coming together in the inquiry to oppose the permission in the face of NIREX’ 
vastly superior financial resources (COWAM 2001: 17).  The MRWS case, on 
the other hand, never reached the stage of a development consent and that 
remains an upcoming development under the current process.  However, it is 
clear that a planning inquiry can be more empowering of an array of interests 
than “UNCLE—Unlimited Consultation Leading to Exhaustion” may be in the 
new planning process (Johnstone 2014: 705). 
The change to the final decision point between the NIREX experience and the 
subsequent policies does introduce a significant local ‘safeguard’ on the 
development.  In the MRWS policy the local decision making bodies had the 
right to withdraw up to the point “when underground operations and construction 
are due to begin” (DEFRA 2008: 56).  Following on from this “final opportunity” 
to exercise the right to withdraw the site would be further characterised and 
subject to regulatory and planning approval (DEFRA 2008: 65).  The MRWS 
white paper was published at the time the Planning Act 2008 was a bill going 
through parliament, and the policy was based on the assumption that this would 
become law and be the planning regime under which a geological disposal 
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facility would be granted permission (DEFRA 2008: 43-43).  This means no 
planning inquiry.  This is the process to be followed for the current policy 
towards radioactive wastes, and to that end the government amended the 
Planning Act 2008 with a statutory instrument, The Infrastructure Planning 
(Radioactive Waste Geological Disposal Facilities) Order 2015, which amended 
the list of ‘Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects’ to include “development 
relating to a radioactive waste geological disposal facility” (Infrastructure 
Planning Order 2015: 1).  The Implementing Geological Disposal policy does 
however alter the timings of the elements of local consent and planning 
applications.  While the MRWS policy had the planning application prior to, or 
alongside, the planning application, the new policy most specifically places the 
last point of a local right to withdraw “any stage in the siting process leading up 
to the test of public support” which if positive would allow the developer to apply 
for “planning consent for a GDF, and other permissions to proceed from the 
environmental and nuclear safety and security regulators” (DECC 2014: 44).   
The test of public support is the most novel element of this current process, and 
while its timing prior to a planning application is clear, the actual mechanism is 
not proscribed in the white paper, as “the precise mechanisms and timings for 
this will be informed by the recommendations of the community representation 
working group” (DECC 2014: 44).  The final decision “will not be taken until, and 
unless, there is a positive test of public support for a GDF at the site in 
question” (DECC 2014: 45).  However, the significant issue for Cumbria County 
Council’s cabinet in ending the MRWS process was that the Right of Withdrawal 
was not legally binding on government (BBC News 30 January 2013) and this 
remains the case. 
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The experience of the changes to radioactive waste policy over these years 
points out two particularly significant changes, which are the alteration of the 
site selection process and also the way in which consent for a site is granted.  
These changes have been brought about with the sole aim of securing 
geological disposal of radioactive wastes.  The potential to challenge the 
construction of such a facility has, in the design of these policies, been given 
two significant hurdles.  The first of these is related to and builds upon the 
planning regime changes already discussed.  Opposition to nuclear power in 
the UK in the 1980s, which coalesced around the public inquiry into the Hinkley 
Point B reactors, was although unsuccessful in that specific development, 
delayed the facility by being able to consider issues of need and suitability of 
nuclear power by broadening out the scope and scale of the inquiry (Johnstone 
2014: 703).  However, Geological Disposal being a settled method, there is not 
the opportunity to question formally the nature of the facility being proposed. 
That decision was taken and settled well before 2008, when between 2001 and 
2006 an expert committee, the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management 
(CoRWM) published their recommendation that “geological disposal, preceded 
by safe and secure interim storage, was the best available approach for the 
long-term management of higher activity radioactive wastes” which government 
accepted (DEFRA 2008: 10).  This in effect closes off one significant route to 
argue and affect the development of radioactive waste disposal. 
The second change which is very significant, and occurred following the MRWS 
process failing to proceed in West Cumbria due to the opposition of Cumbria 
County Council, is the removal of the requirement for both local authorities in 
two tier areas to agree for a site to go forward.  The NIREX site selection 
choosing Sellafield was not unsuccessful because of a lack of public support 
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near the proposed site, which was positive close by and diminished with 
distance (COWAM 2001: 24), but because local government opposed the 
scheme in conjunction with NGOs at the planning inquiry as explored earlier.  
The same could be said for the MRWS process, where public opinion towards 
going on with the site selection process was overwhelmingly positive in West 
Cumbria but diminished with distance, such that net support was +45% in 
Copeland, but only +14% in Allerdale and +16% in the rest of Cumbria (Ipsos 
MORI 2012: 3).  The simplification of the site selection process, such as 
removing both staged decision points and the need for upper tier local 
authorities’ participation, aims to give greater “confidence in the process to 
deliver this nationally significant infrastructure project” (DECC 2014: 6).  It can 
hardly be ignored that this occurred following two siting attempts in which 
Cumbria County Council played the leading role in their early termination and 
Copeland Borough Council had made clear its willingness to ‘go it alone’ in the 
MRWS process (BBC News 30 January 2013). 
The experience of the repeated rescaling of policy towards radioactive waste 
disposal is one of repeated attempts by developers and governments to find a 
site, which is understandable given the danger posed by long-term storage of 
highly radioactive wastes in ageing facilities at Sellafield and around the UK.  In 
each new policy and process, lessons from the failure of the previous policy 
were learned and changes in the next reflected that.  Examples highlighted here 
include the greater transparency in the site selection through volunteerism and 
the end of planning inquiries from NIREX to MRWS, or through streamlining the 
multi-level governance of the process following MRWS.  The only community 
under discussion or willing to come forward to discuss the possibility of hosting 
an underground radioactive waste facility has been West Cumbria.  While in the 
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NIREX case the local borough council did oppose the scheme, it was not on the 
principle of objecting to a repository but to the process NIREX followed 
(COWAM 2001).  Indeed, public opinion locally towards the nuclear industry 
and towards specific radioactive waste facility siting schemes has been positive 
(COWAM 2001: 24; Ipsos MORI 2012: 3).  In each case then the policies have 
altered after west Cumbria proved unsuccessful, then re-entered and proved 
unsuccessful again.  Government clearly do not wish to predetermine any site, 
but they have clearly worked to make sure that the area can keep coming back 
and have a greater chance of getting further each time. 
 
 
5.5 – Discussion: Political projects with scalar implications 
The need for a new model to replace BNFL and UKAEA to manage the nuclear 
legacy stemmed from the desire not only to save money (NDA 2006: 6), but to 
bring expertise and capabilities that the government believed it did not possess 
itself to address a complex problem and “benefit all aspects of site clean-up, 
improving safety and environmental performance as well as outcomes, reducing 
timescales as well as costs” (DTI 2002: 33).  The NDA blamed the subsequent 
failure of the transfer of ownership of Sellafield Ltd on the difficulty of managing 
such a complex site through contractual relationships (NDA) and incentives 
which had unintended consequences (KPMG 2012).  The Public Accounts 
Committee highlighted the lack of risk transfer to the private sector under the 
PBO model as a significant issue which led to cost and time overruns which did 
not affect the PBO companies (PAC 2012).  There was, basically, not enough 
incentive in the PBO model at Sellafield to perform well.  For waste 
management the changes in policy have not had to deal with operational 
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failures, having never proceeded far enough.  Instead, the inability of 
government or the nuclear industry to persuade West Cumbria, or any other 
area in the UK, to host higher activity wastes has been the driver behind policy 
change. 
The changing governance of the nuclear legacy, despite the aim being to 
‘create a market’ for nuclear clean up, is an example of Type II governance i.e.   
private provision organized on a contractual basis with central government, 
rather than market competition (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 25).  This is 
demonstrated by shift from BNFL to the NDA which involved the move from 
government direct provision to contractual relationships with private sector 
companies where, despite not being a total privatisation, significant autonomy is 
granted (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 25).  The result is a mixture of “specific 
competencies and local discretion” (Bulkeley and Kern 2006: 2239) evidenced 
by the freedom NMP had to pursue objectives which took focus away from the 
achievement of its main obligations (KPMG 2013: 110) which contributed to 
model change. 
The involvement of both state and non-state actors in the ownership and 
management of the sites makes the boundary between public and private 
“blurred” (Allen 2004: 29) with decision making being split between the SLC, 
PBO, regulators, government and others between ‘multiple centres’ (Ostrom, 
Tiebout and Warren 1961: 831) and creating a “complex network” by which 
governance of the nuclear legacy is achieved (Marks et al 1996: 346; Kern and 
Bulkeley 2009: 311).  This created a ‘public service industry’ (Ostrom and 
Ostrom 1999, 88-89) for nuclear decommissioning.  In such an ‘industry’, 
authority is transferred as a discrete package of defined ‘capabilities’ (MacLeod 
and Jones 2007: 1187).  As seen with the level of control the NDA and state 
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were able to exert over the Sellafield contract, indeed ultimately bringing it back 
under direct national control, the authority of the state itself was, however, never 
relinquished.   
The ability for government to reorganise the governance of Sellafield however is 
revelatory of several key features and extensions of type II governance.  Firstly, 
the “catalysts for governance” are diverse and include “wider social/political 
pressures” (Armitage 2008: 11) such as reports from parliamentary select 
committees, watchdogs and other sources which made the previous 
governance arrangements untenable as they lost the “public confidence” which 
was necessary for their operation (DTI 2001: 17).  Secondly, the flexibility of 
task specific type II structures (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 28; Faludi 2012: 203) 
is demonstrated by the ability of government and the NDA to alter the 
governance model quickly with little apparent cost. Thirdly, while government 
has become dispersed, the notion that it is necessarily diminished as a result of 
the shift to governance is overly simplistic, but rather the central state remains 
strong and able to extend its power (Swyngedouw 1997: 142; Allen 2004: 27; 
Baker 2015: 250-251) evidenced in this case by the re-nationalisation of the 
management of the Sellafield site.  
The practice of governance, as discussed, embraces a range of actors and 
institutions, and in any given type II governance configuration, each has their 
own strengths and weaknesses (Ostrom and Walker 1997: 36).  The issue that 
is demonstrated by the Selafield site governance model failure is that an over-
reliance on private sector actors as a catalyst for change was misguided.  The 
state had to mobilise its “peculiar position [as] the actor of last resort” (Baker 
2015: 250) to reorganise the governance architecture to embrace a wider array 
of policy tools than contractual relationships were able to. 
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These changes in two different areas of nuclear policy both highlight the 
importance of the range of policy tools available to government to achieve its 
aims.  The ‘tool of government’ approach (Hood 1986; Hood and Margetts 
2007) proposes a framework of four ‘tools’ by which government achieves 
change: nodality, authority, treasure and organisation (NATO).  Nodality 
involves information and the ability of government to persuade.  Authority is the 
ability for government to arrange, instruct and enforce structures and rules.  
Treasure based tools, or “chequebook-government” (Hood 1983: 40) involve 
government incentivising actions.  Finally, organisation tools relate to the ability 
of government to provide directly through, amongst other elements of state 
organisation, its “stock of people” (Hood 1983: 6).   
 NODALITY AUTHORITY ORGANISATION TREASURE 
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BNFL 
 
 State managed (Deficient)  
NMP  Privately run (Deficient) 
Contracts and 
incentives 
(Insufficient risk 
transfer) 
2016+  State managed (Deficient) 
Private sub-
contracts for 
specific aims with 
risk transfer 
W
A
S
T
E
 
 
NIREX 
 
Deficient (Imposed)   
MRWS 
Volunteerism & 
(Right of 
withdrawal) 
(Threatened)  
Community 
benefits package 
2014+ 
Volunteerism, 
Right of 
withdrawal & 
Test of public 
support 
(Threatened)  
Community 
benefits package 
Table 5.2 – Policy tools applied by decommissioning and waste 
management policies 
For the different nuclear policy areas the range of ‘policy tools’ have varying 
significance, both in their application to achieve the stated aims of government 
and also in their role in undermining the achievement of those aims.  For 
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nuclear decommissioning the ‘stock of people’ as defined by the expertise 
required to decommission the site was the primary deficiency that change from 
BNFL to the Parent Body model sought to address.  The use of a contracted 
parent body was not successful as the contract was too complex to incentivise 
effectively.  For waste management, the overreliance of the industry on their 
ability to define a site and successfully then persuade the local community 
drove the change from NIREX to MRWS.  However, the lack of a legally 
guaranteed right of withdrawal and the remaining explicit threat that government 
could at any stage override local opposition led to further failure.  For waste 
then the constant threat of government authority has been problematic, and 
other tools have been employed to persuade and incentivise communities to 
volunteer themselves.  In short, in common with other policy problems, including 
attempts to revive the nuclear power industry (Baker 2015), management of the 
nuclear legacy reveals that policy tools are not mutually exclusive, but that they 
must work in combination to solve complex policy problems.  
In the case of the privatisation of Sellafield Ltd and its renationalisation, this 
reveals the weakness of reliance on, and the need to combine, both treasure 
based and authority tools to overcome the deficiencies in its organisational 
capacity.  Perhaps fittingly, it is the over-reliance on both separately that was 
problematic for two different governance arrangements.  Where government in 
2001 believed that BNFL lacked the capability to achieve their aims for the cost 
and time to decommission Sellafield and other sites, the recent model change 
revealed the NDA’s opinion that the overreliance on a purely contractual and 
incentivised relationship with a private owner was insufficient for such a 
complex site as Sellafield.  The new model, which brings the site back into 
public ownership but supplements that with both a strategic partner from the 
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private sector for site-wide deficiencies in capability and programme partners to 
work with the SLC on specific areas of the business.   
The overreliance on and failure of the contractual, incentive based model for the 
Sellafield site, when contrasted with the success of that approach at other less 
complex facilities on the NDA estate, also highlights a common failure in the 
application of new public management approaches to governance – the failure 
of ‘one size fits all’ approaches (Ohemeng 2010: 456).  Undoubtedly hastened 
by the breakup of BNFL, the rush to contract out the entire NDA estate can with 
hindsight be viewed as a mistake.  The return now to a more nuanced 
partnership between the public and the private sector is in fact redolent of the 
spirit of plans for the public-private partnership approach for BNFL in the late 
1990s and early 2000s.  However, despite the management of the site being 
taken from a nationalised company (BNFL), to an international consortia (NMP), 
and back to a nationalised company (Sellafield Ltd), for the workforce and wider 
community there has been no return to the past.  Scale is therefore only one 
element of this political project, invoked in specific ways to justify policy 
changes.  MacKinnon (2011: 29) argues that political projects, which aim at 
controlling and influencing areas of policy and social activity, can have scalar 
implications, particularly when scale is strategically deployed by various actors 
to justify changes in policy.  In both areas of policy towards the nuclear legacy 
scale has been deployed as a justification in altering policy and the geographies 
of power.   
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Figure 5.4 – Simplistic and complex representations of the rescaling of the 
management of Sellafield 
 
The policy tools approach provides a succinct overview of the problems, and 
solutions, each new policy and structure sought to address for the management 
of the nuclear legacy.  The lack of ‘home grown’ expertise in the 
decommissioning of Sellafield, and opposition towards attempts to site 
radioactive waste facilities in a centralised process were the two key 
challenges.  International expertise and community volunteerism were (part of) 
the proposed solutions.  These are scalar issues, as parts of political projects.  
For the management of the Sellafield site, from the 2002 White Paper 
‘Managing the Nuclear Legacy’ which started the process of change in the way 
the nuclear industry was governed, scale was invoked to justify the move to a 
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‘competitive market’ for decommissioning and clean-up.  The key justification for 
the change was that a competitive global market for decommissioning would  
“…help to stimulate innovation and improvements in safety and operating 
standards and enable the LMA to make the best possible use of the best 
available skills.” (DTI 2002: 13) 
The implication being that existing skills were insufficient, compared to what 
was out there globally: 
“What is now important is that BNFL’s management and staff have the 
opportunity to deliver on the good work already begun to improve the 
company’s performance... and demonstrate that it can continue to 
compete successfully in the global market place.” (DTI 2001: 49) 
The veneration of the ‘global market’ is a ‘strategic deployment of scale’ 
(MacKinnon 2011: 29) which invokes the global scale to justify privatisation of 
the nuclear site management.  This framing also relegates the status of the 
existing workforce, who had until that point been led to expect they had 
internationally marketable skills, and in the new model became classified 
implicitly as deficient and requiring help.  However, as expected in the 
processes of rescaling, change is not entire but rather demonstrates a path-
dependency, where the existing structures are retained but novelty is added to 
what is carried over from the past (Brenner 2004: 11).  In this case, the sites 
and the vast majority of the workforce were retained, but the ownership was 
transferred to the NDA, new management were added in by secondment to the 
existing organisation and the work carried out became specified by contract.  
The new structure therefore fundamentally rescaled the management of the 
site, which implicitly made the workforce simultaneously more global, working 
for a consortia of multinational firms, and more locally scaled, as no longer part 
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of an organisation seeking to compete globally itself.  The status of the 
workforce is returned to in the next chapter. 
The return to state ownership and management of Sellafield was brought about, 
as explored earlier, by the poor performance of NMP in terms of cost and 
delivery of major projects.  These issues were comprehensively raised by 
reports from the National Audit Office (NAO 2012), private analysis of NMP 
performance for the NDA by KPMG (KPMG 2013), and both reports and public 
hearings of the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee which took 
place in both Westminster and West Cumbria (PAC 2014).  The rescaling of the 
management of Sellafield once again was the result of the conflict between 
scale and territory. 
Recognising that networks, territory, place and scale as different forms of socio-
spatial relations do not exist in isolation avoids incomplete analyses (Jessop et 
al 2008: 396).  Crises, and the resultant remaking of different ‘fixes’, are the 
result of successful or attempted re-ordering of the importance of the different 
dimensions of spatial relations (Jessop et al 2008: 397).  For the management 
of the nuclear legacy at Sellafield the relative importance of territory, as 
multileveled government, and scale as differently scaled governance, changed 
from 2005 to 2015.  There were two principal reasons for the national scale 
exerting greater control over the legacy management issue. 
Firstly, national public spending became one of the biggest political issues after 
the 2010 election.  During the 2010-2015 parliament, departmental spending 
was cut by, on average, 9.1% (IFS 2015).  However, spending on the 
Department for Energy and Climate Change was one of only four departments 
to see an increase in its funding, by over 10% in real terms (IFS 2015), driven in 
part by the cost of the nuclear decommissioning programme not being able to 
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be reduced.  It is particularly important then, when education and other public 
services are seeing funding reduced, that value for money is demonstrated. 
This is where the second change in circumstance drove rescaling of 
management at Sellafield; parliamentary select committees changed hugely 
after the 2010 general election.  Elections by secret ballot to select committees 
from 2011 has transformed their activities, making them no longer reliant on, or 
controlled by, party whips and consequently in a few short years they have 
become much more effective at scrutinising the executive (Hagelund and 
Goddard 2015); or to be more succinct, they now “never allow a good crisis to 
go to waste” (Russell 2011: 64).  The newly activist Select Committee on Public 
Accounts was extremely critical of the expenditure at Sellafield, both in specifics 
and in the way in which the whole contract model precluded “maximising value 
for the taxpayer” where risk cannot be effectively transferred to the private 
contractor in one site wide contract  (PAC 2012: 9).  It was in the select 
committee that the conflict between the globally rescaled management of the 
Sellafield site and the imperative of the national state to achieve greater value 
given changed political and economic circumstances was played out.  Existing 
scalar constructions are made and re-made at the point of interaction between 
existing and emergent projects and scales (MacKinnon 2010: 37).  In this case, 
the emergent project of austerity and ‘public value’ at a national scale, and the 
old project of creating a market for nuclear clean up, conflicted and the 
management of the Sellafield site was changed, and rescaled, again. 
For the disposal of radioactive waste, the political project, most strictly defined, 
is aimed at securing a site for an underground facility.  Critics of the process say 
that the political project is actually aimed at securing local approval in West 
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Cumbria to host such a facility13.  The process creates new scales of 
intervention, such as designating councils as decision making bodies, and 
establishing siting partnerships and other bodies.  The scale at which questions 
are asked clearly, in this instance, has a bearing on the answer received.  Local 
public opinion and experience of the MRWS process, suggest that Copeland, 
both the public and the council, is much more likely to support finding a site in 
their area.  The exclusion of the county council from the Implementing 
Geological Disposal siting process, begun in 2016, could be interpreted as 
rescaling the decision making burden to exclude a less favourable political 
structure at a higher scale.  The change has undoubtedly diminished future 
opportunities for political action to oppose geological disposal, should Copeland 
Council take part in the new process.   
The issue of competing levels of government in the demise of the MRWS 
process is another example of the national state being unable to actually 
commit to rescaling its authority.  While perhaps admirable of government to at 
least be upfront about the possibility, should volunteerism not work, that other 
options could be pursued (DEFRA 2008: 47).  In one sense this is nothing more 
than a statement of fact, that government retains ultimate authority as explored 
earlier.  However, the issue was not the statement of the obvious, but even 
within that reality the minimal effort put into making the right of withdrawal more 
than words in a white paper.  This lack of commitment by central government to 
make even a partially binding rescaling of power over the right of withdrawal to 
a lower level of government caused the process to end prematurely.   
                                                          
13 On-line consultation responses on the change from the MRWS process to the Implementing 
Geological Disposal white paper contain this theme throughout – see 
www.gov.uk%2Fgovernment%2Fuploads%2Fsystem%2Fuploads%2Fattachment_data%2Ffile%2F298806
%2FRedacted_Consultation_Responses_from_the_Online_Tool.xlsx&usg=AFQjCNHnVhgpjcdNIbW8JxTrK
BctI2caQQ&sig2=BoKvMqP8hj3SXyJ27R5Mjw&cad=rja  
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The solution to this problem for the Implementing Geological Disposal process 
is twofold.  Firstly, the removal of an entire level of government from the formal 
process of withdrawal from a site selection process simplifies the multi-level 
government of the issue.  Secondly, the introduction of a ‘test of public support’ 
(DECC 2014: 27) creates an entirely new scale for the governance of the 
geological disposal process, but one which is as yet undefined and dependent 
on the site pursued.  The scale of the test of public support will be significant in 
influencing the outcome.  Make it small enough and issues directly connected 
with construction, such as noise, nuisance and so on could dominate (Wylie et 
al 2016: 154).  Make it big enough and potential benefits will not be important to 
a large number of those taking part (Wylie et al 2016: 155-156), opening up 
more possibilities for opposition and another failure for government.  Defining 
the public eligible to take part in any test of support on the issue of a geological 
disposal facility is in essence creating a new scale of authority, which can be 
beneficial or problematic depending on both the scale and one’s perspective.  
Given the changes made from the NIREX approach, through MRWS, and now 
in the current process, which all aim at the successful siting of a GDF, it is 
reasonable to assume that government will seek to craft this new scale to be 
the most potentially favourable public for the issue, and others to argue for a 
different scaling depending on their political aims.  Territory thus structures new 
scales, which will be contested, both in an attempt to secure a political project. 
The two major elements of policy towards the nuclear legacy – 
decommissioning and waste management – involve the complex interaction 
between power as territory (multi-level government) and power as scale 
(governance).  However, despite both being important, rumours of the demise 
of central government are greatly exaggerated.  With issues such as “borders, 
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security, sovereignty” and other quintessentially territorial issues rarely out of 
the spotlight, territory has undergone a “decline and rise” (Painter 2010: 1090). 
 
5.6 – Conclusions 
There is not one centre of authority in modern governance, rather it is dispersed 
across multiple locations and scales, moving up, down and outwards from the 
central state (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 233).  These new centres of authority 
may take many forms, such as supranational structures of government, 
privatised forms of governance and more.  For the issue of the nuclear legacy, 
the privatisation of the management of the sites through competitive contracts 
transferred significant capabilities (and thus authority) to the private sector.   
The transfer of the ownership of Sellafield ltd to Nuclear Management Partners 
meant that for the first time in its history, the Sellafield site and workforce were 
working for the private sector14.  While the involvement of private contractors on 
the site and in the wider west Cumbrian economy is not novel, by the time of the 
competition for the Sellafield site it had become very dominant of the west 
Cumbrian economy.15  The dominance of BNFL, combined with its status as a 
commercial organisation gave it a degree of independence, undoubtedly 
enhanced by the remoteness of the area from either BNFL’s headquarters in 
Cheshire or ministers and civil servants in London.  The changes begun in 
2006-2008 with the competition for the management of the Sellafield site were 
therefore qualitatively different, and of a scale not seen in the area before.  The 
changes therefore while not novel in the context of the wider economy, were 
novel for West Cumbria. 
                                                          
14 Despite the majority of the funding being from the treasury, except for the commercial reprocessing 
income, although this was not new income so still arguably public money. 
15 By some measures Copeland was the most public sector dependent borough in the UK (Reference)  
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A very simplified version of the governance arrangements for Sellafield and 
other NDA sites, as shown in figure 4.3, obscures a much more complex 
system of governance.  Among the components not included are the formal 
roles of the treasury in funding, international bodies such as the International 
Atomic Energy Authority and the World Association of Nuclear Operators in 
standard setting, local authorities development control and some waste 
authorisation responsibilities, and others.  In addition to these formalised 
organisations there are also informal elements which are also important, 
especially when considering an industry which relies on local support for its 
ability to operate (Blowers 2003: 71) and a system of governance which the 
works only in so far as it commands public confidence (DTI 2001: 17).  In this 
context, the data explored in this chapter offers three key insights.   
Firstly, suggestions that rescaling down to more local levels being more 
empowering while rescaling to more global levels being inherently 
disempowering of workers and communities is demonstrated here to be overly 
simplistic.  An end to national collective bargaining, for example, is seen as part 
of the ‘new authoritarianism’ of the post-Fordist state as market-forces, and thus 
money, dictates the terms (Swyngedouw 2000: 69).  However, as Swyngedouw 
recognises here, it is not the scale that matters, but the imperative.  Rescaling 
bargaining to a more local level for the Sellafield staff was, at a time of public 
sector pay freezes, empowering for the staff, compared to the stringent 
requirements of being part of the national public sector wage bargaining in 
2016.  The rescaling of power through the privatisation and nationalisation of 
the Sellafield site, from national to global and back again, reveals the 
complexity of rescaling and the range of diverse, specific impacts that has.  No 
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scale, is appears, has any inherent benefit in and of itself (Brown and Purcell 
2005: 607). 
Secondly, the networked rescaling of the ownership and management of the 
Sellafield site highlighted the tensions between place and space in the 
contemporary economy, where hypermobile elites interact and conflict with 
embedded capital and labour.   The conflicted priorities of seconded staff from 
multi-national firms in their control of the implementation of government policy 
towards nuclear decommissioning demonstrates the difficulty of relying on 
market mechanisms to deliver public policy objectives.  This leads on to the 
wider issue revealed in the exploration of the changes in the governance of the 
nuclear legacy, that solutions must be specific and appropriate to the problem, 
and the importance of a wider perspective on governance which recognises 
how the state achieves its aims. 
As such, the third issue revealed in this chapter is that the governance 
arrangements which sought to create a market for nuclear decommissioning, 
and their subsequent failure at Sellafield, highlight the problems inherent in the 
application of one-size fits all solutions, common to the application of market 
mechanisms to public policy (Hood 1991: 3).  Taking a longer-term view of the 
Sellafield site, it is demonstrated that although seeking to achieve policy aims 
through the private sector failed due to an inability to properly control the parties 
involved through market mechanisms, a simple change to state control does not 
offer ideal model as the experience and performance of BNFL demonstrated.  
Rather, the experience of the governance of the nuclear legacy highlights the 
need to draw upon a wide array of policy tools to effectively govern complex 
problems. 
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CHAPTER 6 – NUCLEAR COMMUNITY: DECOMMISSIONING 
AND WEST CUMBRIA 
6.1 – Introduction 
This chapter, through the analysis of focus group and survey data, analyses in 
detail specific changes which resulted from the change in governance of the 
Sellafield site in West Cumbria.  The analysis of the survey data provides the 
context of a complex, contradictory local public opinion towards the nuclear 
industry.  Despite overwhelmingly positive public opinion towards the industry in 
general, a significant minority and in some areas a majority of residents 
expressed a belief that West Cumbria does not see a great enough benefit from 
hosting nuclear sites.  The issue of corporate responsibility, or lack thereof, of 
the Sellafield site is discussed.  The chapter then analysis, through focus group 
transcripts, the changes made following the part-privatisation of the 
management of the site.  The changes implemented by the new, private 
management, predominantly composed of executives from overseas, 
demonstrates the role of local elites in the exercise of significant economic 
power and suggests that they have interests to serve which are contradictory to 
the interests of their new host community.  This has disempowering 
consequences for the community and results in issues for the local perception 
of the site and its management. 
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6.2 – Nuclear community 
 
There's a kind of an unholy alliance in a way here in the fact that you've 
got a very dominant single industry but also in terms of geography there 
isn't an awful lot else without transport links, so I think there's a sense of 
identity that probably is related on a historical pro-nuclear perspective, 
because there isn't a lot else.1 
 
An isolated area with a dominant industry and little opportunity to diversity.  
Public opinion towards the nuclear industry in West Cumbria, as the focus 
group participant alludes, is positive throughout West Cumbria and 
overwhelmingly so in Copeland (see table 6.1).  However, while the industry is a 
large employer, and as a result average wages in Copeland in particular are 
extremely high (see chapter 2), there are challenges facing West Cumbria.   
There are areas of significant poverty, struggling local public services and high 
wages failing to translate into a thriving local retail economy. 
 
Table 6.1 – Public support for the nuclear industry at national and local 
levels 
 
                                                          
1 02/12/2013 Copeland Borough Council 
 Favourable % Neither or don’t 
know % 
Unfavourable % 
West Cumbria (2012)* 60 10 30 
National (2010) 34 23 41 
National (1997) 23 18 58 
West Cumbria (1996) 60 19 18 
1996; 1997 (Wylie 2011); 2010 (Ipsos MORI 2010); 2012 (Ipsos MORI 2012) * Support 
for the continuing the process to find a site for the most hazardous radioactive wastes 
in the area 
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Do you or does someone in your household work in the nuclear industry? * Nuclear Opinion 
Crosstabulation 
 
Nuclear Opinion 
Total Pro Nuclear Anti Nuclear 
Do you or does 
someone in 
your household 
work in the 
nuclear 
industry? 
Yes - at 
Sellafield 
Count 146 5 151 
% within nuclear household 96.7% 3.3% 100.0% 
Yes - not at 
Sellafield 
Count 9 1 10 
% within nuclear household 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
No Count 190 26 216 
% within nuclear household 88.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 345 32 377 
% within nuclear household 91.5% 8.5% 100.0% 
Kendall's tau-b.001           Gamma .001              Spearman Correlation .003 
 
Table 6.2 – Crosstabulation of opinion towards the nuclear industry with 
household member working in the nuclear industry 
 
Despite the benefits of high wages not being universally felt, public opinion 
towards the industry is almost universally positive in Copland and remains 
overwhelmingly so in the whole region.  Those in a household where someone 
works in the nuclear industry are far more likely to hold pro-nuclear opinions, 
with less than 4% of those in a ‘nuclear household’ expressing anti-nuclear 
opinions.  Even among those not directly dependent on the nuclear industry for 
some or all of their household income only 12% expressed anti-nuclear 
opinions.  The geographical split of nuclear opinion shows that of those who are 
anti-nuclear are more likely to live in Allerdale.  Of those who live in the two 
boroughs nearly all the respondents from Copeland are pro-nuclear (96.7%) 
and while this drops in Allerdale the vast majority of the respondents from that 
borough were pro-nuclear (84.1%).   However, there is a clear and significant 
difference between the two boroughs for the 32 anti-nuclear responses, with 
78% of those expressing anti-nuclear opinions living in Allerdale. 
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Nuclear Opinion * Borough Crosstabulation 
 
Borough 
Total Copeland Allerdale 
Nuclear 
Opinions  
Pro Nuclear Count 207 132 339 
% within Nuclear 
Opinions 
61.1% 38.9% 100.0% 
Anti Nuclear Count 7 25 32 
% within Nuclear 
Opinions 
21.9% 78.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 214 157 371 
% within Nuclear 
Opinions 
57.7% 42.3% 100.0% 
Kendall's tau-b .000           Gamma  .000                 Spearman Correlation .000 
 
 
Borough * Nuclear Opinions Crosstabulation 
 
Nuclear Opinions 
Total Pro Nuclear Anti Nuclear 
Borough Copeland Count 207 7 214 
% within Borough 96.7% 3.3% 100.0% 
Allerdale Count 132 25 157 
% within Borough 84.1% 15.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 339 32 371 
% within Borough 91.4% 8.6% 100.0% 
Kendall's tau-b .000           Gamma  .000            Spearman Correlation .000 
Table 6.3 – Public opinion towards the nuclear industry by Borough 
 
The reasons for supporting the nuclear industry (table 6.4, below) were 
predominantly local and national, with 63.5% of those who considered 
themselves a supporter of the nuclear industry doing so firstly because it 
supported local jobs and secondly for reasons of domestic energy security 
(41.8%).  In contrast, among those who did not consider themselves a 
supporter of the nuclear industry international and global concerns were more 
important to them, with ‘Accidents pose potentially global risks’ and ‘Already 
harms the environment across huge areas’ being the most popular reasons for 
holding anti-nuclear opinions from the responses available. 
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For those who do consider themselves supporters of the nuclear industry, which of the following 
four statements most closely matches your opinion?  And which second-most closely matches 
your opinion? 
 
First choice Second choice 
Frequency Valid Percent Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Supports jobs in West 
Cumbria 
245 63.5 57 15.4 
Helps Britain to be less 
reliant on foreign sources of 
energy 
74 19.2 155 41.8 
Is important in the fight 
against climate change 
19 4.9 50 13.5 
Is the only way to meet 
energy needs of a rising 
global population 
48 12.4 109 29.4 
Total 386 100.0 371 100.0 
Missing System 44  59  
Total 430  430  
For those who do not consider themselves supporters of the nuclear industry, which of the 
following four statements most closely matches your opinion?  And which second-most closely 
matches your opinion? 
 
First choice Second choice 
Frequency Valid Percent Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Damages the local 
environment 
27 36.0 11 15.3 
Puts off other employers 
locating here 
12 16.0 12 16.7 
Accidents pose potentially 
global risks 
30 40.0 22 30.6 
Already harms the 
environment across huge 
areas 
6 8.0 27 37.5 
Total 75 100.0 72 100.0 
Missing System 355  358  
Total 430  430  
 
Table 6.4 – Reasons for supporting or not supporting the nuclear industry 
 
There is no significant difference in either borough between responses for the 
reasons for and against supporting the nuclear industry (table 6.5, below).  
There is a slightly greater proportion of the sample in Copeland believing that 
the nuclear industry was off-putting of other industries coming to the area.  The 
material benefits and dis-benefits for the area are more salient in Copeland, 
closer to the site and more dependent economically on it than for Allerdale.  
However, it is clear that opposition to the industry is based on concern for risk 
and the environment whereas support is strongly based on material concerns of 
jobs and wages.  The issue this raises is that Copeland in particular has a 
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labour market dominated and polarised by the very generous terms and 
conditions available in the nuclear industry, particularly at Sellafield.  This is not 
a recent phenomena, as a survey of perceptions of West Cumbria among 
business executives over twenty years ago in 1995 revealed that operating 
costs were the biggest barrier to inward investment, and this was based on the 
dual issues of rurality and an extant highly paid yet low skilled workforce (CBI 
1995: 7).  In this context of a support for nuclear based in large part on its 
supporting the local economy, it might be assumed that the local population 
believed that Sellafield and the wider industry were therefore providing well for 
the area.  However, the survey revealed that there is a more complex 
understanding of the situation among respondents.   
 
Nuclear Opinion * Special Rights Crosstabulation 
 
West Cumbria has hosted nuclear sites 
since the 1950s  – which of the following 
statements most closely matches your 
opinion.  West Cumbria… 
Total 
…deserves 
more from 
government 
than other 
areas for its 
service 
…does well  
from the 
nuclear 
industry 
Both 
answered 
Nuclear 
Opinion 
Pro Nuclear Count 153 185 1 339 
% within Nuclear 
Opinion 
45.1% 54.6% 0.3% 100.0% 
Anti Nuclear Count 19 9 0 28 
% within Nuclear 
Opinion 
67.9% 32.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 172 194 1 367 
% within Nuclear 
Opinion 
46.9% 52.9% 0.3% 100.0% 
Kendall's tau-b .022           Gamma  .022               Spearman Correlation .020 
Table 6.5 – Nuclear opinion cross-tabulated with belief in special rights 
Overall, when asked whether they believed West Cumbria deserved more than 
it currently received for its service in hosting Sellafield 52.9% stated the area 
had done well from the nuclear industry.  Among those responders who support 
the nuclear industry, the majority of responders also believed that West 
Cumbria ‘does well from the nuclear industry’ but only a small majority.  
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However, among those who do not support the nuclear industry the belief that 
‘West Cumbria deserves more from government than other areas for its service’ 
was held by over two thirds of those responding.  Given that jobs are the 
primary concern among those who support the industry, and the job market in 
West Cumbria is both dominated and polarised by the nuclear industry, the 
belief among pro-nuclear responders that the area deserves more is not 
necessarily unfounded.  There is further complexity when the sample was 
broken down geographically as per map 7.1 and table 7.1 below.  Copeland (B, 
excluding the area directly around the Sellafield site) was the only area to have 
a majority of responders state that ‘West Cumbria deserves more from 
government than other areas for its service’ (51.9%). 
Below there is a map of West Cumbria, divided into four areas – A, B, C and D.  Please indicate 
below which of these four areas you live in. * West Cumbria has hosted nuclear sites since the 
1950s  – which of the following statements most closely matches your opinion: Crosstabulation 
 
West Cumbria has hosted nuclear sites since the 
1950s  – which of the following statements most 
closely matches your opinion: 
Total 
West Cumbria 
deserves more from 
government than 
other areas for its 
service 
West Cumbria 
does well  from 
the nuclear 
industry 
Both 
answered 
P
le
a
s
e
 i
n
d
ic
a
te
 b
e
lo
w
 w
h
ic
h
 
o
f 
th
e
s
e
 f
o
u
r 
a
re
a
s
 y
o
u
 l
iv
e
 
in
. 
A Count 12 16 0 28 
% within A 42.9% 57.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
B Count 108 98 2 208 
% within B 51.9% 47.1% 1.0% 100.0% 
C Count 56 73 1 130 
% within C 43.1% 56.2% 0.8% 100.0% 
D Count 14 23 0 37 
% within D 37.8% 62.2% 0.0% 100.0% 
None Count 3 5 0 8 
% within None 37.5% 62.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 193 215 3 411 
% within areas 47.0% 52.3% 0.7% 100.0% 
Table 6.6 – Perception of corporate responsibility of the Sellafield site by 
geographical area 
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Map 6.1 – West Cumbria, divided into four areas 
Indeed, even when exploring this further broken down by borough and opinion 
towards the nuclear industry, those who support the industry in Copeland are 
still ever so slightly more likely to believe that the area deserves more for its 
service than that it has done well.  Those with pro-nuclear opinions and living in 
Allerdale were strongly of the opinion that the area did well from the industry.  
The situation is reversed for those who do not support the industry, where for 
both boroughs respondents believing that the area deserves more for its 
service, but a greater proportion of the responses from Allerdale stating that.  
Therefore, among a small majority of those supporting the industry in Copeland 
there is a recognition that the area has not necessarily done well enough, yet an 
overwhelmingly pro-nuclear public opinion. 
The benefits to the area from hosting the nuclear industry are traded against the 
risks, where the potential dangers of the industry are not ignored by the local 
population but accepted as part of a bargain which recognises that the industry 
is central to the local economy and lifestyle (Blowers 2003: 72).  Indeed, there 
exists in west Cumbria a “countervailing sense of pride” at being so open to 
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nuclear risk (Wynne et al 1993: 58).  In addition the area has a long-term 
familiarity with the industry and more positive press coverage compared to 
national press coverage.  However, despite this, the people of West Cumbria do 
not accept absolutely all nuclear developments.  This is demonstrated by 
controversy surrounding the proposal to site two new nuclear power stations 
away from existing nuclear facilities which was met with substantial local 
hostility, in contrast to the Moorside site adjacent to Sellafield which was 
broadly well received (Haraldsen et al 2011).   
 
6.2.1 - Corporate social responsibility and the nuclear risk premium 
The staff workers at Sellafield recognised that they, and many like them, were in 
a privileged position and that there was a lot of money in the area as a result of 
the nuclear industry but were at a loss as to why then towns like Whitehaven 
were struggling: 
Because there's no economy is there, [murmurs of agreement] well there 
is, actually 
Its pound shops and charity shops. 
But it doesn't make sense, does it?  So where's all the money going?2 
 
The participants then talked about how places like Whitehaven were the victim 
of changes in the general economy, particularly internet shopping.  However, 
regardless of the cause, other towns in the area do much better, with the small 
market town of Cockermouth being mentioned, despite being further away from 
the Sellafield site.  It was also mentioned in two groups that staff in higher paid 
positions lived outside Whitehaven.  The question which this raises is – what 
responsibility does Sellafield and the nuclear industry has if any, to address 
these problems?  When asked whether they believed West Cumbria deserved 
                                                          
2 24/09/2013 Sellafield professional workers 
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more than it currently received for its service in hosting Sellafield, 46% agreed, 
with 49% stating the area had done well from the nuclear industry.  This was 
reversed however when the sample was broken down geographically as per 
map 7.1 and table 7.1 earlier.  Copeland (B, excluding the area directly around 
the Sellafield site) was the only area to have a majority of responders state that 
‘West Cumbria deserves more from government than other areas for its service’ 
(51.9%).  Such a significant proportion of the population locally believing the 
area deserved more for its service suggests that many do believe in specific 
local rights in relation to hosting nuclear sites.  Local authority participants 
discussed this question in depth, agreeing that there was a duty on any large 
employer to support the community in which they operate.  However, the detail 
of what exactly such a duty might look like was not by any means agreed, with 
one participant urging quite far reaching obligations, and recounting how in the 
past this has been seen to be akin to blackmail: 
I've been told time and time again that don't say a certain things to 
nuclear industry to new gen to national grid, they'll see that as us black 
mailing them.  I think that is the totally wrong attitude to have.  Now it isn't 
black mailing them it is making them understand what is their duty is...3 
 
Local authority participants believed that Sellafield was not living up to its 
responsibilities to the community and that given the amount of money being 
spent in the area, the wider community should not be facing some persistent 
inequality, and thus the nuclear industry in the area needed to do more.  The 
post-nationalisation of ownership (and profit) has become entwined in this 
debate: 
I think there is a sense that they are not contributing.  I think given their 
behaviour as well, and how the amount they have taken out of this area 
which goes overseas which is not being circulated back into our 
                                                          
3 02/12/2013 Copeland Borough Council 
161 
economy, I think there is a sense that they are not actually meeting their 
corporate responsibility.4 
 
A significant problem, as identified by the local authority participants, was that 
there is no standard formula to work out what a local area can expect from a 
large company thus each is a case-by-case basis.  In this case there were two 
issues; firstly what is the basic level of corporate responsibility expected of any 
large employer; and, secondly what additional benefit should the local area 
receive which is specific to the nuclear risks associated with Sellafield’s work: 
I there is something for me about corporate social responsibility in any 
large employer and I think where we go to here is that there is a 
perception that the nuclear industry owes us a living because it is in our 
back garden, but I'm not sure that Sellafield is living up to any corporate 
social responsibility because it gets thrown into this debate about the 
additional nuclear risk so for me it's quite difficult to separate out, if you 
like, what it should be doing as any other large cooperative or whatever 
should be doing through CSR, and what is the extra bit that would be 
expected from the risk for the local area.5 
 
Therefore, while the Sellafield site and the presence of the nuclear industry in 
West Cumbria has had, and continues to have, a substantial effect on the 
labour market in West Cumbria as explored earlier it has also had significant 
environmental impacts.  This nuclear risk issue has had a consequent effect on 
perceptions of the area for people looking to the area from the outside. 
There's a fantastic park but there's also perception around a nuclear site, 
because there is still a perception around nuclear, so again even there 
we've got a dichotomy because come to the beautiful lake district or 
would you go to that place near where the Sellafield site is? And that 
doesn't give us a very good badge.6 
                                                          
4 02/12/2013 Copeland Borough Council 
5 02/12/2013 Copeland Borough Council 
6 02/12/2013 Copeland Borough Council 
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Similarly, both A-Level students at a local school and students at the local 
college in separate focus groups when asked to sum up their area in a few 
words mentioned the same two themes of rurality and nuclear: 
Sellafield. 
Boredom. 
Nothing here.7 
 
Fields .. sheep. 
Next to the Lake District. Everyone knows where that is. 
Near Sellafield. 8 
 
This additional challenge for the area, on top of the economic challenge posed 
by the isolation of the area, stemmed from not simply the presence of the 
industry, but its actual record.  The Windscale fire of 1957 was, until the 
explosion at the Chernobyl plant in 1986, the world’s worst nuclear accident and 
remains the worst nuclear accident in the UK (Leatherdale 2014).  The 
perception of an area blighted by its association with eh nuclear industry, and 
this having associated economic challenges, was traced back to that fire: 
1957, when the fire went up, Rowntrees had a chocolate factory in 
Egremont.  It was going to be biggest chocolate factory in Europe.  They 
used to manufacture the crumb for chocolate that was taken to York to 
be made into a Kit-Kat and every other thing you can talk about.   As a 
result of that fire from Sellafield and the contaminated milk, Rowntrees 
closed to the factory down because they could not risk the chance of 
worldwide sales of something like a billion Kit-Kat being associated with 
contaminated milk because old milk was used from there.   We were 
notified that Rowntrees was to be closed and it was closed literally 
overnight.   Now, that blight, how far did that go into the community? 
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That's just one example.  How far did it go into the community of West 
Cumbria and how far has it gone from that day? 9 
The fire, and response to it, is revealing of the nature of the earliest days of the 
UK atomic programme.   Driven by central government, the desire for atomic 
weapons placed the site under pressure to produce plutonium.  When the 
accident occurred, the subsequent Board of Inquiry blamed the operators for 
their recklessness, but this was disputed and demands made by government 
were thought to be contributory as they had led to alterations to the design of 
the fuel cartridges which made an overheating and fire much more likely (Arnold 
1992).  The blaming of the operators, and subsequent revelation in 1988 when 
the transcripts of the inquiry were declassified under the thirty year rule, 
illustrates the combination of both central state and expert authority that 
dominated the nuclear industry from its inception: 
After the Winscale fire of course, it was revealed that actually central 
government lied.  The blame was put on to certain individuals for that 
event whereas, when you look at the underlying cause, the reality was 
the personnel who were operating Windscale were put under unbearable 
operating pressures from number 10, and I think when that disclosure 
was made very publicly that might of had a role again in galvanizing 
essence of support for the site and for people on the site.10 
The lack of an understanding of the complex activities of the site remains an 
issue for the industry to persuade the lay population of the safety of the 
industry. 
There's such a level of, well in some parts, distrust [murmur of 
agreement from other participant] of what we do, people are a little bit 
frightened of what we do at times and don't quite understand sometimes 
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what we do and we've sometimes been victims of, er, of that poor 
perception.11   
In this context of potential blight coupled with an issue that is inherently 
technical, scientific and complex, it is difficult to come to an understanding of 
risk and the compensation to offset that for nuclear facilities (Kunreuther and 
Easterling 1996; Frey et al 1996).  Indeed, what might be viewed as a burden or 
a blight for some, may be viewed as an asset for others: 
We are having to force them now when they give contract out to 
companies to build in you must take a certain amount of apprentices on, 
you've got to. 
Child poverty as well just like you mentioned. What was that percentage? 
[Facilitator] 45 percent in one ward in Copeland, the only place higher in 
Cumbria is central ward in Barrow which is 50 percent. 
And that shouldn’t be the way it is. 
It shouldn't. 
Do they get involved with things like that they don’t and they are not 
interested they are just not interested. 
As the crow flies 11 miles away from the highest stock pile of plutonium 
in the world and the money that site generates and you have got a stat 
like that 11 miles away it's just... 
…it's crazy12 
 
The implication here is that the presence of the nuclear industry ought to be a 
boon for the area.  However, this is not the case as has been explored in this 
chapter.  Despite all this it was noted that more than in other places, West 
Cumbrians looked to their large institutions to solve problems. 
I do sense there is, this community looks towards it local authority and 
elected members to fix the problem. 
And the nuclear industry.13 
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6.2.2 – Identity and obligation 
There is a strong community identity in West Cumbria.  When asked which 
geographic area they felt closest to, 60% responded with the town or locality 
they lived in, and the second highest response was ‘West Cumbria’ at 20%.  
West Cumbria came highest when asked which geographical area respondents 
felt second closest to at 40%, with 88% of those who felt closest to their locality 
choosing West Cumbria as their second closest area: 
 
To which of these geographical areas do you… 
 …feel you closest to? …feel second-most closest to? 
Valid Town or locality where you live 61.8 8.9 
Town or locality where you're from 7.7 11.7 
West Cumbria 19.3 39.7 
UK/Great Britain 9.6 34.3 
Europe .7 1.6 
World .9 3.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.7 – Geographical areas responders felt closest and second 
closest to 
 
It is clear that for those living in the area, despite it not being formally 
constituted, there is a clear identification with West Cumbria among the local 
population.  The area has as explored in chapter two an isolated geography, 
shared history and economy, overwhelmingly homogenous cultural background 
with 98% white British (2011 census) and consequently lower levels of 
immigration than for less isolated areas.  The population, thought one focus 
group participant from the local authority, as a result of these factors, are 
unique:  
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Predominantly we do not have the population in this area that represents 
a large itinerant work force so if you went into the south east for instance, 
people will perhaps live there for a few years and then move on into 
other areas as a person to the careers. I don't believe you see that same 
phenomena in this area.  I think that in itself create a sense of belonging 
a sense of identity with the area and again I think about actually helps 
foster community values.14 
 
The idea of community values, when asked of participants from both local 
schools and further questioning in the local authority group, focussed on what 
might be considered ‘traditional’ community values of ‘civil sociality’, which is 
found elsewhere to be the most common understanding of what it means to be 
a citizen (Stack 2012: 871): 
Being a member of society, what it's like to live as a member of society. 
Yeah, the culture around us, from all part of the world. 
Like how you act towards other people, so like being friendly or kind of 
helping out other people.15 
 
There's a sense that you look after your neighbour whereas, I'm from 
outside this area. I sense the sense of duty to your neighbour is stronger 
here then I have experienced elsewhere16 
 
While this is a common understanding of the values of a community, it was felt 
that the presence of the nuclear industry helped foster these locally: 
What the nuclear industry does particularly at Sellafield or BNFL, it has 
fostered a sense of citizenship it instils in its workforce, and that 
workforce dominate this area, a sense of community values.17 
These ‘community values’ which are fostered by the Sellafield site and, m 
through its dominance of the labour market, felt more widely are not just the 
pro-nuclear public opinion explored earlier.  Participants felt that, through the 
long term, secure jobs, and the unique position that Sellafield occupies in terms 
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of stable employment, regardless of external factors (it is not possible to not 
decommission the site) allowed those locally to focus on the wider community 
and their responsibilities towards it: 
Yeah, but I think another characteristic though of the Sellafield workforce, 
you often hear it said within the community that the Sellafield workforce 
can be a lazy workforce and if they ever had jobs in the real world they 
wouldn't be able to survive. I’ll be honest with you I have worked in the 
private sector and I've worked in what I would consider to be the public 
sector still and there is a sort of a lazes-faire semi academic culture I 
think that does exist, but I do think that benefits the area in the sense that 
people are given the freedom and the time and the inclination focus on 
community and civic activity whereas I think when you work truly in the 
private sector and you are working all hours of the day with the prospect 
that you might move from one area to the other I think you are less 
inclined to even turn your thoughts to issues of citizenship and 
community.18 
The fostering of these values, and those of a pro-nuclear public opinion, happen 
as a result of the stability that the Sellafield site provides over a number of 
decades and at one time more than now, the ubiquity of the site in the lives of 
its workers: 
I watched an old film the other night, terrific film, a classic 'a kind of 
loving'... I think it was Leeds in the very early 60s late fifties, Leeds or 
Nottingham, the firms run your life for you and Sellafield was the same 
with the sports and social clubs, everybody drank in them and this was 
the works dance, and there was a works formation team came in and 
danced, and ... there was a big typing pool with a thousand typists in 
there and a drawing office and things, Sellafield was like that initially, you 
had all these social clubs what about all over the place, so they run your 
social life as well as your working life and as you say, everybody you 
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knew, you socialize with, you worked with as well, and you live next door 
to them, you work with them and you socialize with them.19 
 
The strong attachment to their geographical area, its isolation, the dominance of 
Sellafield and the reasonably homogenous and static population; these things 
and others beside all contribute to the feeling of a close and almost closed 
community.  However, Sellafield has had large influxes of workers in the past.  
In the 1950s when the site was established, and again in the 1980s when large 
scale civil engineering works were underway to construct new industrial plant on 
the site.  In both these instances there was a large influx of workers, in the first 
case quite permanent, and in the second temporary contractors from elsewhere 
in the UK.  Despite arriving into an isolated and close community, in the past 
influxes of people have been greeted warmly and integrated into the 
community: 
A lot of them they started off in Egremont, but then they, because of the 
skills and whatever, they then moved to Beckermet, Seascale, St Bees, 
they moved out, so that they were again communities.20 
 
The influx was of highly skilled engineers and scientists, who ended up moving 
into traditional villages which had to expand significantly, and from there later 
dispersing from those pre-fabricated housing estates into the wider community.  
The influx in the 1980s was different.  While undoubtedly causing a myriad of 
small problems at the time, it was an economic boom for the area which was 
more temporary, akin to a prospecting gold rush.  These two major inward 
movements of people were, compared to recent migration, large in the scale of 
the number of people involved.  The migrants into Sellafield and West Cumbria 
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following the changes in the ownership in 2008 were small in number, and 
almost exclusively senior managerial positions.  A key recurring theme 
throughout many of the focus groups was the cultural differences which existed 
between workforce and the new managers’ attitude towards the wider 
community.  Participants thought that the new managers were bringing the 
values of their American parent company, rather than adapting to West Cumbria 
and Sellafield: 
 
[the former British Managing Director of Sellafield] made sure that he 
looked after the local community, and he looked after the workforce,  I 
believe this lot couldn't give a hoot about the local community and the 
workforce it's just about money  and sending money back across the 
Atlantic ocean to me.21 
 
The former (British) Managing Director, when the site was nationalised, was 
held as being more in tune with the needs of the local community.  This is in 
stark contrast to the perception of the current management: 
 
I think they just keep to their own little clique. Oh they do. 
I don't think that they go out into the wider community; they have their 
own little parties in their own little enclaves.22 
 
Mundane, everyday actions were important, such as where these people 
shopped, and when they did their use of expenses, which was seen to imply 
that the new directors do not share in, or even understand, the issues faced by 
many of those in the community: 
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I would say you use the same supermarkets I use, have you ever met 
them, have you ever met them in any of the Copeland area 
supermarkets? Have you ever met any of them shopping anywhere in 
Whitehaven, have you ever better than walking down the street because 
I’ve never met one. 
 
I've met a couple but I can tell you something now I've always check how 
they are paying and they are always paying by their one card,  which is 
the company card, always paid by the company card.  I’ve never seen 
any of them using cash.23 
 
The participants talked about company cars which sat unused, in favour of taxis 
charged to Sellafield (and thus the taxpayer), a collection of issues also heavily 
criticised by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee in 2013 (PAC 
2012).  Throughout the sessions this emerged as a theme, that the new 
managers could not understand the situation in West Cumbria, particularly 
areas of deprivation.  In the focus group with industrial trades’ unionists, ‘don’t 
understand’ and ‘not interested’ in relation to the attitude of new owners and 
managers came up 17 times, and then on top of that there were references in 
that group and the staff unions group to cultural differences being an issue.  
There are two issues which this lack of understanding appears to arise from.  
Firstly, it is clear that the imposition of overseas ownership and management 
has not been well received.  Secondly, the perception of a gilded elite, detached 
from the reality of the area that these new managers now have a direct impact 
upon, has become entrenched: 
 
And if you look, they can't understand poverty because I believe, and I 
haven't any fact and these two can maybe shoot me down if I am wrong 
but I believe that you have a director whose wife is a director for 
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somewhere else you know and their child goes to St Bees School, so 
they don't understand poverty, they don't understand the kids who are 
going to Valley Junior School, Valley Infant School, Monkray and this that 
and the other.  They just can't grasp and they're not interested, by the 
way. They're not interested. 
That's it. It's not that they can't grasp it, they're just not interested, eh.24 
 
It is not just that these are geographical outsiders.  There is a perception that 
the new managerial staff are, like other highly paid workers locally, not 
embedded and either are not interested, unable to understand, or just do not 
care about wider community and its fate.  When questioned about the cultural 
differences between the existing site and the workers coming from overseas, 
trades union participants admitted that they were initially willing to accept a 
period of adjustment, but it never arrived: 
 
Do you know something, I didn't buy into that one bit, erm, that used to 
be the consistent argument that in particular the Americans for NMP 
used to give us 'we do apologise, guys, but you know we don't work with 
trade unions in America or if we do they don't work like you do, and you 
know we're not familiar to this type of working, you know'.  That can only 
go on so long, you know, a week, a month, at most a year, I know if I was 
going to Savannah River to hold a senior manager's position at Savanah 
River, I'd know everything, not just about the site, the plants, but about 
the area it was at, the people I was going to meet.  I'd bottom the lot, and 
I can't believe people are coming over here from America and the highest 
paid of them were on £1.2 million per year and they wouldn't also dig 
into, what do I need to know about everything.25 
 
When pressed further on the point of highly mobile workers, and whether they 
were of the type to prize their freedom of movement and not embed locally or 
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whether they were those that immersed themselves in the local areas they 
worked – the libertarian or civic republican global citizens (Schattle 2005: 125) – 
the new American workers in particular, both in management and temporary 
technical support positions were felt to not want to embed locally, or even learn 
about the local culture: 
 
I have heard [the CEO of the NDA at the time] say to me… he has 
worked all over the world with gas and oil, and one of the first things that 
he would do was get to know the customs and everything else of the 
local people and by the way wouldn't be rubbing their noses it telling  
people how much they made and this that and the other like these 
people do because he could not believe what he had heard some of 
these yanks doing to local people actually rubbing their noses about what 
they are making what they buy and this that and the other, he said he 
would never do that if he went to somewhere like in Vietnam awesome 
were like that the first thing he would be doing did he say would be for 
three or four weeks training on customs, training on the customs of 
Vietnam on the area he is going to what it was and respect that. These 
lot they just come in like you say,  bang come in make the money and I 
think the biggest thing they want to get is 'I have worked at Sellafield' and 
by the way if they can get B30 on or B3826 on the CV they are made for 
life, and that's the big thing isn't it?27 
 
This points not a simple reaction against outsiders, but a reaction against a 
group of people who are not seen to share the values of the wider community 
they work in, and thus are not motivated to do anything to help it.  Further 
demonstration of this point can be drawn from an older event.  In 1990, a local 
girl, Gemma D’Arcy, sadly passed away aged nearly seven years old after 
suffering with leukemia.  She and her family lived near to Sellafield, and blamed 
the nuclear industry.  A local authority participant recounts the reaction of some 
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members of the community to the fight her parents made against BNFL and 
Sellafield at the time, particularly following a high-profile ITV television 
documentary ‘Fighting for Gemma’ aired in 1993: 
 
I mean I can really remember there was a young girl Gemma D’Arcy, 
tragically and sadly died with leukaemia. Her father make his issue 
blaming Sellafield, no I’m not subscribing to that at all because I’m not 
medically qualified, but he had a big campaign.  You could see that it 
was orchestrated against Sellafield.  Well, a lot of sinister mail started to 
appear that their family were abused by... ‘why don’t you shut up you 
know the kids gone’ and yeah these were from people ostensibly who 
work at Sellafield, that you’re rocking the boat.28 
 
Community has its dark side related to being a member and the obligations of 
solidarity which arise out of that; there are those who are considered part of a 
community, and this status is defined in contrast to those ‘deviants’ who are not 
(Wylie et al 2016: 155).  In the case above, the reaction against the parents of 
Gemma D’Arcy was motivated clearly by their attacks on the dominant 
employer locally.  The perception was that the D’Arcy family was against the 
wider community which relied on Sellafield.  Similar issues have been seen at 
other nuclear sites, such as near Thurso, where individuals and groups were 
maligned for being against the community, rather than the reality of being 
against specific aspects of the operation of their nuclear site (Wylie et al 2016: 
158).  The new foreign management at Sellafield is cast in a similar role, as 
outsiders and deviants, and not simply because of where they happened to be 
born.  A focus group with staff in managerial positions had people from across 
the all of the UK.  When asked how they would describe where they are from, 
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one participant was proud of his Scottish heritage, yet also of being in West 
Cumbria: 
 
I don't know, but I would also say that, er, I'm Scottish but I live in West 
Cumbria, you know I'm clearly not Cumbrian, but you know 10 or 11 
years being here you sort of have an affinity of the area and you're kind 
of proud of it....  So you know there's a certain pride about being not from 
this area but in this area.  I don't live here because I have to, it's by 
choice.29 
 
It would seem clear then that, while some people do express a preference for 
local people in jobs at Sellafield, the backlash against people who move into the 
area to work is not simply about where they happened to be born, demonstrated 
by the lack of such a backlash against people from elsewhere in the UK who 
come to work at Sellafield and make a home in West Cumbria.  This was shown 
by one group highlighting specifically the transient and temporary nature of 
those coming from overseas, and the importance of enhancing their personal 
career as the reason for them being at Sellafield and in West Cumbria.   
 
6.3 – Privatisation and change 
The workers, focusing on the negative impacts on their place of work, are not 
aware how important global connections are to the business of the site and its 
survival, according to one participant: 
Do you think that from what you were saying most people didn't quite 
appreciate how globally connected the [Sellafield site is], how the 
decisions… 
Exactly that. 
Until it was laid out for them? 
Exactly that.30 
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The vision for the Sellafield site, as part of BNFL, prior to privatisation was to be 
a world leader in decommissioning services.  However, the path taken saw the 
site and the workforce, rather than going out to sell their skills to the world, 
instead be part of a structure specifically designed to being expertise to Britain.  
The way this worked in practice at the site was through overseas workers being 
brought to facilitate transfer of best practice, but this was a one way exchange.  
Only personnel from the parent companies came to Sellafield, rather than 
workers being sent overseas from the site.   
As explored in the previous chapter, the rationale for the contractorised model 
of operation at Sellafield and other nuclear sites was to bring “managerial and 
technical expertise and a private sector mentality” (KPMG 2013: 21) and payed 
fees based on meeting targets for programme delivery and a share of efficiency 
savings.  However, the structure of the contract between the NDA and the 
parent body, particularly the incentivisation of efficiency savings, was 
problematic. The benefits which have been achieved through cost reduction 
have had “undesirable consequences” in particular leading to a “lack of focus on 
schedule performance, particularly for major projects” which will “ultimately cost 
more than the efficiency savings” (KPMG 2013: 110).  The contract 
incentivisation structure that has led the parent body to seek efficiencies as a 
route to increased profit has had more wide-ranging impacts than just a loss of 
focus on other contractual obligations given the centrality of Sellafield to the 
local labour market. 
When asked whether the transition to a multi-national consortium for the 
management of the site had meant that the site was more or less globally 
connected than it once was, the response revealed that while the management 
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was indeed drawn from companies operating across the globe, the workforce 
were no longer employed by the people that managed them.  Seconding staff 
from the parent body organisation to manage sites, while the wider workforce 
remained employees of the enduring entity, the site licence company, meant 
that the workforce were not an asset of the people that managed them: 
It actually, to me, it felt more global years ago, but when we were 
actually, when reprocessing was at its peak and you were out there 
providing a service for all these countries that I've just named, but I've no 
doubt if you had someone from URS or arrive in here now and you were 
to plot down on this table all the places where they've got work, got 
offices, interests... 
…but they had that before they come. 
They did but it doesn't feel, does it not, you know what I mean, if they 
were here now they'd probably say we're as global as we’ve ever been? 
But we're not as a workforce, because we don't work for them…. 
…yeah, we don't work for them… 
…but it certainly doesn't feel that way, it doesn't to me anyway. 
We made our own fuel, we had everything. 
All they're there to do is implement that contract, we don't work for them, 
we're not one of their assets, the workforce.31 
 
The workforce are therefore an asset of the site licence company, but not the 
management of the site who are only temporary.  The only condition that the 
management have in relation to the workforce is then to maintain “adequate 
financial and human resources to ensure the safe operation of the licensed site” 
(ONR 2016: 22).  This was felt to be in stark contrast to the BNFL management: 
If you look globally at what work's out there, and I believe when we 
worked for BNFL, they would be going looking for that work globally.  At 
the moment, we don't go look for, they do as part of the consortium, as 
individuals like URS will go and look for work globally, but it's not for us... 
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Aye, not for Sellafield, it's for themselves. 
...we're getting nothing globally, and when you look there's work out 
there, in nuclear submarines, there's all sorts of work, but we're getting 
none of it whereas I believe in the olden days BNFL would have fought 
for some of that.32 
In line with earlier comments about the management being only interested in 
making money, it is clear that the change in model for Sellafield significantly 
altered not only the status of the workers as an asset, but also heralded a 
change in culture from a perception of a paternalistic management to one not 
incentivised to either develop o even in the long term work well with the 
workforce.  This is, however, more than just the attitude of a small group of 
managerial staff.  The context in which the site operated changed.  The 
contractorisation of the workforce heralded the change that many public 
services had gone through over the previous twenty years, from public 
administration to new public management – “the managerial and technical 
expertise and a private sector mentality” (KPMG 2013: 21) that the new model 
was supposed to provide, despite the claim that such techniques were “an all-
purpose key to better provision of public services” being by that point thoroughly 
discredited (Hood 1991: 3).  The change in the context of the site was summed 
up by two local authority participants, one an ex-Sellafield worker and one a 
current Sellafield worker, describing how the site operated in its 1970s through 
to 1990s peak: 
When I started Sellafield it worked on a principle of cost plus and what 
that means is that you give a cost of say £2 million for a tonne of uranium 
and will process it, and then you add on after that, that is your profit 
before you start, and everything it cost you to make that to reprocess that 
is added on so that the person doing it was paying the bill.   I remember 
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my old boss saying […] it would be, instead of giving the foreman a bike 
to ride around on, it would be better for the company if we all had a car to 
ride around site on because the more it cost the more they got.   This is 
where the perception of being a lazy workforce comes from it is because 
you didn't have to work hard to make, you weren't tied to a... 
We didn't have a shareholder, we did not have a shareholder demanding 
profit.33 
In the BNFL days the company not only had a guaranteed client in the state 
owned reactors cross the UK, but it brought in significant overseas reprocessing 
contracts. 
The best propaganda tool that we had was the old BNFL news which 
was irrespective of what was going on, it always boasted these figures 
you know what I mean, what the company made and every single time 
you opened a page they were signing a contract with somebody, weren't 
they? You know, whether it be the Italians, the Swiss and you know 
these at the time were, I suppose you can buy a footballer for the 
amounts now, but at the time these were colossal deals that were being 
struck, probably... 
… and they were coming in regular… 
… all the time, yeah. 
And it was work coming in, it's the opposite way now, it's going out all the 
time, we're giving work away rather than fetching work in globally, we’re 
giving it away, and it probably is global companies that are coming in, 
you know they are global companies coming in all the decommissioning 
and this that and the other.  But what they fetch for the local community I 
do not know, a couple of jobs here and there because they do nothing 
else. 
If we look at the pensions issue, how many years did we have a 
pensions freeze for? 
Was it 7? I think it was. 
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You know where the government didn't need to put anything in because 
there was that much in the pot, where they just had a complete freeze … 
for seven years.34 
 
In this context, the circumstances were right for workers to achieve significant 
advances in their terms and conditions.  With an order book bringing in large 
amounts of money on the basis of ‘cost-plus’ and the imperative to reprocess 
fuel which cannot be stored35.  With those twin circumstances in mind, it is easy 
to see how industrial action could be so effective: 
If we go back a few years, Sellafield wasn't the best paid job by a long, 
long way.  The miners were probably getting more, Marchon you were 
getting more, probably Smiths you're getting more.  So with all those 
gone you would have thought Sellafield would have a monopoly and the 
wages would have gone down but it worked in reverse effect.  The 
wages went up after the strike. 
I was going to say 1976 Bill Maxwell [local trades union leader] was 
boasting that the Sellafield worker was going to be on 100 pounds per 
week, headlines in the paper wasn't it? 
We went back off strike for a penny an hour. 
And that was about ‘76 wasn't it? 
‘77 I think yeah, we went off strike after about nine weeks for a penny an 
hour.  The next wage rise was 15 percent and after that was 25 percent.  
That's where we got the big wages from, so they wouldn't go out again 
basically that was the idea. 36 
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The very generous terms and conditions at Sellafield achieved through the 
1970s extended beyond wages though.  While pay was generous, the wider 
culture of the site was very paternalistic: 
You know something else, we have I believe we have probably one of 
the healthiest communities in relation to the medicals that Sellafield have 
always afforded people, when I was there at the height of the contracting 
every contractor was given an annual medical and you would be amazed 
at the amount of people who were sent on to their own doctors that found 
this, that or the other that would have never been found out, just through,  
you know, they would probably have died with some condition so then 
they stopped that but we had a great backup that way, didn't we? 
We got a medical every 3 months and because we worked with lead, and 
young Dixie, he hadn't leukaemia one three months, he had it the next, it 
was the quickest anyone had ever found leukaemia and he's still alive 
today, that was 20 years ago, and that was through Sellafield's medical 
system.37 
However, the creation of a market for decommissioning services as the site 
transitioned from a commercial fuel services provider to a legacy 
decommissioning issue led to a wide array of changes as explored in earlier 
chapters.  The site becoming a cost to government rather than an income 
generator, coupled with the imperative to more quickly deal with the multitude of 
ageing facilities posing increasing risk, brought about the new model.  The 
marketised model for management at Sellafield, in particular the imperative to 
save money, had a range of effects for the terms and conditions of workers.  No 
longer protected by the income from reprocessing, but an expensive drain on 
public money, changes were made.  One of the early changes made by new 
management at Sellafield which demonstrates well not only the desire to save 
money, but also an end to the paternalistic management and a change which 
                                                          
37 02/12/2013 Copeland Borough Council 
181 
disproportionately would have affected industrial workers, was an attempt to 
remove company supplied towels from the changing rooms. 
I mean the clearest one with regards what you want to know was about 
the difference when they took over.  They must have landed in for 12 
months, just you know starting to feel about the business, getting 
adapted to the site, and one of the first things they wanted to implement 
was the removal of towels for active area workers.  Now if you think 
about our members, you know what I mean we represent the industrial 
people on site, erm, our membership is overwhelmingly active area 
workers that is a direct attack on them people. 
I mean the biggest issue about that with the towels was, what they didn't 
grasp was that our job mainly was to keep any radioactivity or 
contamination on that site and not let it go anywhere else.  People 
fetching their own towels in and taking the towels home, we tried to 
explain to them, could lead to west Cumbria being contaminated by 
whatever and they just didn't get it like.  We had to grievance it to stop 
them doing it. 
This change, although unsuccessful, was the first proposed of many which 
disproportionately impacted industrial workers.  Following from that change, 
minimum qualification requirements of three GCSEs in English, maths and a 
science were brought into force, technically for all staff, but in reality only 
applied for industrial workers: 
The biggest kick into the local community was they then came to us and 
said ' by the way, we've said you have got to have three GCSE's to start 
Sellafield, English, maths and a science...38 
 
There are various reasons for imposing minimum qualification levels on 
workers, depending on what the worker is there to do and what type of 
organisation they work for.  In this case, given that general qualifications in 
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English, maths and science are not directly related to the ability of the worker to 
carry out manufacturing and manual type jobs, it is clear that Sellafield take a 
“positional good” perspective on education which uses schooling and 
qualifications mainly as an indicator of trainability (van de Werfhorst 2011: 534).  
This can be seen as inevitable, given the contractual model on which the new 
management run the Sellafield site, and in particular the way in which savings 
on the budget for the site are shared between the government and the new 
management.  Saving money is incentivised by leading to higher profits on the 
contract, thus it makes sense to lower the costs of training.  The problem for 
both local authority members and trade union members was that given there is 
a polarised labour market, a blanket refusal to consider applicants on an 
individual basis was exclusory of so many:  
The nuclear people, and they are not the only people, they tend to go for 
the high achievers and you can understand that, they have a business to 
run […] the other category of people just fall off the radar all together.39 
Even for those who have taken the time to undertake an apprenticeship and 
improve themselves, the blanket ban on hiring without three GCSE's in English, 
maths and a science excludes them from the biggest employer in the area: 
They have raised the bar really high you need a certain standard to work 
in the nuclear industry but I think they have raised is really high we have 
got local people who can't get work at Sellafield... 
…especially in craft as well, there are a lot of craft who have an 
apprenticeship have done an apprenticeship and can't get work at 
Sellafield.40 
The justification by management of these minimum qualification levels was 
more difficult when subsequently attempts were made to bring staff from the 
                                                          
39 02/12/2013 Copeland Borough Council 
40 05/02/2014 Sellafield industrial trades’ unions 
183 
Chapelcross site in South West Scotland to work on similar nuclear reactors at 
Calder Hall on the Sellafield site: 
another high profile dispute we had with the company over the last so 
many years was the movement of workers from chapel cross, where the 
chapel cross reactors have come to an end they had been defueled, and 
the company just approached us, and just, it was blasé really wasn't it 
when they initially approached us as if, you know, just letting you know.. 
…We're going to bring... 
…X amount of workers to defuel Calder. Hang on a minute, we've got the 
highest youth unemployment rates or some of the highest youth 
unemployment rate in the country in west Cumbria why don't we train 
people up now and give them the work.  'Er, hang on a minute,  we'll do 
what we want to do,  we want to move people down from Chapelcross' 
what's they said was we haven't got time we need to get it done within 
the next 18 months and so we need to bring experienced people in, and 
that was what, two to three years ago? Still haven't started on it.41 
 
The perception became that the overseas management worked purely in the 
short term interest of greater efficiency savings and therefore more profit for 
their parent companies, rather than what was in the interest of the community in 
which they worked.  As well as the more altruistic concerns for the local area, 
trades unions have reasons other than local job access to be concerned about 
the imposition of minimum qualification levels on industrial workers. There is a 
perceived unfairness when no such minimum requirement exists for white collar 
staff.  One participant explains that under nationalised ownership, the terms and 
conditions for both blue and white collar staff were being brought together, a 
process which has gone into reverse: 
In 1999 the company pulled together a single status… contract where 
they merged the blue book which was the industrial worker handbook 
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and the white handbook, it was a white handbook wasn't it, which was 
the staff, and the direction the company really should have adopted from 
1999 is sort of intertwining these two together as the years have gone by 
where we were eventually in a position where every worker is treated the 
same.42 
 
The implication of the unequal treatment of white and blue collar workers is a 
perception of the white collar workers looking after themselves and their own 
types of people in an act of social closure, by maintaining their ability to recruit 
who they like through interview, while rejecting thousands of locals with poor 
formal qualifications which do not necessarily have a direct impact on their 
ability to do the jobs they would be doing.   
Once inside and working at the site the differences between blue and white 
collar positions continues to demonstrate that far from being one workforce, it is 
in fact two.  The ‘semi-academic culture’ explored earlier, which it was 
suggested allowed the workers time to focus on such things as community and 
voluntary work was clearly very successful, popular with some workers and 
potentially essential to : 
Are you encouraged then as Sellafield workers to do a certain amount of 
volunteering or whatever? 
Absolutely yeah, they have a policy and actively promote it. What kind of 
take up does it have? 
I think it is quite significant, I think when you look at the number of people 
engaged in running youth clubs... 
…STEM ambassadors… 
...yeah, governors, mountain rescue. 
I'm a school governor and six of the other governors are Sellafield 
employees, yeah.43 
 
Coupled with the significant cash that Sellafield gives to various organisations 
within the community, and the generous wages of workers at the site, it is 
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undoubtedly the case that the Sellafield site supports the community not only 
economically, but socially and culturally. However, there were two caveats to 
this generosity raised by industrial workers representatives.  Firstly that allowing 
time off for community work favours those in office based and staff roles, rather 
than shift workers who may be working in teams where a minimum level of 
staffing has to be guaranteed, and secondly that the generosity is both 
changing and specifically focussed on causes that the management themselves 
are interested in. Essentially, this amounts to allowing company time and 
money to support the personal interests, such as specific sports facilities and so 
on, of the higher level staff. Indeed, the generosity of management in relation to 
allowing staff to participate in local civil society may obscure wider issues of 
where such generosity and largesse is directed.  As seen earlier, the imposition 
of minimum qualification levels effectively closes opportunity to the already 
excluded, but in the case of the site’s relations with the wider area, its largesse 
is potentially being used to advance the personal interests of the staff workers 
who are budget holders.  The issue of a recently closed local authority owned 
civic hall led to a discussion on where Sellafield workers have their meetings.  
External meeting rooms were not centrally booked, but charged to each 
individual budget, of which there are many.  It was felt by participants in the 
trades’ union group that rather than using facilities which may benefit from the 
income, staff workers were spending the money on venues which they used 
personally outside work: 
 
 
I'll tell you what they're doing, Egremont Rugby Union club, because a lot 
of managers [inaudible] there, they've had the big extension put on. 
That would survive without us.44 
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Other examples, such as using the local golf club and the masonic centre, fed 
into a perception of bias in spending in the local area.  This perception of bias, 
where managerial staff support their own causes and social groups, points 
towards another act of closure by a dominant group who control access to 
resources.  The same can possibly be said of staff time, given that being 
allowed to leave is at the discretion of managerial staff, and is less likely to be 
granted to industrial workers who may be subject to minimal operational staffing 
levels, unlike their white collar counterparts. 
One particular cost-saving proposed which demonstrates the impact of changes 
at Sellafield on the wider issues of disadvantage and inequality in the wider 
community was the proposed removal of the assisted travel scheme, a 
subsidised bus service, which has for many years taken workers to the site. 
The other one they couldn't grasp was the removal of the assisted travel 
scheme, and what we raised then [with the Head of Human Resources] 
we sort of said to her you know we have young kids starting 
apprenticeships this place is in the middle of nowhere how do you expect 
them to get to work? There could be somebody on Greenbank, 
Woodhouse, Mirehouse, the only person working in that family could be 
that apprentice because of the areas that they come from and she just 
couldn't grasp that.45 
 
Indeed, the decision was seen as hypocritical given that senior management 
had minibuses, company cars and taxis on expenses to take them wherever 
they needed or wanted to go.  One contribution summed it up: 
But to remove assisted travel, there's no two ways about it, it's your 
lowest paid within the business that's going to be most hit by that, they 
are the ones who need this facility.46 
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Indeed, when questioned about their job aspirations, local college students, who 
were not planning on university study and were staying locally, were downbeat 
about their ability access jobs at Sellafield: 
 
It’s very hard to get to… 
We’ve had opportunities to volunteer, to go there and do work, but I’ve 
always said no, because it’s getting there and getting back, it’s not worth 
it for me47 
 
The reality of the assisted travel scheme was that, as one participant put it, “to 
use it you must have no other option” given that it would add hours onto the 
working day owing to the geography of the area and location of the site away 
from the major centres of population.   The attempted reduction of the assisted 
travel scheme, to save money as with the removal of towels, was ascribed 
mostly to an indifference to or unawareness of the problems of poverty in some 
parts of West Cumbria, where in some areas child poverty is over 40%, directly 
adjacent to some of the wealthiest areas in the county.  The impact of the 
reduction in assisted travel would have been to further restrict access to work at 
Sellafield to the very small numbers of people that live nearby or near a railway 
station, those who could afford a car, or could travel with someone.  This 
creates an impression of social closure enacted against existing and potential 
blue collar workers.  This impression comes about not as the direct result of just 
these two examples, but the cumulative impact of multiple practices which have 
been seen to either be borne disproportionately by blue collar workers or benefit 
disproportionately white collar workers. 
It is not novel that some people are excluded from jobs at Sellafield, no one site 
can employ everyone.  The changes seen since the site management was 
privatised provoked a very negative response from industrial trades unions at 
                                                          
47 20/02/2014 Lakes College West Cumbria students 
188 
the site in an expression of class solidarity with those denied the privilege of 
well-paid and secure employment at Sellafield.  This has not always been the 
case: 
I can give you the reverse of that though in 1984 I was 1 of the 
organizers of the campaign for jobs for locals. A number of us who were 
in work who were on Sellafield contracting, and we had a massive the 
dole queue, believe it or not 1984 Sellafield was at its peak, contract wise 
10,000 people, and we still had a large amount of young people, semi-
skilled, unskilled, whatever, unemployed.  so we organise the rallies etc. 
we had a march from Egremont to Sellafield, all these young people 
there was a couple of hundred in the march we went to Sellafield not one 
of the union convenors or the Sellafield labour force came to meet those 
people that was the focal point, outside the gates, why have we got 
unemployment and they weren't interested. They didn't want to know, 
that was their empire if you weren't in it, tough luck.48 
The overarching question raised by issues such as obligation and the changes 
to social rights in the workplace is; what does the Sellafield site, and the nuclear 
industry, owe?  Does it have an obligation, as a site and by extension do those 
managing the site have an obligation to take into account the impact of their 
actions beyond the site boundary?  Does an organisation which accounts for 
nearly £2 billion a year of public money (PAC 2012) have any special obligation 
to take into account wider social issues and make an effort to ameliorate those? 
As citizens individually we have obligations, particularly to those who have “lost 
out” (Faulks 2000: 42), which extend beyond “those responsibilities imposed by 
law” and are “voluntary and an expression of solidarity and empathy with 
others” (Faulks 2000: 82).   Clearly from the data here there is among trades 
unions and the local authority a belief that managers and directors should allow 
a sense of personal obligation to influence their corporate decision making, but 
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that it does not happen under the marketised model for managing the nuclear 
legacy.  The Sellafield site dominates West Cumbria both in terms of the labour 
market and more widely in social and cultural spheres (Bickerstaff 2012: 2616; 
Wynne 1992: 284).  The results of this, outlined earlier, are evident in the levels 
of persistent inequality in the area.  However, despite the argument that 
“identifying relationships of casual responsibility” is a necessary condition of 
concrete political action i.e. making an obligation mean something (Dobson 
2006: 182), it is not clear that there is a sense of obligation among executive 
staff in the nuclear industry towards the pro-nuclear local community, the 
“nuclear oasis”, on which it relies for its continued licence to operate (Blowers 
2003: 72). 
 
6.4 – Discussion: Social closure 
 
Changes in the governance of the nuclear industry, as explored in the last 
chapter, handed both decision-making and economic power to the private 
sector during their management of the Sellafield site.  For West Cumbria by far 
the most significant of these was the economic power of the Sellafield site being 
transferred to the private sector.  The significant economic power of the 
Sellafield site and by extension its management enables acts social closure to 
be brought upon the already disadvantaged in West Cumbria, indirectly 
incentivised in the pursuit of efficiency savings under the commercial contract 
with the NDA. 
Social closure involves “mobilising power in order to enhance or defend a 
group’s share of rewards or resources” and has two modes, exclusion and 
usurpation, where the former refers to a group ‘closing-off’ opportunities for 
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those below and the latter seeks to “bite into the advantages of higher groups” 
(Murphy 1984: 548).  Exclusion is the main mode of closure, and usurpation a 
reaction to it and thus a sub-type (Murphy 1986: 32).  Closure takes “two chief 
forms” in property and qualifications, both academic and professional 
(Matheson 2001: 44).  However, social closure, as “another name for exclusion 
and monopolisation” (Murphy 1986: 584), is contingent on the control of 
property as the principal exclusory form from which others flow, such as 
education requirements (Murphy 1984: 557).  Credentials are used to form or 
maintain a hierarchy (Murphy 1984: 562) where “status distinctions” are 
established to maintain that hierarchy (Bendix 1974: 153) and thus close access 
to those not in possession of certain characteristics.  Most clearly in the 
workplace the distinctions between “manual and non-manual groups” are 
sought to be maintained, and beyond merely job differentiation, the two groups 
diverge further and as a result are differentiated socially and their interests 
incompatible, such that ultimately white collar workers can be thought of as “a 
constituent element of the dominant class” (Parkin 1979: 142).   
In the case of Sellafield and West Cumbria the control of property which 
enables exclusory closure (Murphy 1984: 557) is derived from the management 
contract for the Sellafield site, given the ownership itself remained with the 
public sector.   The gradual expansion of the Sellafield site, coupled with the 
advancements in the terms and conditions of workers achieved through 
industrial action and protected by the commercial success of the site in the 
1980s and 1990s, while other industries locally declined and disappeared has 
led to a “labour aristocracy” characterised by generous pay and conditions to 
which others in the labour market can only aspire (Strümpell 2011: 485).  The 
existence of such a stark divide between those who have access to the 
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generous pay in the nuclear industry and those who do not poses problems for 
achieving the “employment and economic well-being” which are “essential 
conditions” for full participation in the modern citizenry (Sassen 1996: 40).  
Denying people full membership of their community can lead to discontent 
which at extremes seen in deeply polarised and divided communities can lead 
to violence (O’Brien 2010: 589).  That is not to say that violence was in the least 
bit suggested by the data, but it is clear that the denial of what is seen as the 
conditions for full membership of the community and thus equal status has 
provoked a hostile reaction in West Cumbria. 
In the early 1980s the ‘People’s March for Jobs’ highlighted the issue of 
unemployment in the UK under the first Thatcher government.  The march took 
500 people from Liverpool to London, starting on 1st May 1981, taking a month 
to reach London.  In West Cumbria, a local version was organised.  However, 
despite the wider ‘March for Jobs’ links, as one focus group participant who was 
an organiser of the local march noted, on arrival at the gates of the Sellafield 
site the local March for Jobs which went un-met and un-recognised by trade 
union leaders at Sellafield, in an apparent breach of working class solidarity.  
Class solidarity in this example was prevented by the “status distinctions” 
(Bendix 1974: 153) of those seeking to protect their position and favour with the 
dominant class – trades union leaders at Sellafield and their management.  
However, the recent changes affected both manual workers and non-workers 
seeking employment.  Contemporary changes were therefore unifying of class 
solidarity, which is to be expected, as “groups see more readily the illegitimacy 
of rules responsible for their own exclusion” than they would see the illegitimacy 
of rules which aimed at the inclusion of others with no threat to them (Murphy 
1984: 563).  It was clear in the case of Sellafield that the credientialism, seen by 
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management as a “positional good” and indictor of trainability (van Werfhorst 
2011: 524) were viewed by industrial trades unions as a mechanism to maintain 
the “status distinctions” and hierarchy (Bendix 1974: 153) of manual and staff 
workers.  This fed into a wider array of distinctions between manual and non-
manual workers such that they were differentiated socially, their interests 
incompatible and ultimately the professional staff workers, whose interests were 
not disadvantaged, were seen as “a constituent element of the dominant class” 
(Parkin 1979: 142).  The provision of jobs to those from outside the area, when 
management attempted to bring workers, who did not have the required 
minimum level of qualifications, from the nearby Chapelcross nuclear site added 
to the sense of exclusion and was seen to undermine the case put forward by 
management for such changes in the first place.   In the context of a site and 
industry seen to have a special responsibility to the local area and facing 
demands to ensure a greater proportion of spending of the multi-billion pound 
budget locally, the defence of the site management of wanting to break their 
own rules on the basis of better experience for those being brought in and lack 
of qualifications in the local population was not accepted by the trades unions.  
This fed into the perception that the wide array of changes were designed to 
enhance the share of efficiency savings for the companies managing the site.   
In discussions on these issues there was a focus on the identity and motivations 
of the management and other seconded staff from the parent body into 
Sellafield.  Personal career enhancement was spoken of in a derogatory way, 
as the sole or primary motivation of foreign seconded staff.  It is, however, 
among the primary motivations for people seeking overseas work (Valk et al 
2014: 203).  The incoming staff were also very specifically referred to in ways 
which constructed their identity as outsiders, often referred to as ‘the 
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Americans’ or simply ‘the Yanks’ in focus groups and in more general 
community discourse.  The resistance to incoming staff is though unlikely to be 
ultimately about identity alone.   The transfer of best practice, which is what the 
seconded staff are there to do, can encounter “contextual incompatibilities”, in 
this case a perhaps understandable reaction given that the implication is that 
the existing staff and practice are not good enough (Hinds et al 2011: 181).  In 
this specific case the fact that the transfer was solely one way, from overseas to 
Sellafield, contravenes what is considered best practice in this situation 
(Edwards et al 2010: 631-632).  In the long-term, however, changes in the way 
in which work is organised as a result of the wider changes in the way 
economies and societies interact will continue to affect both day-to-day work 
and the location of power in the workplace (Jones 2008: 17).  While it has been 
argued that globalisation had yet to reach a stage where people working in 
different national environments transcend their own national identity, a stage 
had been reached where workers identified with their corporation (Omahe 1990: 
96; Myoshi 1993: 248-250.  For the managerial staff seconded to Sellafield, 
clearly it was thought by trades’ union focus group participants that this was at 
least partly true.  The perception of the mostly American management was that 
they were working not for the good of the community in which they worked but 
to further the aims of their employer.  These ‘glocal elites’ have competing calls 
on their loyalty and as a result of their obligations to their company may be 
unable to commit to the needs of their host communities (Swyngedouw and 
Baeten 2001: 827).  In the case of Sellafield, the perception among industrial 
unions and some local authority members was that the managerial staff 
seconded into Sellafield has a duty to return a profit for their employer, in stark 
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contrast to the previous situation under nationalised ownership and 
management. 
There are a substantial minority of people in West Cumbria who believe that the 
area deserves more from government for its service in hosting nuclear facilities 
for over half a century.  In that context, changes which take money overseas, 
attempt to diminish terms and conditions for workers and weaken democratic 
control over the management of the site were going to be difficult. The 
apparently overwhelming public support for the nuclear industry is clearly not 
unconditional or uncritical.  From a distance, or at a cursory glance, the very 
positive pro-nuclear public opinion could be mistaken for giving the nuclear 
industry carte blanche to act as it wishes, but this is overly simplistic.  There are 
wide-ranging concerns about the nuclear industry in West Cumbria, held by 
both those who support and those who do not support the industry.  As has 
been observed elsewhere.  
“As one draws closer, in fact, the silence is not as pervasive as it 
appears…generalised discontent is present, but lies hidden and 
controlled” (Gaventa 1980: 252) 
 
6.5 – Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed quantitative data to understand, in depth, local 
perceptions of the nuclear industry.  Beginning with public opinion towards the 
nuclear industry, which is superficially positive, it was revealed that this 
obscured a greater depth and complexity.  The key issue this highlighted, which 
was raised in the focus groups extensively, was what if anything is West 
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Cumbria owed from Sellafield and the nuclear industry?  This led into the issue 
of what does corporate responsibility entail for an organisation of that size and 
what is the role of the unique radiological situation of the Sellafield site and 
whether that implied a ‘risk premium’ to any corporate responsibility, with the 
results demonstrating that confusion has led to the industry failing to properly 
understand or meet either.  The changes brought about by the privatisation of 
the management of the Sellafield site seemed to confirm the lack of true 
corporate responsibility for many participants, and it was believed that instead 
the primary driver for management in a contractorised governance model was 
shareholder value at the expense of responsibilities to the wider community.  
The broad-ranging changes, which were seen to benefit certain groups and 
disadvantage others who both did and did not work on the site led to a solidarity 
not before seen.  The negative reaction to the specific changes made, 
alongside wider perceptions about a lack of corporate responsibility, are in the 
context of continuing support for the nuclear industry.  This theme – support 
despite recognition of problems – is the starting point for the next chapter which 
considers the nuclear future of West Cumbria. 
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CHAPTER 7 – NUCLEAR FUTURE: LOCAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN WEST CUMBRIA 
7.1 - Introduction 
This chapter analyses local economic development strategies and plans in 
West Cumbria.  Following on from the issues of responsibility and duty 
considered in the previous chapter, there is no significant attempt made to 
diversify the local economy away from one heavily reliant on the nuclear 
industry.  The regional ambitions of the nuclear industry are constrained by 
central government in this still very centrally controlled and regulated industry.  
As government policy changes, however, plans are modified.  Domination of the 
economic development arena locally by nuclear interests leads to plans which 
are increasingly focussed on maintaining and expanding the dominance of the 
nuclear industry in the west Cumbrian economy.  Domination is not in this case 
met by resistance, despite a widespread recognition that the area suffers 
problems from its overreliance on this single industry.  There is no real 
opposition to the general trend to place nuclear at the centre of economic 
development plans and perpetuate the current skewed labour market.   
However, despite their local domination, attempts by local networks of pro-
nuclear actors to influence government and bypass economic development 
organisations at higher scales between local and national are met with little 
success.   
West Cumbria has experienced many different attempts at stimulating local 
economic activity.  These have included being one of the seven areas in the UK 
designated under the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act to encourage 
development in the area, and more recently the area was designated as an 
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Objective 2 area for European Structural Funds in the 1990s.  However, this 
thesis is specifically concerned with the changes seen since the 1990s in the 
nuclear industry as it transitioned from commercial nuclear fuel services 
company to decommissioning and legacy management.  This provides a 
delineation in time, and also in purpose.  Following on from 19831 the nuclear 
industry began to become more open and engaged in the communities around 
its sites.  One way this manifested itself fin West Cumbria was an industry 
which began to get involved with wider west Cumbrian economic development, 
culminating in 1988 with the setup of the West Cumbria Development Fund 
which was funded by British Nuclear Fuels.  This organisation joined the many 
others which have had a role both during and after its operational life up to the 
present day.   
The first part of this chapter briefly classifies the various organisations of 
economic development as those imposed by government (top-down) and those 
which were locally initiated (bottom-up), their relationship to organisations and 
initiatives before and since, and in doing so their highlights the timeframe of 
each.  This will place in context the exploration of the organisations, their key 
actors, funding, aims and so on to which the chapter then turns.  Finally, the 
chapter discusses the implications for West Cumbria of the changing landscape 
of economic intervention over the course of the last 25 years to illustrate the 
issues for spatial governance and the continued domination of a nuclear future 
in the region. 
                                                          
1 In 1983 Yorkshire Television aired a programme ‘Britain’s Nuclear Laundry’ which linked the 
nuclear activities in West Cumbria to instances of childhood leukaemia in the nearby village of 
Seascale.  This prompted, the following day in the House of Lords, the government to announce 
the first of two inquiries – the Black and the Gardner Inquiries – which contained many 
recommendations, including the need for the industry to be more open, transparent and 
engaged with the local community.  This in part led to the processes behind the creation of the 
West Cumbria Development Fund and Agency, which is explored in this chapter. 
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Figure 7.1 – Timeline and classification of economic development 
initiatives in west Cumbria 
 
7.2 - Organisations of Economic Intervention 
7.2.1 - The Regional Development Agency and its partners 
The election of the Labour government in 1997 heralded a change in the way 
economic intervention by the state within its territory was to be organised and 
carried out.  The Regional Development Agencies Act 1998 established in law 
nine Regional Development Agencies which began their operation in April 1999.  
The agency which had responsibility for Cumbria was the North West Regional 
Development Agency.  The responsibilities of the RDAs as laid out in section 4 
of the 1998 act were to, broadly, promote economic development and 
regeneration in their areas.  To do this, the RDA had access to government 
money, and certain powers in section 5 of the act to give financial assistance, 
dispose of land for less than market value and to form, or acquire an interest in, 
companies.  The RDAs were required under section 7 of the act to formulate, 
and keep under review, a strategy relating to how it was to go about its activities 
to achieve its aims.  The strategy sat within a complex array of policies, 
strategies and plans, including the Regional Economic Performance Public 
Service Agreement (PSA), the Northern Way Growth Strategy, the Regional 
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Housing Strategy and the Regional Spatial Strategy (incorporating the Regional 
Transport Strategy) (NWDA 2006: 4).  The RES strategy is for 20 years and in 
details the next three years of actions at regional, sub regional and local levels 
(NWDA 2006: 4).   
The scale of the challenge facing organisations seeking to achieve regeneration 
in West Cumbria is made clear from the very outset of the RDA’s strategy.  
West Cumbria appears in the document seven times, including in the six point 
vision statement at the very front end of the document, where one of the central 
aims of the RDA is that “the economies of East Lancashire, Blackpool, Barrow 
and West Cumbria are regenerated” (NWDA 2006: 3).  The key challenge to 
overcome for West Cumbria being “remoteness from areas of growth” (NWDA 
2006: 17).   An “integrated economic plan for West Cumbria” (NWDA 2006: 7) 
was developed and implemented by the RDA’s delivery agency in the county, 
Cumbria Vision. 
Cumbria Vision’s plan, covering the period 2006 to 2016, outlines the issues the 
region faced and their plan for addressing them.  The key challenges for the 
people of West Cumbria were that economic grown lagged the UK, to the point 
where Cumbria as a whole was the only EU sub-region in the UK to experience 
economic decline2, and the 10th biggest contraction3 (Cumbria Vision 2006: 11).  
Specific issues for those in the West Cumbrian labour market are that 
unemployment was above the Cumbrian average and that wages were very 
polarised between a low wage, particularly in Allerdale which is very reliant on 
tourism, and a very high wage in Copeland and other industrial areas (Cumbria 
Vision 2006: 13).  Cumbria Vision’s plan focussed on “improving the fragile 
                                                          
2 While the rest of the UK economy grew, including every other county. 
3 The only other sub-region in the EU not in the former communist bloc to decline was Berlin, Germany 
(9th). 
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economic prospects of the area” through exploiting nuclear decommissioning 
which “offers opportunities of regional/national significance” (NWDA 2006: 35).  
The focus on nuclear decommissioning as the solution to the economic 
problems of West Cumbria, when it is one of the causes of the problems, is an 
interesting strategy given that Cumbria Vision recognise that overdependence 
on Sellafield was problematic (Cumbria Vision 2006: 29).  However, at the time 
as will be seen in the rest of this chapter, national policy towards nuclear 
developments placed significant constraints on an industry which is both very 
nationally regulated and at the time was in decline. 
 
7.2.2 - Britain’s Energy Coast Masterplan 
Cumbria Vision’s proposed approach to the issues facing the West Cumbrian 
economy was split into two broad categories.  Firstly, supporting capital projects 
through West Lakes Renaissance, an urban regeneration company and 
secondly, providing financial support and planning with partners, in particular 
working to deliver the ‘West Cumbria Masterplan’ with local partners (Cumbria 
Vision 2006: 29) to capitalise on nuclear and related opportunities and diversify 
the economy. 
The drive for the masterplan came from the West Cumbria Strategic Forum.  
The Strategic Forum was established in 2004, chaired by a minister, and 
included representatives from government departments 4: 
 Government Departments (approx 10); 
 the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority; 
 Regional and Cumbria wide partners (approx 10); 
                                                          
4 The full list of members can be found in Appendix F. 
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 Local Authorities and other West Cumbrian partners (approximately 10); 
and, 
 Local MPs. 
The Memorandum of Understanding “committed all parties to ‘West Cumbria 
proofing’ key policy and strategy decisions” in the context of a declining 
employment profile at Sellafield while also creating “the definitive plan for the 
future regeneration of West Cumbria” (CBC 2007: 1).  The work, funded by the 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority through West Lakes Renaissance and 
managed by Cumbria Vision, involved a study of the “economic, social and 
environmental needs and challenges facing West Cumbria” (CBC 2007: 2).  
This initiative is classified as neither top-down or bottom up due to the complex 
national/local partners, funding and management of the work.  The Executive 
Summary of that evidence base was published in 2007, titled Britain’s Energy 
Coast: A Masterplan for West Cumbria” 
The twenty year plan aimed to strengthen the local economy and offer a 
“lifestyle of choice” rather than one of fate, and to do so achieve four key 
objectives (BEC 2007: 3): 
1. Build on existing “nuclear assets” to become a “globally recognised” 
business cluster for “nuclear, energy, environment and related 
technology”; 
2. Improve connective infrastructure to strengthen the local economy and 
help attract a more diverse, growing population; 
3. “Project a positive image to the world” which balances existing and 
desired technologies such as nuclear facilities with the “outstanding” 
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natural environment to improve attractiveness for both residents and 
visitors; and, 
4. Reduce “deprivation, inequality and social immobility” by providing 
opportunities locally for all. 
To achieve the reduction of inequality, the ultimate aim of the masterplan, 
involved the pursuit of four broad areas of activity.  The first three are the other 
three objectives; exploit nuclear opportunities, bringing forward central 
government infrastructure investment and establishing a brand.  In addition, the 
masterplan saw a role for itself as providing a roadmap for “aligning existing 
budgets and activities” (BEC 2007: 40) to achieve economic growth.   
 
7.2.3 - Britain’s Energy Coast Blueprint 
The West Cumbria Development Fund and Agency were two organisations 
borne out of a review conducted by consultants WS Atkins on behalf of BNFL, 
Copeland Borough Council and Cumbria County Council in 1986-87. The 
purpose of the review was to “consider additional ways of promoting the 
economy, environment and image of West Cumbria” and resulted in 
recommending “organisational arrangements” to meet that aim, which led to the 
fund, agency and other organisations being established (WS Atkins 1987: 1).   
 
The core organisation of the West Cumbria Development Agency was built by 
transferring the staff from the existing Enterprise West Cumbria, which itself 
was built upon the preceding Moss Bay Enterprise Trust (WS Atkins 1987: 3).  
The Development Fund, on the other hand, was a novel structure.  As a 
consequence, the Agency had a large board made up of a range of interests 
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from public, private and independent members5 in contrast to the smaller, BNFL 
dominated Fund board which has its membership restricted to Copeland 
Borough Council, Cumbria County Council and British Nuclear Fuels (WS 
Atkins 1987: 4). 
 
The justification for the scaling of the financial intervention though the 
Development Fund on Copeland is not clear in the report.  The report simply 
states although discussions had been conducted “by agreement at a chief 
officer level” that “Allerdale District Council is at this stage not actively involved” 
(WS Atkins 1987: 15).  In contrast with the position of Allerdale council 
discussions with Copeland council had also included the political leader of the 
council (WS Atkins 1987: 16).  While the report hints therefore at tensions 
between the district councils, this was confirmed by one of the people closely 
involved with the 1987 report: 
“There was at the time a very foresighted leadership of Copeland council 
which wasn’t shared by Allerdale.”6 
 
What changed this position was, according to the interviewee, the funding from 
BNFL and other sources of £10 million was secured rather than just being in 
prospect7.  This however did not alter the board structure in terms of the 
balance between ‘types’ of member.  BNFL still provided the money and had a 
plurality on the board, including the position of Chairman.  The influence of 
BNFL was not something they necessarily wished to make so starkly plain, as 
the contrast between a draft version of a review of the initiative in 1992 and a 
                                                          
5 This remains the standard practice for development agencies, as the guidance for LEP boards 
demonstrates (HM Givernment 2014: 5). 
6 Interview – 21 September 2016 
7 Interview – 21 September 2016 
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final version makes clear (see figure 7.2).  However, regardless of the numbers 
on the board, BNFL was the primary funder of the development fund. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 – Diagrams from two versions of the 1987 WS Atkins Report 
establishing the West Cumbria Development Fund and Agency 
 
Figure 7.3 – Funding flows for the West Cumbria Development Agency 
and Fund (WS Atkins 1987) 
 
The dominance of BNFL in the board memberships of the development fund, 
and their presence on the boards of the development agency, research 
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institutions and other organisations remained almost unchanged for over 25 
years.  Following the demise of BNFL in 2008, the development fund continued 
to have a nuclear plurality on its board, but with the NDA, NMP and Sellafield 
sharing the three places.  However, the issue of dominance and influence was 
one which was both meant to be addressed by this new structure, but one 
which would come back to the fore much later.  A local political actor close to 
the West Cumbria Partnership explained: 
“From the BNFL side, there was a desire to get away from handing 
money out directly.  Too many questions about pet projects and 
individual influence, and no big aims to any of it, just what came along 
and what some director fancied.”8 
 
Whether or not a majority of non-nuclear board members actually changed what 
would or would not receive support it is not possible to know.  However, the 
potential impact of the dominance of nuclear interests on the activities of the 
development fund is illustrated by the differences between the Britain’s Energy 
Coast Masterplan and Blueprint, fifteen and twenty years later.   
 
The Energy Coast masterplan delivered many of the capital projects it set out to 
bring forward from government, such as road improvements, a new acute 
hospital and taking forward new nuclear reactors.  Following the 2010 general 
election and emergence of a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition, Regional 
Development Agencies were abolished, and so too were the delivery agencies 
in Cumbria9.  The RDA and West Lakes Renaissance, along with the West 
Cumbria Strategic Forum, had been central to developing and implementing the 
                                                          
8 Interview, 04 July 2016. 
9 West Lakes Renaissance, Cumbria Vision and West Cumbria Vision. 
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masterplan.  The Forum met only twice following the 2010 election in June and 
December 2012 before sitting idle and sometime around the 2015 election 
being declared no longer operational10.  The achievement of many of the 
initiatives and the abolition of its main responsible agencies led to a ‘second 
phase’ for the Energy Coast branding.  The development fund and agency 
rebranded themselves as ‘Britain’s Energy Coast Cumbria’ and in 2012 
published ‘The West Cumbria Economic Blueprint’.  
 
The organisation, through its blueprint and activities, is aimed at “capitalising on 
our strengths, helping our businesses to diversify, to innovate and grow 
alongside ensuring that West Cumbria delivers to its full economic potential” 
(BEC 2012: i).  The four objectives of the blueprint are to build on “our 
expertise” and secure global nuclear investments, diversity the businesses in 
the region, provide necessary investment in physical infrastructure and grow the 
asset base of West Cumbria (BEC 2012: vi).  These objectives, while seeking 
region-wide improvements, are particularly focussed on what is termed the 
“Britain’s Energy Coast Innovation Zone” and the bulk of the blueprint focusses 
on a “small number of transformational actions within the Innovation Zone” in 
the areas of research, business support, skills and physical infrastructure (BEC 
2012: vii).  In addition to those activities, and developing further the work from 
the masterplan, the Blueprint includes a “branding and marketing strategy” 
(BEC 2012: i) for the innovation zone.  So, in short, the work in the blueprint is 
more focused on a smaller spatial area, and has its own resources rather than 
bringing relying solely on bringing forward government investment.  While there 
are some key areas of difference to the masterplan, which are analysed later in 
                                                          
10 See the government web-portal (https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/west-cumbria-strategic-
forum; accessed 16 September 2016) 
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the chapter, it is definitely a continuation in spirit.   The underpinning idea of 
taking a sub-national region, building upon its key characteristics from which it 
may derive a competitive advantage and making that into a global brand is the 
thread that connects the two together.  It does however become very explicit in 
the blueprint.  Indeed, four global themes emerge from analysis of the text of 
the blueprint: 
1. ‘Global words’ – the document makes repeated reference to ‘global’ and 
‘international’; 
2. Competitiveness, competitive advantage and expertise – a strong and 
recurring theme throughout, alluding to the nature of a networked 
economy where areas compete with each other across vast distances, 
the unspecified ‘competitor locations’ (BEC 2012: 35);  
3. Connections and access to global markets – importance is places on 
broadband, ports, transport links, including development of a nearby 
airport, to connect West Cumbria to global markets; and 
4. Branding and selling the area overseas. 
This explicit focus on going global is a change in the language used from the 
masterplan to the blueprint.  Competitive advantage is a theme in both 
documents, but while the phrase itself does not appear at all in the masterplan, 
it appears 26 times over a 42 page document in the Blueprint.  Taking that 
theme of a globally tradable geography begs the question; what exactly is being 
sold? 
The branding of West Cumbria as the Energy Coast is a common theme 
between the masterplan and the blueprint, but the way in which this is done and 
enacted is very different in the later incarnation of the brand.   
 208 
 
The brand is complex.  A long standing issue with the economy of West 
Cumbria is that it is very reliant on the nuclear industry, but the dominance of 
that single industry has implications for external perceptions of businesses 
looking for investment locations.  In the 1990s research conducted for the 
Confederation of British Industry revealed that, in addition to the geographical 
barriers to access, there was a perception among executives polled that the 
workforce was small and lacked a diversity of skills (CBI 1995: 8).  This is 
unsurprising in an area where, despite no particular difference in the 
educational profile of the area, high wages are paid (see previous two 
chapters).  The masterplan did seek to expand beyond nuclear industries into 
renewable energy technologies too, it did this by building on the nuclear 
industry: 
West Cumbria’s coast provides good opportunities for other renewable 
energy generation (e.g. wind, tidal). Whilst other regions have similar 
coastal areas, none also have the concentration of expertise and local 
support for power generation and related infrastructure. (BEC 2007: 17, 
emphasis added). 
Places have become as managed as if they were products or brands (Gertner 
2011: 112), and in making this shift to commodifying geography in a competitive 
networked global economy, those creating the brand are as important as those 
consuming it.  Branding a place, and selling it elsewhere, makes choices about 
what in a place is worth highlighting.  The choice of what specific features of a 
place it is from which it derives its competitive advantage is an important 
economic and social choice.  In the case of the Energy Coast branding, while 
the initial masterplan does seek to diversity West Cumbria away from being 
seen as solely a nuclear area to a more broadly energy related economy as 
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explored earlier in this chapter, this is founded on retaining and enhancing a 
strong nuclear presence.  In practice, as this brand and plan were developed, 
implemented and became the Energy Coast Blueprint the nuclear element of 
the economic future for West Cumbria becomes only more dominant.  In the 
first masterplan mentions of nuclear new build and renewables are given the 
same weight, albeit with the caveat that nuclear may be subject to change in 
government policy.  Indeed this did happen, as will be explored in greater detail 
later in this section, and in the 2012 blueprint there are two mentions of 
renewables and twenty-five mentions of nuclear new build.  Therefore, based 
on the evidence of the content of both the masterplan and the blueprint, any 
shift away from a nuclear future for West Cumbria was superficial.   
In addition to the way in which places are described, there are also actual 
concrete projects which are characteristic of a place which is seeking to ‘go 
global’.  Rather than merely supply the territorial conditions necessary to 
reproduce productive spaces (such as housing, transport etc), the glocal state 
with global ambitions will now “restore, enhance, intensify and restructure their 
capacities as productive forces” which will include things such as “public-private 
partnerships, labour retraining programmes, science parks, conference centres, 
waterfront redevelopment schemes, technology transfer projects” and many 
more which based on the “construction of ‘territorially rooted immobile assets’” 
to enhance productive capacity of the region (Brenner 1995: 15).  Promotion of 
“the productive capacities of the elites and regions through the construction of 
‘territorially rooted immobile assets’” is “not limited to … world cities” (Pelkonen 
2005: 687).  The creation of new urban spaces also goes beyond just 
enhancing productive industrial infrastructure to also include the “physical 
manifestations of the [regions] (desired) global qualities” which could be 
 210 
 
“festivals, sporting events, buildings, parks, squares, roads” and more and 
involve “imagineering…a political as well as economic project in which particular 
actors, classes and coalitions pursue their own visions of global status and 
connectivity” (Paul 2004: 573).  In the case of West Cumbria, the ‘imagineering’ 
is tailored to the area.  While major cities have their events such as the 
Olympics, West Cumbria still sought, and through the Energy Coast funded 
events with some status and sought to sell the area overseas:  
Its support for projects which helped West Cumbria stage the Rugby 
League World Cup and Tour of Britain helped profile the region as a 
great place to visit.” (BEC Press Release, 5th February 2014) 
At the same time as hosting events to raise the profile of the region, the 
branding and selling of the area – a unique feature of the networked economy 
(Paul 2002: 466) – was taken ‘on tour’: 
“BEC played a leading role in promoting West Cumbria as a business 
and investment destination on the national and international scene 
supporting West Cumbrian companies on a successful trade mission to 
Japan and Korea, a high profile reception in Westminster and 
participation in the Industry & Parliament Trust Energy Commission 
hearings and report” (BEC Press Release, 5th February 2014 ) 
However, although going overseas and describing the activities of BEC in the 
way they are, so specifically international, is a recent development, the sorts of 
infrastructure talked about earlier as necessary to be competitive is not new. In 
its incarnation before becoming Britain’s Energy coast, the West Cumbria 
Development Fund and other agencies were involved in some significant 
programmes of infrastructure development consistent with supplying the 
 211 
 
territorial conditions necessary for attracting and retaining, in particular, global 
nuclear related businesses.  Indeed, many of the developments the glocal state 
might undertake to fulfil its global ambitions, according to Brenner (1995: 15), 
are evident in the area such as a science park and waterfront redevelopment 
undertaken by a public-private partnership.  In this area there has been a 
redevelopment of a formerly industrial dock into a tourist marina and 
accompanying high-quality accommodation aimed at professionals in the 
nuclear industry.  This is a very visible transformation which highlights for those 
who have lived in the area since prior to the year 2000 the significant economic 
changes and the decline of traditional industries such as fishing this and other 
areas in the UK have experienced.  The move from a dilapidated, industrial 
dock to a visitor attraction, and its promotion as a key asset of the town of 
Whitehaven is a constant reminder of the new economy.  This new economy is 
further demonstrated by the Westlakes Science and Technology Park.  
Originally developed in the early 1990s by British Nuclear Fuels and managed 
by a company called Westlakes Properties Limited, it subsequently became a 
subsidiary of Britain’s Energy Coast Cumbria and now is the only remaining part 
of that organisation (including the development agency and fund) following its 
transition to a commercial company.  The park provides serviced and 
maintained commercial accommodation to firms, mostly working in the nuclear 
sector.  It was an attempt to create a ‘technopole’ in the region, which is a 
“strategic urban places for industrial development, such as industrial and 
science parks, office centres, transport terminals and cultural facilities” which 
can take many forms such as being focussed on high technology industry, non-
entrepreneurial academic activities, or a hybrid of these as is the case in West 
Cumbria (Pelkonen 2005: 698).   
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The productive infrastructure and the cultural offer are also both important in 
less tangible ways.  The pursuit of a “‘progressive competitiveness’ strategy” 
(Panitch 1994: 82) of global connectivity mobilised by a shared commitment to a 
hegemonic project takes the form in West Cumbria of the idea of the Energy 
Coast.  New nuclear facilities, connective infrastructure such as road 
improvements and investment in the Port of Workington, and all the others 
already mentioned “narrate and advance a particular definition and 
interpretation” of the region which allows the dominant group to “impose their 
vision upon space […of…] global connectivity, and wealth embodied in 
transnational capital” (Paul 2004: 575).  It is the purpose of building 
infrastructure and so on not only to provide the physical requirements for 
business, but in doing so create in reality the marketable place that can be sold 
locally and globally.  Through ‘imagineering’ West Cumbria as the Energy 
Coast, it is possible to mobilise local support which is particularly useful given 
the close involvement of democratically accountable local politicians in both the 
public-private partnership which developed many of the schemes, but also in 
their active support for the wider vision which has included its incorporation into 
planning and other policies of the local authority.   
The importance of place-making and imagineering is also demonstrated by the 
rise of the local ‘trade mission’.  In the networked economy, where regions and 
places are left to promote their own economic interests and sell themselves 
abroad, there needs to be a brand to sell.  Particularly since the 1980s there 
has been a focus on “foreign investment, corporate headquarters and trade 
promotion” for the global region (Paul 2004: 578).  In undertaking works to the 
built environment regions not only improve industrial infrastructure to offer 
transnational business but also a wider brand to sell.  In the case of West 
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Cumbria the developments of the science park, waterfront, new connective 
infrastructure and the plans for a large expansion of the nuclear sector and so 
on are sold overseas through, among other activities, the sending of trade 
missions to Asia (North West Evening Mail 22 November 2012). 
 
7.2.4 - Centre of Nuclear Excellence 
Following the demise of the Britain’s Energy Coast organisation as an economic 
development body, the space left has begun to be filled by a new institution – 
the Centre for Nuclear Excellence (CoNE).  CoNE is an emerging concept in 
West Cumbria which is not, as the name suggests, an actual physical centre or 
institution. 
The novelty and lack of an actual structure for the institution makes it difficult to 
appreciate what the centre is actually for, due to a lack of any formal 
documentation. However, through access to e-mail communications between its 
members, presentations given at public events and contributions to other 
documents, it is possible to identify some salient issues that this emerging 
institution poses for economic development, power and spatial governance in 
West Cumbria.  The first of these is the focus of the organisation, the second 
being the continuing relevance of central government policy as a constraint and 
the third the multi-level governance environment which has made scale-jumping 
efforts challenging. 
The aim of the centre is to take on the vacated role of coordinating activities and 
branding for economic development in West Cumbria.  The centre describes 
this aim as being “to provide a coherent planning, organisation and 
communication effort to make the Cumbrian nuclear industry a UK centre of 
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excellence and a world leader in nuclear services” (LEP 2016: 21).  Professor 
Paul Howarth, the Chairman of the Centre for Nuclear Excellence, 
characterised the broader aim of the organisation in rather more candid terms: 
“The dialogue has been, ‘you owe us because we had to put up with 
nuclear for 60 years’.  CoNE looks to turn that around.”11 
As for previous exercises to brand West Cumbria in a certain way, the CoNE 
relies heavily on “a supportive community that has worked with and 
understands the industry”12 as one of the key sources of competitive advantage, 
which the CoNE recognises is not a transferrable asset.  Speaking of the 
support for nuclear, the Chairman of CoNE said “You can’t build that 
elsewhere”13.  This very explicitly nuclear organisation is merely continuing the 
trend seen from the BEC masterplan and blueprint of an ever shrinking focus, 
both in terms of industry, from a broad energy focus to a very narrow nuclear 
focus, and spatially in West Cumbria from the majority of the two local 
authorities to the ‘core’ industrial area. 
The full range of nuclear developments that the Centre wishes to pursue for 
West Cumbria extend beyond existing plans for new power generation capacity 
and into advanced reactors and new nuclear fuel cycle activities.  However, as 
for previous local economic plans, the CoNE is constrained by central 
government policy: 
“The longer term mission of CoNE is that additional projects will follow 
Moorside.  Although those new projects are subject to UK policy 
decision” (LEP 2016: 23) 
                                                          
11 Speech by Professor Paul Howarth at the 1st Cumbria Nuclear Conference – 22 September 2016 
12 Speech by Professor Paul Howarth at the 1st Cumbria Nuclear Conference – 22 September 2016 
13 Speech by Professor Paul Howarth at the 1st Cumbria Nuclear Conference – 22 September 2016 
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A key part of those future projects is about more than nuclear energy.  The 
legacy of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and nuclear fuel manufacture in West 
Cumbria means that any new work in that area would be ideally places in the 
region: 
“Fuel cycle support infrastructure can only be located in one unique 
place: Cumbria”14 
In its attempts to persuade government of the case for CoNE and its objectives, 
the centre has gone through two distinct phases of activity.  In its infancy, the 
centre sought to take its case directly to government, and after this proved 
unsuccessful they have been forced to work within government’s preferred 
structure, the Local Enterprise Partnerships. The attempt by the centre to ‘jump 
scales’ (MacKinnon 2010: 24) and in doing so bypass the multi-level hierarchy 
established by government (Entwhistle et al 2014: 322) was unsuccessful. 
On 2 February 2015 people involved in the CoNE project met with government 
departments15 in Whitehall.  The purpose of the meeting was to brief key 
government departments on the purpose, mission and vision for CoNE – how it 
can support the Cumbrian economy by delivering existing missions, and how 
commercial benefit for the UK can be derived from these and potential future 
missions.  However, these meetings did not go well: 
“There were some specific areas where advice and feedback were 
provided which will help to tailor our future strategy and external 
messages.”16 
                                                          
14 Presentation at nuclear energy business opportunity conference 2015 - 11 May 2015 
15 Department of Energy and Climate Change, Department of Business, Innovation and Skills and the UK 
Trade and Investment organisation. 
16 Email from CoNE Chairman to centre members – 08 March 2016 
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In particular the attempt to circumvent the LEP were unsuccessful and rebuffed 
by central government, with the centre being told that CoNE needed to 
“demonstrate we have listened to government when we meet with them again”17 
in particular by articulating “the value of CoNE to Cumbria”18 which was not 
clear.  The attempt to demonstrate the centre and West Cumbria’s importance 
and value on much broader national and international scales, separately to the 
structures set up by government in the LEPs, was not of interest to government.  
More recent statements have underlined the change: 
“Regionally, we must work within the LEP.  CoNE is the means by which 
the nuclear industry engages with the LEP and also through this 
nationally with government.”19 
The spatial focus of the CoNE is not clear, as it is still an emergent initiative with 
little documentation.  However, from how it was described by its chairman, the 
intervention has a focus on the core nuclear areas, as it is intended to be a 
“technology led economic development”20 initiative.   This would be expected, if 
as is common for processes of rescaling and institutional change, new 
institutions are shaped by what came before (Schmidt 2008: 304), otherwise 
referred to in historical geography as ‘path-dependency’ (Brenner 2001: 609).  
The Energy Coast blueprint rescaled the focus of economic intervention from 
the Masterplan to a smaller, more core-nuclear geography.  Figure 7.4 shows 
the original 2007 masterplan focus, stretching from Maryport in the north to 
Millom in the South.  Red lines delineate the focus of the 2012 intervention, 
from Workington in the North to just south of Sellafield.  The rationale for this 
less extensive geographical scaling was that  
                                                          
17 Email from CoNE Chairman to centre members – 08 March 2016 
18 Email from CoNE Chairman to centre members – 08 March 2016 
19 Speech by Professor Paul Howarth at the 1st Cumbria Nuclear Conference – 22 September 2016 
20 Speech by Professor Paul Howarth at the 1st Cumbria Nuclear Conference – 22 September 2016 
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“The Innovation Zone will broadly cover the area in which the major 
research, business, labour force and employment assets of the area are 
located.  This will act as a spatial focus for investment…  Businesses 
within this area draw their labour force from a wider area of West 
Cumbria and as such the economic importance of this area is significant 
in employment terms.” (BEC 2012: 22) 
 
Given the closeness of the CoNE aim, as technology led innovation’ focussing 
on nuclear, combined with the tendency to path dependency in rescaling 
processes, it is likely the CoNE will focus on a similar or smaller area than the 
Energy Coast blueprint did. 
 
 
Figure 7.4 – Geographical focus of the Energy Coast intervention from the 
2007 Masterplan (with the 20102 blueprint rescaled focus delineated in 
red) (BEC 2007: 13) 
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7.3 - Government policy and constrained freedoms 
That the energy coast masterplan did not make much in the way of reference to 
nuclear power is not surprising.  The national policy climate towards the nuclear 
industry was in a state of transition between 2007 and 2008 for both new build 
and waste management.  The Britain’s Energy Coast Masterplan was published 
in 2007, but the national policy position for nuclear power was not settled at the 
time.  In this section those issues are explored and analysed in terms of their 
implications for localism in West Cumbria. 
In 2003 the Government seemed to declare an end to nuclear power generation 
in the UK when it declared that while nuclear power had the potential to 
contribute to a low carbon energy mix, it was not attractive on economic 
grounds at that time (DTI 2003: 44):  
“Nuclear power is currently an important source of carbon-free electricity. 
However, its current economics make it an unattractive option for new, 
carbon-free generating capacity and there are also important issues of 
nuclear waste to be resolved. These issues include our legacy waste and 
continued waste arising from other sources. This white paper does not 
contain specific proposals for building new nuclear power stations. 
However, we do not rule out the possibility that at some point in the 
future new nuclear build might be necessary if we are to meet our carbon 
targets. Before any decision to proceed with the building of new nuclear 
power stations, there will need to be the fullest public consultation and 
the publication of a further white paper setting out our proposals.”  
This position as reviewed in January 2006, and led to the publication of a report 
in July of that year, the ‘Energy Challenge Report’ (DTI 2006).  This review 
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supported the building of new nuclear power stations.  However, Greenpeace 
successfully challenged the review in the High Court on the basis of not having 
undertook “fullest public consultation” as set out in the 2003 White Paper.  The 
government published a new white paper ‘meeting the energy challenge’ in May 
2007 following that High Court judgement which stated that:  
Alongside this White Paper we are publishing a consultation document 
setting out the information and evidence that we have considered in 
reaching the preliminary view that it is in the public interest to give the 
private sector the option of investing in new nuclear power stations as 
part of our strategy to tackle the challenges of climate change and 
security of energy supply. (DTI 2007: 180) 
Whilst the policy position on new nuclear power was unclear, the Masterplan 
was developed and published.  That may explain why, despite being a 
masterplan for an energy coast in an area with a long history of generating 
nuclear power the reference to a new generation of nuclear stations is done 
very carefully: 
In the longer term, UK policy on waste and nuclear power generation will 
also present strong opportunities for West Cumbrian firms (BEC 2007: 
20) 
The development of new reactors was, however, posed not as an opportunity 
but almost as a sales pitch: 
Subject to Government endorsement of a future role for nuclear 
generation, this fuel could be used to power two 1.6 GW(e) fourth 
generation reactors for up to 60 years. If these were built near Sellafield 
they would generate up to £20 billion inward investment without the need 
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for Government funding and avoid the creation of 0.5 billion tonnes of 
CO2. Furthermore they could provide a path to future energy sources 
such as hydrogen, thereby augmenting even more the overall vision of 
Britain’s Energy Coast. (BEC 2007: 21)21 
Later in that section, under the ‘actions required’ there was no mention of the 
pursuit of nuclear new build as an action (BEC 2007: 23).  There could not 
possibly be, given government policy at that time had been delayed significantly 
by the High Court judgement forcing government to re-consult on nuclear power 
policy.  However, in January 2008, the government published a second energy 
white paper specifically dealing with nuclear power, “Meeting the Energy 
Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Power”.  The Prime Minister at the time, 
Gordon Brown, stated in his foreword that following consultation, and taking into 
account the pressing issues of energy security and carbon reduction stated in 
the May 2007 white paper (DTI 2007: 180), that the government had now 
decided to allow new nuclear power stations to be built: 
“We have therefore decided that the electricity industry should, from 
now on be allowed to build and operate new nuclear power stations, 
subject to meeting the normal planning and regulatory requirements.” 
(BERR 2008: 4, emphasis added) 
This change in policy from the 2003 position was driven by different 
imperatives. The stated case from government in the 2007 white paper for 
wishing to allow new nuclear was as explored, to “tackle the challenges of 
climate change and security of energy supply” (DTI 2007: 180)22.  In addition 
                                                          
21 Almost identical text appeared earlier in the document (BEC 2007: 17) 
22 The Secretary of State responsible at the time, John Hutton, would go on to become president of the 
Nuclear Industry Association, the trade body for nuclear industries in the UK, as Lord Hutton after 
leaving the House of Commons in 2010. 
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pressure was being placed upon government to allow nuclear power for 
reasons of local concern to West Cumbria (as is clear in the documents 
analysed in this chapter).   
No doubt industry too was lobbying the government at the time – the term 
‘nuclear renaissance’ was used to describe a renewed interest in the technology 
across many countries in the 2000s following the “fluctuating fortunes” and a 
“period of decline” for nuclear power (Nuttall 2004: 1).  It was in the united 
states that the term was first used, in 1990, but did not reappear until 1999 and 
it was not until this second outing that “the idea took hold” (Nuttall 2004: 2).  In 
the UK, as policy changed some years later, the key difference was that 
engineering-led innovation was out, market driven energy development was in 
(Nuttall 2004: 2-3) as the 2008 white paper makes clear that “the electricity 
industry should, from now on be allowed to build and operate new nuclear 
power stations” (BERR 2008: 4). With these changes, actors and institutions in 
West Cumbria begun to find someone, and somewhere, to build a new nuclear 
power station.   
In fact there were two developers and three sites initially put come forward, but 
under very different circumstances and with very different outcomes.  The 
process by which sites were chosen for new nuclear developments involves 
land being nominated into a Strategic Siting Assessment (SSA) which is part of 
the reforms of the Planning Act 2008 and process by which sites are assessed 
for suitability for deployment of new reactors before the end of 2025 (BERR 
2008: 3).  The very basic requirement is that the site be suitable on a range of 
environmental and technical grounds, and that it is either nominated by a 
“Credible Nuclear Power Operator” (CNPO) or accompanied by a letter from 
such a CNPO who currently operate nuclear or other major power stations 
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(BERR 2008: 9).  In all cases the nominator or the CNPO have to demonstrate 
that “have taken steps to engage local communities living in the vicinity of the 
nominated site (including the owner(s) of the nominated sites)” (BERR 2008: 9).  
On these two points, which are the first two conditions of the SSA process, the 
three nominated sites in West Cumbria differed. 
The three sites initially nominated were land adjacent to Sellafield, land near 
Sellafield adjacent to the village of Braystones and land approximately 20 miles 
south near the village of Kirksanton.  The Braysones and Kirksanton sites were 
nominated by German utility RWE, led to significant opposition at their own 
public meetings and at special public hearings organised by the Department for 
Energy and Climate change and were ultimately not successful in being 
adopted (Haraldsen et al 2011: 42).  The nomination of the site next to 
Sellafield, however, was successful and well received at public consultations 
(Haraldsen et al 2011: 43).  This may reflect support for Sellafield as a nuclear 
site, and it has been seen elsewhere that even where local communities are 
supportive of nuclear developments, they still have specific ideas about where 
those should belong (Wylie et al 2016: 153).  On the other hand, the process for 
the nomination of that site was very different to that followed by RWe for its two 
sites. 
After government policy on nuclear power became clear, work began to 
nominate land adjacent to Sellafield for the siting of new reactors.  The 
nomination was pursued by the ‘Cumbrian Partners’ with the work required to 
nominate the site was taken forward by AMEC Nuclear and West Lakes 
Renaissance, funded from the West Cumbria Development Fund and the final 
nomination submitted by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority as the land 
owner (CBC 2009: 2).  Engagement with local stakeholders was led by 
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Copeland Borough Council and involved a series of pieces of information, 
meetings near the affected area and a large public meeting in the borough 
town, Whitehaven (CBC 2009: 3).  The reason stated for the pursuit of this 
nomination was that the development of new reactors was “a key element and 
beacon project of the ‘Energy Coast’ masterplan” (ABC 2008: 2).  Indeed, 
Copeland Borough Council supported the new build nomination at Sellafield on 
the basis of that masterplan:  
The Energy Coast Plan, which is fully supported by this Council, takes a 
positive stance in relation to the development of new nuclear power 
stations in Copeland as part of the transition of our local economy (CBC 
2009: 2) 
However, the masterplan does not commit to the building of reactors of this 
kind, but of the next generation of nuclear reactors expected in the 2020s to use 
reprocessed nuclear fuel products:  
“Subject to Government endorsement of a future role for nuclear 
generation, this fuel could be used to power two 1.6 GW(e) fourth 
generation reactors for up to 60 years. If these were built near Sellafield 
they would generate up to £20 billion inward investment without the need 
for Government funding and avoid the creation of 0.5 billion tonnes of 
CO2. Furthermore they could provide a path to future energy sources 
such as hydrogen, thereby augmenting even more the overall vision of 
Britain’s Energy Coast.” (BEC 2007: 21) 
The masterplan, therefore, does not “take a positive stance” (CBC 2009: 2) 
towards new build in this decade and nor does new build constitute “a key 
element and beacon project” (ABC 2008: 2).  The reason the masterplan did not 
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contain any plans for so-called “Generation III+”23 reactors is however clear; 
government did not at that time have a settled policy on nuclear power 
generation.  The masterplan does however clearly favour some form of nuclear 
new build in the area at some future point in time24.  This tension between 
locally desired actions and government policy constraints characterises localism 
in the UK, which is an “uneasy relationship between centralised powers, 
conditional decentralisation and fragmented localism” where central government 
constrains the freedoms of local areas to “undertake innovative actions” 
(Bentley and Pugalis 2013: 257).  As a result, areas have to negotiate these 
freedoms with government, the problem is that while for many examples of what 
sub-regional areas might seek from government, such as tax raising powers, 
devolution of certain budgets, and co-operating on planning matters (for a 
comprehensive list of new localism powers, see Bentley and Pugalis 2013: 262) 
the ability to independently develop nuclear power or other nuclear 
developments is most certainly not something for which the central state has 
abandoned a role.  Urry’s (2010: 355) conception of a world of global flows, 
where places seek to become nodes by developing hub airports, improve 
telecommunications infrastructure or “they may even seek to reprocess nuclear 
waste products”, conceals the role of the central state in such significant 
developments25.  Areas may seek, but even for airport developments, the state 
has not transferred its authority entirely.  As for nuclear, significant transport 
                                                          
23 These ‘Generation III+’ reactors are basically incrementally improved versions of a type already in 
operation in the UK at Sizewell B (World Nuclear Association 2016 - http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/advanced-nuclear-power-
reactors.aspx. 
24 There has already been interest in ‘Generation IV’ reactors being sited in west Cumbria, indeed Hitachi 
and others have expressed interest in doing just that (Hitach 2014 - http://gehitachiprism.com/ge-
hitachi-and-iberdrola-collaborate-on-uk-prism-project/ ) 
25 The Sellafield case is likely what John Urry was referring to here.   Urry is a sociologist at nearby 
Lancaster University and has published on West Cumbria, Sellafield and the nuclear industry – see Urry 
(2002) for example. 
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infrastructure is covered by the Planning Act 2008, and likewise has its own 
policy statement covering major road, rail, harbour and airport expansions.  
That, however, does not preclude local areas seeking such significant 
infrastructure from negotiating with government.  If we accept what the local MP 
says, then government policy change was in part driven by West Cumbria.  
Even in policy areas as significant and sensitive as nuclear, the same principle 
of negotiated, and constrained, freedoms applies.   
The BEC Blueprint, published in 2012, further demonstrates the constraints of 
government policy on local action.  The Blueprint contained only six references 
to waste, with three of those being non-nuclear, and the remaining three 
references to nuclear waste related to the decommissioning of Sellafield and 
the export of those skills.  The 2007 Masterplan contains 14 references to 
radioactive wastes, even describing the “possibility of Copeland hosting facilities 
for the nation in the future (BEC 2007: 14) and that “in the longer term, UK 
policy on waste and nuclear power generation will also present strong 
opportunities for West Cumbrian firms” (BEC 2007: 20).  The constraint in this 
case came from the West Cumbria being a part of the discussions around site 
for the disposal of higher activity radioactive wastes, and the very significant 
issue at the time of not wanting to be seen to ‘pre-determine’ the outcome of 
that process.26 
 
  
                                                          
26 As a Copeland Borough Councillor at the time (from 2011-2015), the requirements on what I was 
personally able to say on that subject were strict, and more so for those in positions of executive 
authority as those who developed the Energy Coast blueprint were. 
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7.4 - Accountability and democracy 
Local policy is affected by the changes in economic organisation and the 
associated adjustments in governance.  Indeed the Energy Coast blueprint 
states specifically that “a supportive planning policy framework” (BEC 2012: i) is 
important to the success of the project.  Thus, in the case of Copeland, it has 
specific planning policies relating to the nuclear industry and key employment 
sites, including the zoning of land for future nuclear development and 
associated works27.  The Local Plans of both Allerdale and Copeland Borough 
Councils, which set out the development management policies and site 
allocations for 2013 to 2028, assert that in both cases their Local Plans and 
Development Management Policies will “assist delivery of” both the Masterplan 
and the later updated 2012 Britain’s Energy Coast Blueprint (CBC 2013: 2; ABC 
2014: 6).  Specifically, Copeland Borough Council’s Local Plan and 
Development Management Policies documents, along with the Site Allocations, 
“particularly assist delivery of … Britain’s Energy Coast: A Masterplan for West 
Cumbria (sometimes referred to as the ‘Energy Coast Master Plan’) as 
refreshed by new work on the West Cumbria Economic Blueprint (2012)” (CBC 
2013: 2).  Therefore, in Copeland and Allerdale, both the Energy Coast 
masterplan and blueprint influence land use planning by the local state by 
shaping council development policies.  This brings questions about 
accountability, and the role of democratic decision making, which apply not just 
to these two initiatives but to others too, sharply into focus. 
Working in partnership raises some particular issues for deliverability and 
accountability.  Cumbria Vision sat in between the Regional Development 
                                                          
27 The blueprint and the local planning policy share an underlying evidence base, and were produced 
simultaneously. 
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Agency, and owned the capital delivery body for West Cumbria.  However, none 
of these bodies were directly accountable.  In both the foreword to the 1997 
White Paper on the establishment of the Regional Development Agencies, and 
later in the 2002 White Paper on the actual subject, the Government was 
committed to move to directly elected regional government alongside the 
devolution in Scotland and Wales (DETR 1997; DTLR 2002).  However, with 
this not ever coming to pass, the RDAs were accountable through multiple 
mechanisms to various bodies, such as councils, ministers and others.  For 
their delivery partner, Cumbria Vision, this challenge was equally problematic, 
given the two-tier local government arrangements in the county.  This was 
evident in their 2009-2019 strategy, which recognised the need to “develop 
appropriate structures for holistic accountability and democracy” (Cumbria 
Vision 2009: 32).  The board of Cumbria Vision was made up of 15 members 
(Cumbria County Council 2005: 3), with a private sector majority but an effective 
county council veto as the ‘accountable body’ for its funding: 
 Chaired a NWDA Board member based in Cumbria;  
 two representatives from the County Council;  
 three representatives from the District Councils (the Leader of Allerdale, 
Barrow and Carlisle);  
 the Chairs of Rural Regeneration Cumbria and West Lakes 
Renaissance;  
 a private sector representative of the Cumbria Strategic Partnership;  
 other private sector representatives (sufficient to ensure a private sector 
majority – a recruitment process for these places is currently underway). 
There is a similar, but starker pattern on the board of the Britain’s Energy Coast 
organisation (and the West Cumbria Development fund which proceeded it): 
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 Chairman, a former government minister who is independent of West 
Cumbria, but not politically independent of the local authorities (both 
Labour controlled); 
 Three nuclear industry representatives, one each from the NDA, NMP 
and Sellafield Limited, the three organisations funding the initiative; 
 Three private sector business representatives from businesses operating 
in West Cumbria; and, 
 Three elected representative from local government, one from each of 
the two Borough Councils and one from the County Council (all Labour). 
It has been claimed that new forms of governance are characterised by an 
authoritarianism and democratic deficit, and this is part of wider changes in 
governance over the last thirty years (Swyngedouw 1996; 2004).  What we see 
in the economic plans for West Cumbria, and in the bodies which undertake 
intervention, is a minimal to none-existent role for local legislatures.  Sassen 
(2008: 145) argues that “while each state is different, the internal redistribution 
of power away from the legislature and toward the executive is becoming 
evident in a growing number of states worldwide”, and this extends to local 
government as well as is seen here.  Executives of local authorities have their 
part, but still sharing power with private sector and other interest.  The makeup 
of the boards of the various organisations reveals that while there is a 
democratic element to the overview and management of both the government 
mandated, top-down Cumbria Vision and the locally initiated, bottom-up 
Britain’s Energy Coast organisations through the inclusion of representatives of 
the three local authorities, this is in the minority and the makeup of the Board 
reflects the public/private partnership and in particular the funding of the 
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organisations.  Establishing one’s own organisation locally does not seem to 
have a beneficial effect on democratic accountability.  This is reflective of the 
current era of “elite localism” and “local elitism” (Peck and Tickell 1995, in 
Cochrane et al 2002: 113).   In this context, businesses are granted “power 
without responsibility” and the local state “responsibility without power” (Peck 
and Tickell 2002: 386).  As a result, “place entrepreneurs” are able to utilise 
their significant economic and political status to “exercise considerable influence 
on policy formulation, planning documents, and regulatory procedures” and 
other elements of local governance (Swyngedouw and Baeten 2001: 384).  This 
clearly has “far-reaching consequences for local political conditions and 
regulatory settlements” (Peck and Tickell 2002: 385).   
In addition, all these various governance structures are aimed at the same 
thing, local economic development, and are responding to the same changes.  
It is also important to focus not only on the structure, but its aims.  Whether we 
characterise local governance as ‘post-Fordist’ depends on what it aims to 
achieve more than the nature of the new structures and processes themselves 
(Goodwin 1996: 1403).  Local governance has an important role to play in the 
mode of regulation of society, particularly in this case through, among other 
things, infrastructure provision and the planning of local economic development 
(Goodwin 1996: 1402).  The evolution from state to local economic intervention 
in West Cumbria, although in some ways unique in that they reflect very locally 
specific aims and objectives, are in response to a post-Fordist imperative to be 
a globally competitive sub-national region. 
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7.5 – Discussion: Whose region? 
Regions may emerge, broadly speaking, for two reasons (MacLeod and Jones 
2007: 1181).  Firstly, through politico-administrative action, which seeks to 
restructure existing political and administrative landscape to address challenges 
such as the difficulty of state intervention in economic activity at the national 
scale, or pressure from regional movements.  Examples include the rise of 
devolved administrations and of imposition of Regional Development Agencies 
by central government.  Secondly, as a result of economic developments, 
where regional convergence of firms into clusters is driven by the benefits of 
doing so such as sharing the costs of infrastructure and ‘untraded 
interdependences’ which can’t be traded but are essential to business and are 
rooted in relational networks between firms (Amin 1999: 369).  Examples 
include the emergence of regions such as Silicone Valley in the USA. 
While interest in regions as sites for economic intervention can be a further 
development of advantage seeking capitalism (i.e aiding clustering) it could also 
be interpreted as the failure of the state to evenly manage economic 
development and a way of normalising unequal growth (Brenner 2003: 306).  
The contribution regionalism brings is in seeing the regional scale not as a 
given, but as an emergent category; something which has to be made and is as 
such an “inherently political act” which forces us to consider “whose region is 
actually being constructed” (Neumann 2003: 116).  In the context of a political 
environment in which the state is not the only actor, there may be competing 
regionalisms emerging from a complex milieu of competing actors (Söderbaum 
2003: 8).  In regions which are “institutionally thin” in particular, governance has 
been dominated by “elite coalitions” which rather than seeking to unlock new 
routes to development, builds on reinforcing existing dominant interests and 
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eschew “new institutional practices” which might widen participation in local 
decision making and regional development (Amin 1999: 373).  Thus as a 
discourse and practice regionalism may be “instrumentally attractive to powerful 
interests” (Lovering 1999: 392). 
So, ‘whose region is actually being constructed’ in West Cumbria, what interests 
have they served and why has it emerged as a site for repeated, bottom-up, 
specific economic interventions over the last 25 years?  
Throughout all the iterations of local economic development in West Cumbria 
over the past twenty-five years, one things has remained constant.  Despite the 
words, which might suggest that the “old images of municipal welfarist 
(bureaucratic) politics” being replaced by “dynamic and charismatic 
(entrepreneurial) business leadership” (Cochrane et al 1996: 1319), in the end 
what Cochrane et al (1996: 1319) call “British style” becomes apparent, where 
the actual plan only superficially resembles a local ‘growth coalition’ of the US 
style and in fact is more accurately a ‘grant coalition’ seeking to attract and 
spend public money.  From the West Cumbria Development Fund, which was 
money from a nationalised company (BNFL), through to the more recent 
attempts to attract nuclear power stations28, through the more central RDAs, all 
have been primarily about attracting or realigning existing, public money.  In 
many other ways the interventions seen in West Cumbria, as explored in this 
chapter, are also not unique, such as their apparent democratic deficit and the 
constrained freedoms imposed by, and negotiated with, government.  The 
unique element of these interventions is their explicit and implicit aims; the 
pursuit of a future based on the nuclear industry. 
                                                          
28 New nuclear stations finances are backed by the UK treasury with a ‘strike price’ which guarantees a 
minimum price for the energy generated for several decades (World Nuclear News 08 October 2014 - 
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Hinkley-Point-C-contract-terms-08101401.html) 
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The lack of democratic accountability and wider community agreement to the 
blueprint is to be expected of contemporary economic development initiatives.  
Two neo-Gramscian concepts, ‘accumulation strategy’ and ‘hegemonic project’ 
(Jessop 1997: 61-62), help characterise the local politics of economic 
development.  The overarching accumulation strategy in contemporary society 
is trans-national liberalism (Paul 2005: 2106), in which capital seeks the 
greatest return on investment from locations across the globe, aided by and 
requiring changes in the role of the state.  Elements of that framework are 
demonstrated in West Cumbria through the partial de- and post-nationalisation 
of the Sellafield nuclear site in 2008 and other changes made by governments 
over the past thirty years to industry and welfare, and within that framework 
local strategies are important in an age of intra-local competition.  Attempting to 
deliver local economic growth, as will be seen in the West Cumbrian context, 
can often rely on the second of the neo-Gramscian concepts, the ‘hegemonic 
project’, which: 
“. . . mobilizes support behind a concrete program of action that asserts a 
contingent general interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or 
implicitly advance the long-term interests of the hegemonic class 
(fraction) and thereby privileges particular economic-corporate interests 
compatible with this program while derogating the pursuit of other 
interests that are inconsistent with the project” (Jessop 1997: 62). 
Paul (2004: 2016) argues that social support for the hegemonic project, which is 
inherently unequal, requires the stressing of shared cultural and ideological 
beliefs.  In this respect, the concrete plan is the ‘Britain’s Energy Coast’ 
blueprint, which explicitly advances the interest of the nuclear industry, 
emphasises a particular locally shared belief (or attitude) which is public support 
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for the nuclear industry.  Whether or not this derogates the pursuit of other 
interests is debatable as there may be no other realistic interests to pursue in 
such a remote area (Wynne et al 2007).  Although the blueprint does seek to 
encourage other related energy and advanced manufacturing developments in 
addition to, but undoubtedly dwarfed by, the nuclear ambitions.  The extent of 
the inherent inequality of hegemonic projects may be contestable, as while 
some may be excluded from direct benefits (such as direct employment in, say, 
financial services in London), in cases where there is no other viable choice to 
sustain the economy of a certain place it may be the least unpalatable option.  
To those that have shall be given. 
In interpreting this project, Gough’s (2004: 194-197) differentiation between 
neo-liberal and social democratic ideologies of local economic governance and 
regulation are relevant.  The former stresses fragmentation of national systems 
to enable and encourage greater autonomy and differentiation between places 
so intra-local competition will seek to attract capital by, or resulting in lowering 
the cost of labour.  The latter on the other hand seeks to embed production in 
places and seek the cooperation of labour and residents and create unique 
niche local economies.  As the state’s interference in the economy has 
declined, and a “shift from government to governance” involving the 
“engagement of quasi- and non-state actors in a range of public–private 
partnerships” (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999: 506) has occurred, in practice the 
two strategies are not mutually exclusive, rather they can be melded to form “a 
‘progressive competitiveness’ strategy” where labour, the state and businesses 
seek competitive success together (Panitch 1994: 82).  This attempts to “give 
the best of both political words” in which “public-private partnerships … can fuse 
collective organisation of a social democratic flavour with … a sharpening of 
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inter-local competition” (Gough 2004: 197).  In practice, there is a scalar 
differentiation between the strategies, with the neo-liberal ideology being most 
evident at national and supra-national levels where regulation was and is 
liberalised, and the social democratic ideology being seen at the more local 
level, where business happens and has to co-exist with and have the support of 
at least a majority of the residents. 
In the case of West Cumbria, the features of the area which were covered in 
detail in this and earlier chapters – the isolation, overwhelmingly positive public 
opinion towards the nuclear industry, and an inability to move existing nuclear 
operations – make adopting features of an embedded, social democratic 
strategy necessary, while the networked realities of the contemporary economy 
and specifically nuclear industry after de-nationalisation impose elements of 
international neo-liberalism. In seeking to meld the two, and have the state, 
capital, labour and local residents involved to construct the “political consensus 
between sections of capital, labour and residents” (Gough 2004: 196) the 
Energy Coast, and now the Centre for Nuclear Excellence as concepts attempt 
to do that, to varying extents as was explored, involve public and private 
industry, local authorities and wider consultation.  The problem however is that 
the pursuit of already dominant economic and political interests leads to “the 
systematic exclusion or further disempowerment of politically and/or 
economically already weaker social groups” (Swyngedouw 1996: 1499). 
7.6 – Conclusions 
 
Broadly speaking, those ‘top down’ institutions of intervention, such as the 
Regional Development Agency and even its delivery bodies in West Cumbria 
have much broader geographical coverage, and therefore consequently broader 
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aims, than initiatives originating in the region.  The relationship between 
geographical scale and intervention focus is quite clear.  The two incarnations 
of the Britain’s Energy Coast initiative, and lately the Centre for Nuclear 
excellence, have followed a trend to smaller geographical focus and more 
explicitly nuclear-aim development.  
There may be no other economic options for West Cumbria that are viable, 
certainly in the short term, than to pursue more nuclear development.  Nor 
should this chapter be seen as casting a judgement on whether or not more 
nuclear developments should or should not be pursued in the region.  However, 
what this chapter has aimed to set out, building upon the chapters which 
preceded it, is that despite attempts at diversification, nuclear is the only option 
being pursued with any success.  It is being driven by actors with institutional 
interests in a nuclear future; such as those representing councils with business 
rates to consider or those involved in nuclear technologies with commercial 
concerns to protect and advance.  This further pursuit of an industry which is 
already dominant has clear consequences.  Just as the rescaling of the 
structures of economic intervention demonstrate a path dependency in their 
scaling, so too will the pursuit an economic order broadly based around more 
nuclear lead to the reproduction of existing patterns of inequality. 
It may, or may not, be the case that nuclear developments could preclude or 
deter a more diverse economic base in West Cumbria.  Evidence in this and 
previous chapters is contradictory.  From local authority experience suggesting 
an issue of blight, to survey data from industry highlighting the most significant 
deterrent is the lack of connective infrastructure.  It is the case that nuclear 
developments, particularly large-scale developments such as reactors and 
underground waste repositories, will require investment in local infrastructure 
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and both may carry with them additional benefits for the local communities.  
However, as was seen in the past with the development of the THORP facility, 
which was described as being “beaten only by the construction of the Channel 
Tunnel to the title of ‘biggest construction site in Europe’” (Sellafield 2016: 30), 
such infrastructure may arrive after a facility is finished and be small in scale 
compared to the geographical challenge.  In the long term, the currently 
planned economic developments in West Cumbria could provide a foundation 
upon which to build a more diverse economy, or they could not.  The lessons of 
past developments, such as THORP, would suggest that the pursuit of nuclear 
will not solve the inherent issues of doing business in a very remote region.  
Instead, it is more likely to continue to perpetuate the economic conditions 
which has produced a biased labour market, significant income polarisation and 
persistent inequalities in the local community.  Why a future of this kind is 
accepted, despite a recognition of the nuclear industry’s role in many of these 
social problems, is the question to which the conclusion of this thesis turns next.  
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CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 – Introduction 
This thesis has sought to analyse ‘the relationship between a global industrial 
actor (Sellafield) and its regional host (West Cumbria) – and what insights does 
that relationship offer for understandings of neoliberalism/globalisation?’  In this 
chapter the main findings of the thesis are summarised, specifically how the 
data analysis resolved the three supporting research questions.  In the latter 
part of this chapter, the trajectory of this research is outlined, as the directions 
for future research, informed by an appreciation of the limitations of this study, 
are considered to extend the main findings.  Finally, some implications of this 
thesis for theory and policy are explored. 
 
8.2 – Resolving the research questions 
This section will discuss how this thesis has resolved the three research 
questions in order to achieve the overall aim.  The three supporting research 
questions are: 
RQ1 - Political: How have local, regional and national governance 
arrangements been modulated through the presence and actions of the 
nuclear industry in West Cumbria? 
RQ2 - Social: How is the nuclear industry viewed in West Cumbria, and 
how has this changed in line with wider shifts in terms of state-industry 
relations? 
 
 
 238 
 
RQ3 - Economic: What are the implications for regional competitiveness 
arising from the changing relationship between the state and market for 
the nuclear industry in West Cumbria? 
In this section each of those research questions will, broadly, be addressed 
separately.  This will detail how the thesis has resolved those research 
questions in support of addressing the main aim, which will be explored at the 
end of this section. 
8.2.1 – Research question one 
The first research question relates to political effects, particularly the effect on 
governance structures, of the relationship between Sellafield and West 
Cumbria.  This was addressed in both chapters five and seven, which 
predominantly explored the governance of the nuclear industry and of economic 
development respectively.  This section will predominantly focus on the national 
level of governance of the nuclear industry, and deal with economic 
development structures in the discussion around economic competitiveness 
later with the discussion around research question three. 
The nuclear industry in West Cumbria includes the most expensive and 
hazardous decommissioning challenges in the UK.  As explored in chapter 
three, the range of activities undertaken at the site in its 60 year history 
embrace power generation, reprocessing and fuel manufacture.  The significant 
challenge comes from the reprocessing activities, which separate from spent 
fuel the most hazardous isotopes as a waste stream, and the lack of thought 
given in the early development of the site to its eventual decommissioning.  As 
explored in chapters three and five, this created a significant financial, technical 
and environmental challenge which, under the long-term management of the 
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site by BNFL as a nationalised company, did not see sufficient progress to 
satisfy government.  BNFL’s track record on the successful delivery of major 
projects to either design specification, time or budget was dire, such as the 
massively over-budget and underperforming THORP and MOX plants at 
Sellafield.  However, the challenges being faced at Sellafield were not entirely 
novel.  The United States had developed atomic weapons programmes earlier 
than the UK, and consequently had to decommission those earlier too.  The 
poor performance of BNFL at Sellafield led to the desire for, and veneration of, 
global expertise.  This led to the market for decommissioning services the NDA 
was set-up to achieve to address the costly and challenging nuclear legacy. 
Chapter five analysed changes to governmental policy towards the nuclear 
industry, specifically decommissioning and waste management, since the 
1990s.  The governance of the nuclear legacy underwent significant changes in 
that time.  A multilevel governance perspective was employed to analyse the 
changes to the way the state achieves its aims for management of the nuclear 
legacy.  This revealed that despite policy changes leading to a wider array of 
actors involved in the delivery of policy, the state remains in a strong position 
based on its position as the actor of last resort.  The rescaling of power, 
apparently upward to the global and then back to the national in the 
decommissioning policy area for Sellafield, was driven by a desire to reduce 
cost; from the days of the ‘cost-plus’ commercial contract brining money into the 
treasury, to the cost-reducing contract to reduce the amount being spent.  For 
waste management, despite devolving the responsibility for initiating the site 
selection process to much more local levels, the process was unsuccessful due 
to the multi-level governance environment in UK local government and the 
tension between tiers of local and central government.  In both cases the 
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policies rescaled power, but its application did not take account of the full range 
of ‘policy tools’ by which this power can be exercised in practice.  
At the local level, as chapter seven explored, local structures of economic 
development in West Cumbria were established or attempted to be co-opted by 
the nuclear industry to promote existing dominant interests and their 
reinforcement.  This ‘elite’ regionalism, rather than being contested through 
struggles involving scale being politicised or jumped saw the nuclear industry 
attempting to circumvent more regional structures of economic development by 
appealing directly to central government in order to secure greater freedom to 
pursue a nuclear future for West Cumbria.  This was unsuccessful, and the 
state retained barriers and capabilities in the field of nuclear and imposed its 
own system of Local Enterprise Partnerships for economic development in sub-
national regions.  
8.2.2 – Research question two 
This section discusses how this thesis addressed the second research 
question, which asked ‘how is the nuclear industry is viewed in West Cumbria, 
and how has this changed in line with wider shifts in terms of state-industry 
relations?’  This was almost entirely contained within chapter six, but there were 
linkages to the changes in the relationship analysed in chapters five and 
chapter seven. 
In chapter six the changes made by incoming management of the Sellafield site 
were analysed alongside survey data which demonstrated the complexity of 
local public opinion towards the nuclear industry.  Changes were taking place 
as a result of the change in governance of the site in an area which, despite 
strong support for the nuclear industry, had a substantially less positive opinion 
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of the role and impact of the nuclear industry in the local area.  The greatest 
levels of support were in Copeland, where the Sellafield site and the greatest 
proportion of the workforce reside, however it was only in this area where a 
majority of people believed the area deserved more for its service in hosting 
nuclear sites.  Greatest support in this area was matched by greatest 
dissatisfaction.   Or, perhaps greatest exposure leads to greatest 
understanding?  The chapter then turned to an exploration of the lack of 
understanding of what responsibility Sellafield has to the wider community, 
either in terms of the corporate responsibility of any large employer or in terms 
of the premium for living with nuclear risk.   
The role of ‘glocal elites’ in shaping local conditions in a networked global 
economy was highlighted in this specific case.  The substantial economic power 
wielded by Sellafield executives in the West Cumbrian economy meant that 
changes which elsewhere might be less extensive have impacts beyond the site 
boundary.  This economic power was transferred to private sector interests by 
government transferring its capabilities, and thus a link between legitimate 
authority and economic power was identified.  The introduction of imperatives to 
deliver shareholder value, and then subsequently public value for the taxpayer, 
which were manifested in cost savings having to be made by management led 
to economic power being directed against already weaker and disadvantaged 
groups locally such as those without access to the Sellafield job market and 
existing industrial workers.  The obligation and identity of overseas 
management was questioned by focus group participants, but their actions were 
simply incentivised by the contract they were operating under.  The move back 
to a nationalised ownership and British management team was accompanied by 
greater attacks on employee terms and conditions than ever happened under 
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the ownership of Nuclear Management Partners.  This reveals that the 
imperative to save money came from the UK central government, enacted by its 
agency, the NDA. 
A key issue in the way Sellafield was viewed in West Cumbria related to the 
status of the workforce.  The creation of a type-II multi-level governance 
environment for the decommissioning of nuclear sites allows significant 
authority to be transferred to a wide range of actors at varying distances from 
government and at a range of scales.  At the Sellafield site in particular this 
meant more than just transferring the responsibility to enact a contract to 
achieve certain decommissioning and operational targets, it also meant altering 
the status of over 12,000 employees and over 25% of the working age 
population in a borough.  The aims and objectives of the application of that 
power were changed, and despite being run by a consortium of global 
companies, the site and its workforce became more locally focussed. The 
transfer of the authority to manage the Sellafield site cannot be considered 
without recognising that it is also, in practice, the transfer of significant 
economic power.  The consequences of this transfer however have more to do 
with the way in which they are transferred and why than to whom they are 
transferred.  While overseas management became a target for aspersions over 
their loyalties and obligations, the significant economic power which they 
possessed and was directed against those already disadvantaged by the locally 
skewed labour market, was wielded according to the priorities of government 
set by contract which would have been enacted by management regardless of 
where they are from.  The subsequent return to nationalised ownership and 
management demonstrates that this is the case.  As discussed, the austerity 
programme to cut public expenditure, from which Sellafield had been largely 
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immune from when the workers were technically private sector employees, 
targeted pay and conditions of workers in a way which made the efficiency 
savings of the parent body organisation (NMP) seem minor.  However, the 
issue the significant financial resources of the Sellafield contract being used to 
award contracts to the companies of the parent body (PAC 2016) included a 
British company does reflect the issue of corporate loyalties of economic elites 
and supported the perception that private ownership was placing corporate 
interests before those of the workforce or region.  The restructuring of the state 
to bring in such a wider array of actors was on balance, therefore, a negative 
influence on the way the industry was perceived in West Cumbria. 
8.2.3 – Research question three 
This research question asked ‘What are the implications for regional 
competitiveness arising from the changing relationship between the state and 
market for the nuclear industry in west Cumbria?’  This was predominantly 
addressed in chapter seven which, informed by the complex public opinion 
explored in the previous chapter, analysed attempts to craft a nuclear future for 
West Cumbria.  This takes forward the issue of domination and elite interests 
but in the context of regional economic development.  The contribution 
regionalism brings is in seeing the regional scale not as a given, but as an 
emergent category; something which must be made and is as such an 
“inherently political act” which forces us to consider “whose region is actually 
being constructed” (Söderbaum 2003: 7).  Over the course of over 25 years, 
numerous attempts have been made in economic development in West 
Cumbria, backed mostly with state money either through established economic 
development funding routes such as the Regional Development Agencies or 
through money from the nuclear industry.  In all cases, economic development 
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either involved as part or focussed on near exclusively new nuclear 
developments.   This is not unexpected, given that in regions which are 
“institutionally thin” in particular, governance can become dominated by “elite 
coalitions” which rather than seeking to unlock new routes to development, build 
on reinforcing existing dominant interests and eschew “new institutional 
practices” which might widen participation in local decision making and regional 
development (Amin 1999: 373).  Thus, as a discourse and practice, regionalism 
may be “instrumentally attractive to powerful interests” (Lovering 1999: 392). 
Regions may emerge, broadly speaking, for two reasons, either through 
“politico-administrative action” such as Regional Development Agencies, or 
through “economic developments” such as Silicon valley, where untraded 
interdependencies matter.  With regard to the second imperative, Dicken (2007: 
21-23) highlights the propensity for firms to form these ‘localised geographical 
clusters’ which are ‘generalised’ or ‘specialised’ i.e. cities as an example of 
generalised clusters where the peripheral activities common to many firms and 
their employees can be located, and science parks (a classic UK example from 
the past 20 years) where closely related industries locate as an example of a 
specialised cluster.  These clusters, or local “territorial production systems” 
(Swyngedouw and Baeten 2001: 833-834), can emerge from both economic 
and political action. The two imperatives for regions emerging are not mutually 
exclusive.  The West Cumbrian example, begun with the spinning-out of 
elements of BNFL to establish a science park now occupied by over 100 
companies in the nuclear supply chain, is evidence of this.  Political action can 
provide the catalyst for economic development.  However, in an age where the 
“discretionary powers of the state” to shape economies has declined and the 
importance of local conditions has increased (Swyngedouw 1989: 31) regions 
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have become “partly denationalized strategic territorialisations with considerable 
regulatory autonomy through the ascendance of private governance regimes” 
(Sassen 2008: 54-55).  This raises questions of accountability of economic 
interventions, such as Britain’s Energy Coast and others, where there is a lack 
of direct democratic accountability common to rescaled governance regimes 
(Swyngedouw 2004: 41; Bulkeley 2005: 878).  This is particularly salient for the 
examples in West Cumbria explored in this thesis which rely on public rather 
than private money, a situation not uncommon in the UK (Cochrane et al 1996: 
1331; Swyngedouw 1996: 1503).   
Economic development plans in West Cumbria attempt to create an ‘Energy 
Coast’ or a ‘Centre for Nuclear Excellence’ by stressing “shared cultural and 
ideological beliefs” (Paul 2005: 2016) such as the positive public opinion 
towards the nuclear industry.  The assertion that these plans are in the interests 
of the whole area, while in fact advancing “explicitly or implicitly … the long-term 
interests of the hegemonic class” (Jessop 1997: 62) leads to “the systematic 
exclusion or further disempowerment of politically and/or economically already 
weaker social groups” (Swyngedouw 1996: 1499) as already discussed.  This 
situation arises when “Dissensual contestation and struggles are replaced by 
techno-managerial planning, expert management and administration” and 
“politics as policymaking has sutured the space of the political as expressions of 
disagreement/dissensus” (Swyngedouw 2010: 225).  The focus on measures 
such as GVA, job numbers, inward investment and so on do two things.  Firstly, 
it does not distinguish between those investments which address internal 
inequalities and those which reinforce them.  Secondly, the use of such 
language makes expertise “the foundation for … politics/policies” (Swyngedouw 
2007: 27).  This diminishes the opportunities for opposition when the terms of 
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the debate are skewed towards those who can afford to spend hundreds of 
thousands of pounds on consultants and have the resources of public and 
private bodies locally to draw upon.  This diminishes the opportunity for a 
meaningful opposition “creating a “‘democratic deficit’, through the side-lining of 
critical voices” (Johnstone 2014: 703).  Even for individual developments, such 
as new power stations and waste facilities, despite the pretence to public 
involvement with ever more consultations, the side effect can be a state of 
“UNCLE—Unlimited Consultation Leading to Exhaustion” (Johnstone 2014: 
705).  This renders nuclear developments in West Cumbria ‘post-political’ or the 
nuclear industry ‘hegemonic’ locally and exacerbates the lack of proper 
democratic accountability of the actions of complex governance arrangements 
embracing a wide array of actors attempting to control space.  When plans are 
presented, finished, to local councillors after being developed by a small group 
of council leaders and nuclear industry representatives at meetings which are 
not public, it is fair to say there are substantial ‘barriers’ ensuring ‘non-entry’ into 
arenas of decision (McCalla-Chen 2000: 34).  However, such barriers exist at 
multiple levels.  The constraints placed on local ambitions by government 
policy, and unsuccessful attempts to overcome those by bypassing regional 
enterprise structures, demonstrate that it is not only at a local level that barriers 
are encountered and actors attempt to maintain their control over space or 
policy. 
Political action, particularly when lacking democratic accountability, reminds us 
of the question of interests.  If regionalism is about correcting uneven regional 
development in a national economy (Brenner 2003: 306; MacLeod and Jones 
2007: 1180), and the experience of West Cumbria demonstrates an earnest 
desire to close that disparity, less attention is paid to dealing with the uneven 
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development within the region itself.  Despite this and that in a political 
environment in which the state is not the only actor, where there may be 
competing regionalisms emerging from a complex milieu of competing actors 
(Söderbaum 2003: 8), we see no alternative strategy for West Cumbria.  That is 
not to say specific developments in certain instances are not opposed, 
sometimes successfully, but in general despite as explored in the previous 
chapter, a recognition that the area does not necessarily do well from the 
nuclear industry, all economic development in West Cumbria centres itself on 
more nuclear.  
 
8.3 - Implications for the geographies of power 
 
What can we learn, from this study, about the geographies of power?  In short, 
we can see the difference that geography makes to the exercise of power (Allen 
2003: 1).  Power, rather than being a placeless property, is experienced in the 
places people live and work.  As explored in chapter two, the state has been 
altered, in the shift from government to governance.   However, as this thesis 
has revealed, it is not a simple case of a decline in state authority, but is more 
complex.  Indeed, the attribution of any particular property to any particular 
scale is folly.  The transformation of the state, which has involved capabilities 
being rescaled, cannot be understood by simply following the capabilities.  
Making a state function more proximate to a region does not mean it becomes 
more proximate in their lives, nor more accountable to them, perhaps quite the 
reverse.  It has been the case that generally it is capital that has jumped up to 
the global scale and regulation of labour down to the local (Swyngedouw 1997: 
170).  However, it is not enough to be confined to terms such as ‘up’ and ‘down’ 
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and ignore how these changes are enacted and practiced.  The notion that 
globalisation of the ownership and management of firms is inherently 
disempowering is too broad.  The dynamics of what these rescalings of state 
authority actually mean in practice are complex and geographical.   
Local conditions shape what is possible in the exercise of power, such that in 
this instance the local public opinion towards the nuclear industry is a vital 
enabler for the actions of the industry and the potential for its reinforcement of 
dominance through a nuclear future for West Cumbria.  However, the centre 
has retained a key position; the demise of state authority is wildly exaggerated.    
The move to a contractorised, target-driven model of service delivery in the 
public sector is “a form of authority ‘detached’ from the centre, yet ‘re-
embedded’ in subnational institutions as a means to secure outcomes” (Allen 
2011: 292).  This denationalisation of state functions (Sassen 2008), in the case 
of the nuclear industry through the establishment of the NDA and creation of a 
competitive market for decommissioning services, draw distant actors and the 
interests close such that “the centre” and the ‘global’ are both in the region, 
creating novel geographies (Sassen 2008) where the idea of a centre being 
above the region no longer holds (Allen 2003; Allen 2011).  Instead, power is 
brokered directly in the region and these non-state actors can “fold in their 
political demands” to alter and change the inducements and conditions of a 
contractorised state (Allen 2011: 292).  The experience at Sellafield of a private 
owner exercising public functions, is one of constant contract variations driven 
by a desire for increased payments to satisfy distant shareholder value. 
The failure of that contract model for the decommissioning of nuclear sites and 
the subsequent renationalisation of the Sellafield site revealed two issues for 
the geographies of power.  Firstly, the state never went away, it was not 
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disempowered but the way its aims were achieved changed and involved 
opening up the practice of state capabilities to a broader array of actors.  
Secondly, the disempowerment of workers was driven by interests which were 
intent on maximising shareholder returns.  The location of those interests was 
irrelevant, they were made proximate by the contract.  The return to state 
ownership and management however made no difference to the issues the 
workers had faced, rather things were made worse, as efficiencies were no 
longer confined to or limited by the scope of a contract, but opened completely 
up to meet the state’s requirements for national collective bargaining in a time of 
austerity to limit pay and benefits across the public sector.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 – The relationship between the government, nuclear industry 
and West Cumbria  
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8.1.  What this highlights is that it is the interests and practice that matter, not 
the movement up or down of authority.  Therefore, we have to examine how 
power is in how it is used in specific places, not ascribe properties or intentions 
to any particular scale as a given characteristic.  Simply as a scale, global does 
not necessarily mean greater disempowerment for the region than national, and 
nor does freedom necessarily come without constraints.  The centre constrains 
by “reaching into the politics of regions and localities” (Allen 2011: 291) which 
will accept, contest or negotiate successfully or not, as the crafting of a nuclear 
future for West Cumbria clearly revealed. 
 
8.4 – Future research 
8.4.1 - What could or should it look at?   
The way in which domination occurs, and the reasons rebellion does not form, 
require further research in the UK.  In this community, while there are no 
alternative strategies for the future economic and social development of the 
area, there have been cases of opposition to nuclear developments in the 
1990s and 2000s.  There is also a clear recognition that a single dominant 
industry is problematic in general, and Sellafield has specific issues with its own 
responsibility to the community.  Despite the intentions of earlier economic 
development plans to at least have nuclear as part of a wider more diverse 
ambition, subsequent more recent plans have become more and more nuclear 
focussed.  More research is needed to understand why actors fail to pursue 
issues of interest or concern and instead accept or adjust to the existing 
situation. 
This could be addressed with more study in West Cumbria, but it would address 
a significant limitation of this research if a comparative element were sought.  
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The greatest limitation of this research stems from the single case study. Future 
research could explore other nuclear sites, other areas dominated by single 
industries in the UK, and the wider political context of an increasingly traditional 
left and right wing polarised political landscape at a national level is opening up 
the whole terrain of state/market relations to practical pressure and concrete 
change, as explored in the next sub-section. 
 
8.4.2 – Policy developments 
Upcoming policy developments in the nuclear industry were explored or 
mentioned in chapters three and five earlier in the thesis.  There are four 
nuclear policy developments and wider issues in the relationship between state 
and market which are emerging that could provide opportunities to explore the 
issues raised in this thesis. 
The first is the failure of the contract to decommission the MAGNOX reactors 
and subsequent internal inquiry into how that contract was awarded.  The NDA 
and Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy are exploring why 
they tendered and awarded a contract which the winning consortium then found 
did not specify the work which was actually required at those nuclear sites.  The 
decision as to whether to re-tender the contract, or as for Sellafield explore 
other models (such as direct ownership) is yet to be taken.  In either eventuality, 
this provides an opportunity to explore the way in which complex contracts 
which rely heavily on payment as incentive work, and the range of interests and 
power which are brought to bear upon communities at nuclear sites.  Secondly, 
the programme of new reactors, all of which are at existing sites, will be an 
opportunity to examine how the nuclear futures of these areas do or do not 
reinforce patterns of inequality and disempowerment among the workforce and 
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wider community.  The reactors planned for West Cumbria will be provided by 
the Korean Nuclear Power Corporation (Kepco), and other sites are provided by 
different private partners.  Thirdly, waste management will be a huge project in 
time, cost and activity should a community go from initially expressing interest in 
taking part in the search for a suitable location for a deep geological facility for 
the storage and disposal of higher activity radioactive wastes.  This process will 
embrace a range of issues in this thesis, such as rescaled power relations in the 
siting process, contestation of the nuclear future in the opposition to any facility 
right through to construction and operation for the next century or more.  Fourth 
and finally, the appointment of strategic and programme partners to address 
capability deficiencies site wide and for specific projects respectively at 
Sellafield and potentially other sites, pending the outcome of the MAGNOX 
contract inquiry, will provide opportunities to further explore the role of the 
private sector in public service. 
Outside the nuclear industry the issue of the relationship between the state and 
industry is under a level of scrutiny which is unprecedented since the shift to a 
neoliberal, contractorised model of public service delivery started to be really 
pushed in the 1980s.  On 15 January 2018 the construction services firm 
Carillion entered liquidation.  Carillion was involved in providing public services 
across the UK, from construction of hospitals and railways, to the provision of 
school meals and maintenance of military housing.   The collapse straight into 
liquidation, without any period of administration, signalled that the business was 
able to be salvaged.  The company had debt of £1.5 billion, some of which 
arose from over-promising and under-pricing public sector contracts, which then 
required the company to borrow money to complete the projects (Brummer 
2018).   This has prompted economic and political commentators to question 
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the very viability of neoliberal restructuring of the state, which has been 
explored in this thesis by looking at the nuclear industry.  Robert Peston (2018), 
the former BBC Economics Editor and current ITV Political Editor said of 
Carillion’s collapse: 
“Carillion’s collapse marks the end of a 25-year love affair between Tory 
and New Labour governments on the one hand and private-sector 
service providers on the other.  To use a Star Wars analogy, the public 
sector strikes back.” 
However, the findings of this thesis are very relevant to the Carillion crisis.  The 
suggestion that these crises imply that a totally nationalised public sector is 
preferable to outsourcing and contractorisation of public service are premature 
or naïve.  Historical examples, such as the performance of BNFL, or the 
changes to terms and conditions of nuclear staff following renationalisation 
caution against assuming any particular model is best.  This thesis 
demonstrated that for the move from privatised to being re-nationalised brings 
simply a different set of interests to bear, from having made distant shareholder 
interests proximate in the context of a contract (perhaps amended or varied) to 
granting a much greater scope to government at a time of austerity may well be 
a case of ‘from the frying pan to the fire’.  However, the common theme from 
this research to the emerging shift back to an in house public service provision 
is the failure of public sector contracts.  The return of these staff and others to 
the public sector, and what effect the replacement of shareholder and other 
interests with the austerity-driven interests of central (and local) government 
among other changes has. 
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APPENDIX B – SURVEY TECHNICAL DETAILS 
Sampling – size, stratification and randomisation 
The formula to estimate the required sample size is below (Dillman 2007): 
𝑁𝑠 =
(𝑁𝑝)(𝑝)(1 − 𝑝)
(𝑁𝑝 − 1)(
𝐵
𝐶⁄ )
2
+ (𝑝)(1 − 𝑝)
 
where: 
 Ns = completed sample size needed (notation often used is n) 
 Np = size of population (notation often used is N) 
 p = proportion expected to answer a certain way (50% or 0.5 is most conservative) 
 B = acceptable level of sampling error (0.05 = ±5%; 0.03 = ±3%) 
 C = Z statistic associate with confidence interval (1.645 = 90% confidence level; 1.960 = 95% 
confidence level; 2.576 = 99% confidence level) 
 
For the purpose of surveying west Cumbria, in line with the ethical approval and 
the electoral register listing only those of 18 years age and above, the sample 
size can be estimated.  The 2011 census indicates there are 130,804 persons 
of the appropriate age.  The number on the edited version of the electoral 
register for the two boroughs is significantly lower, at 85,424 for 2013, as not 
everyone registers to vote and some opt out of appearing on the edited version 
of the register.  Using the census figure is more appropriate, given that the 
study aims to explore the whole adult population of West Cumbria, not only 
those who register to vote.  Based on this figure, the box below shows the 
calculation of sample size for this project. 
𝑁𝑠 =
(130,804)(0.5)(0.5)
(130,804 − 1)(0.05 1.96⁄ )
2
+ (0.5)(0.5)
           𝑁𝑠 = 383 
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An optimistic estimate of the response rate would be 15%, but it was thought 
that nearer 10% was more realistic at the time of sampling.  On the basis of a 
10% response rate the mailing would need to be to 3830 people.  For practical 
reasons with printing and ordering quantities the mailing was to 4000 people, 
with an initial trial to 100 of those 4000 to test the survey and response rate.  
Too many responses would not be a problem, unlike too few.  The 100 revealed 
some minor issues with question wording (covered later) and yielded a 
response rate of 22%. 
After deciding on the sample size, the sample was stratified on a geographical 
basis.  This is because location, particularly any potential differences 
urban/rural and distance from the Sellafield site, are of theoretical interest and it 
is therefore necessary to stratify the sample geographically to ensure that the 
response is as representative as possible.  Small rural sub-populations could be 
missed as a result if there were no stratification.  The stratification by electoral 
ward ensures a complete and even geographical coverage of all West Cumbria, 
and that the main urban areas of Whitehaven and Workington are not 
overrepresented.  The electoral register, which is being used as the sampling 
frame, records the polling district of individual; this is then easily grouped by 
electoral ward.  Table 5.3 shows the stratification for all electoral wards in west 
Cumbria.  This is only based on the population aged over 18 in the 2011 
census.  The figures in red show the number of cases from each ward for a total 
sample of 4,000. 
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Table B.1– Stratified sample by electoral ward 
Once the data has been stratified, and the numbers to be sampled from each 
ward is known, cases were selected.  The selection each individual case is 
done by random sampling so that all individuals have the same probability of 
being included in the survey.  Cases are not substituted back in after selection, 
avoiding the possibility of the same individual being selected twice.  Given the 
large population size compared to the sample size, replacement is not 
necessary, as the probability of subsequent cases being selected is hardly 
altered.  If the sample size were near to the population size, then this would be 
different, as towards the final cases the probability of selection gets 
considerably larger as there are fewer and fewer cases left to draw from.   
Ward Population (18+) Proportion (%) Sample Ward Population (18+) Proportion (%) Sample
All Saints 3,739 2.86 114 Arlecdon 1,212 0.93 37
Aspatria 2,635 2.01 81 Beckermet 2,412 1.84 74
Boltons 1,524 1.17 47 Bootle 1,071 0.82 33
Broughton St Bridget's 3,208 2.45 98 Bransty 3,866 2.96 118
Christchurch 2,753 2.10 84 Cleator Moor North 3,186 2.44 97
Clifton 1,270 0.97 39 Cleator Moor South 2,162 1.65 66
Crummock 1,302 1.00 40 Distington 3,173 2.43 97
Dalton 1,439 1.10 44 Egremont North 3,355 2.56 103
Derwent Valley 1,328 1.02 41 Egremont South 2,989 2.29 91
Ellen 2,517 1.92 77 Ennerdale 821 0.63 25
Ellenborough 2,962 2.26 91 Frizington 1,981 1.51 61
Ewanrigg 2,525 1.93 77 Gosforth 1,195 0.91 37
Flimby 1,307 1.00 40 Harbour 3,436 2.63 105
Harrington 2,574 1.97 79 Haverigg 1,599 1.22 49
Holme 1,326 1.01 41 Hensingham 3,172 2.43 97
Keswick 4,278 3.27 131 Hillcrest 2,061 1.58 63
Marsh 1,259 0.96 39 Holborn Hill 1,876 1.43 57
Moorclose 3,714 2.84 114 Kells 1,921 1.47 59
Moss Bay 3,681 2.81 113 Millom Without 1,143 0.87 35
Netherhall 2,454 1.88 75 Mirehouse 3,362 2.57 103
Seaton 4,018 3.07 123 Moresby 1,104 0.84 34
Silloth 2,663 2.04 81 Newtown 2,729 2.09 83
Solway 1,285 0.98 39 Sandwith 1,816 1.39 56
St John's 4,375 3.34 134 Seascale 2,282 1.74 70
St Michael's 4,067 3.11 124 St Bees 1,345 1.03 41
Stainburn 1,374 1.05 42 Total Copeland 1690
Wampool 1,327 1.01 41
Warnell 1,542 1.18 47
Waver 1,429 1.09 44 Allerdale Copeland Both
Wharrels 1,208 0.92 37 Eligibe population 75,535 55,269 130,804
Wigton 4,452 3.40 136 % per borough 58 42 100
Total Allerdale 2310 Number to sample 2310 1690 4000
Allerdale Copeland
West Cumbria Stratified by Electoral Ward
 289  
Random sampling is preferable to systematic sampling in this case.  When 
using the electoral register as a sampling frame the cases are grouped 
geographically by polling district.  Selecting, say, every 10th item in the list could 
lead to geographical clustering of the cases selected within each electoral ward.  
Random sampling thus ensures an unbiased geographical selection of cases 
from within each ward.  Combined with the stratification by electoral ward, this 
ensures an even coverage of cases across the area. 
The method by which the random selection is done involves assigning each 
case a long random number (with no duplication).  Cases are then ordered by 
the random number to randomise the list.  The required number of names and 
addresses are then taken in the new, random order.  Tables 5.4 and 5.5 below 
show, for a hypothetical sample, the effect of this method of randomisation. 
Table B.2 – Sample frame before randomisation 
FRAME NO. DUPLICATE FRAME NO. RANDOM NO. Postal District Name Address
1 1 0.872277507 A1 A 1 First Street
2 2 0.35888885 A1 B 2 First Street
3 3 0.170666794 A1 C 3 First Street
4 4 0.879492496 A1 D 4 First Street
5 5 0.609291538 A1 E 5 First Street
6 6 0.145156502 A1 F 6 First Street
7 7 0.980672085 A1 G 7 First Street
8 8 0.191508311 A1 H 8 First Street
9 9 0.301820995 A1 I 9 First Street
10 10 0.25562565 A1 J 10 First Street
11 11 0.186443681 A2 K 1 Second Street
12 12 0.560790917 A2 L 2 Second Street
13 13 0.050609233 A2 M 3 Second Street
14 14 0.606800333 A2 N 4 Second Street
15 15 0.591501581 A2 O 5 Second Street
16 16 0.46794834 A2 P 6 Second Street
17 17 0.542128717 A2 Q 7 Second Street
18 18 0.733236284 A2 R 8 Second Street
19 19 0.317279486 A2 S 9 Second Street
20 20 0.725852197 A2 T 10 Second Street
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Table B.3 – Sample frame after randomisation 
Increasing response and dealing with bias 
Observational errors are those associated with measurement and processing, 
i.e. the design of the survey and the pre-analysis treatment of the data (Umbach 
2005: 93).  The more important of these two being the avoidance of 
measurement error by ensuring the survey instrument is well designed and any 
potential issues are highlighted and amended prior to data collection.  Umbach 
(2005: 93-94) offers three suggestions for the reduction of measurement error, 
principally having a defined objective and thus knowing what it is that any 
survey should be able to show, carefully wording questions to achieve this 
efficiently, and then rigorously testing the survey through focus groups, 
cognitive interviews and pre-testing.  This, which time consuming, can avoid 
issues at a later stage which could potentially render the whole exercise of 
surveying meaningless.  Following on from survey design related issues, the 
next major source of error is the actual collection of data and its treatment post-
collection.  One key source of error in any survey is through nonresponses, and 
FRAME NO. DUPLICATE FRAME NO. RANDOM NO. Postal District Name Address
1 13 0.050609233 A2 M 3 Second Street
2 6 0.145156502 A1 F 6 First Street
3 3 0.170666794 A1 C 3 First Street
4 11 0.186443681 A2 K 1 Second Street
5 8 0.191508311 A1 H 8 First Street
6 10 0.25562565 A1 J 10 First Street
7 9 0.301820995 A1 I 9 First Street
8 19 0.317279486 A2 S 9 Second Street
9 2 0.35888885 A1 B 2 First Street
10 16 0.46794834 A2 P 6 Second Street
11 17 0.542128717 A2 Q 7 Second Street
12 12 0.560790917 A2 L 2 Second Street
13 15 0.591501581 A2 O 5 Second Street
14 14 0.606800333 A2 N 4 Second Street
15 5 0.609291538 A1 E 5 First Street
16 20 0.725852197 A2 T 10 Second Street
17 18 0.733236284 A2 R 8 Second Street
18 1 0.872277507 A1 A 1 First Street
19 4 0.879492496 A1 D 4 First Street
20 7 0.980672085 A1 G 7 First Street
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there is a wide literature on strategies to increase response rates, which will be 
explored next. 
There are two types of non-response error; unit non response and item non 
response, the former being when a member of the sample fails to respond to 
the survey, and the latter when some questions are not answered (Umbach 
2005: 97).  It is possible that some respondents will not answer some questions 
on the survey.  Some nonresponses are to be expected, and as with unit 
nonrepsonse, a 100% response rate is unrealistic.  However, good survey 
design should attempt to anticipate and thus reduce item non-response.  
Methods such as pre-testing were covered earlier, and it is here that issues 
relating to possible systemic problems with any questions which may lead to 
multiple item nonresponses should be identified.  
Ideally, a survey would achieve a complete response, but this is not the case.  A 
low response rate has implications not only for the sample size obtained, but 
also for the sample characteristics i.e. over-representation of older people.  
Nonresponse bias can affect the validity of any findings.  While there are 
methods to address this after the collection of data, which will be explored later, 
the most straightforward way to deal with potential non-response bias it to 
increase the response rate.  However, there are a vast array of methods to do 
so, which vary in their effectiveness and their cost in cash and time.  Edwards et 
a (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of 481 trails which evaluated 110 methods 
of improving response rates to postal surveys.  The results are summarised in 
table 5.6 below: 
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Postal surveys 
Strategy 
 
Odds 
ratio 
Monetary incentives 1.87 
Recorded delivery 1.76 
Teaser on envelope e.g. suggesting participants may benefit from 
opening it 
3.08 
More interesting topic 2.00 
Pre-notification 1.45 
Follow-up contact 1.35 
Unconditional incentives 1.61 
Shorter questionnaires 1.64 
Providing a second copy of the questionnaire at follow up 1.46 
Mentioning an obligation to respond 1.61 
University sponsorship 1.32 
Non-monetary incentives 1.15 
Personalised questionnaires 1.14 
Hand written addresses 1.25 
Stamped rather than franked return envelopes 1.24 
An assurance of confidentiality 1.33 
First class mailing 1.11 
Questions of a sensitive nature* 0.94 
 
Electronic surveys 
Strategy 
 
 
Odds 
ratio 
Non-monetary incentives 1.72 
Shorter e-questionnaires 1.73 
Including a statement that others had responded 1.52 
More interesting topic 1.85 
Lottery with immediate notification of results 1.37 
Offer of survey results 1.36 
Using a white background 1.31 
Personalised e-questionnaires 1.24 
Using a simple header 1.23 
Using textual representation of response categories 1.19 
Giving a deadline 1.18 
Including a picture in the e-mail 3.05 
Survey mentioned in subject* 0.81 
E-mail includes male signature* 0.55 
Table B.4 – Strategies for increasing response rates for surveys  
(*These reduced response rates) 
With postal questionnaires, the best way to increase response rate is to make 
the questionnaire short and interesting, make the respondent feel important with 
the use of personalised surveys, envelopes and first class stamps, pre-
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notification and post-survey follow-up and the use of monetary incentives.  
Achieving all these can be a challenge and there have to be compromises. 
Incentives introduce ethical concerns and budgetary issues for research.  
Budget and time also constrains the potential for pre-notification and follow-up, 
and the use of first class stamps rather than franked envelopes (which are 
cheaper and quicker to use).  Personalising surveys is not necessarily possible, 
depending on how the sample frame is constructed i.e. if postal addresses are 
used without names.  It is comes down to what is possible within the time and 
resource available.   
The use of mixed mode survey methods, employing more than one method, 
such as combining postal with electronic delivery, is an option which is used 
increasingly by researchers.  Millar and Dillman (2011) found that offering a 
choice of modes led to a lower response rate than either mail or web only.  
Later reminders offering the mail nonresponders an option of web response had 
a negligible effect.  In a scenario where there was a 100% web access and a 
highly internet literate population, in this case university undergraduates, the 
mail only response rate was lower than for a more sophisticated method 
involving an initial mail contact with then email only follow-ups.  However, other 
issues hamper the use of e-mail follow up for many studies, such as the lack of 
a comprehensive list of public email addresses, and the ease at which e-mails 
can be ignored.  Thus, the key finding is that mixed modes lower response rates 
and offering a web based alternative mode as a later follow up to earlier 
mailings has a negligible effect (Millar and Dillamn 2011: 260; Medway and 
Foulton 2012: 733).  However, after doing absolutely everything on the list, it is 
still unlikely to achieve a 100% response rate, and given the constraints upon 
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research in terms of cost and time available in any given project, this is even 
less likely in practice.  
Methods for increasing response propensity unfortunately do not have a uniform 
impact on response rates, given that cases are all, broadly, different individuals 
(albeit with some shared characteristics which impact upon response 
propensity).  Therefore, the particular ‘lever’ which will encourage participation 
can differ across the unit.  Groves et al (2000) explore this through their theory 
of ‘leverage-salience’ whereby the decision to participate is a threshold, so 
potential participants weigh up factors such as topic, incentive, time and so on, 
and some of which are positive and other negative to differing extents.  So, 
depending how much salience cases attach to the various elements, depends 
on whether they take part, and this is represented diagrammatically below, 
where the larger the ball the greater the salience attached to an issue, and 
issues to the right are positive, those to the left negative, thus tipping right 
represents a decision to participate. However, in a project where some 
strategies for increasing response rate are too time consuming, targeting 
different ones to different groups is even more so. 
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Figure B.1 – ‘Leverage-Salience’ model of response propensity for two 
persons with different leverages and silences associated with survey 
attributes (Groves et al 2000: 300) 
The survey employed in this research was designed in such a way as to give it 
every chance of a higher response rate within the time and budget available.  
Starting with the strategies outlined earlier, the university was given prominence 
by having the covering letter on University headed paper and using university 
branded envelopes.  In addition, the questionnaires were personalised as much 
as possible, with the name and address being printed on the envelope and the 
covering letter looking as personal as a 4000 print run can, with a scanned 
signature from the researcher.  At all times confidentiality was assured, which 
was as much about ethical concerns as it was about response rate. Cost 
prevented many possible strategies from being implemented, including 
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incentives, recorded delivery, pre-notification, using stamps and first class 
mailing.  Time constraints made hand written addresses, more fully 
personalised questionnaires and a follow up impractical.  The strategy of having 
a more interesting topic is difficult, as the research is what it is, but in an attempt 
to at least make the topic seem worth the effort the local links of the researcher 
and the research were stressed in the covering letter in an attempt to draw upon 
feelings of obligation to the community. 
The issue of non-response has so far been covered in terms of what the 
researcher can do to minimise nonresponse, but there are characteristics of 
potential participants which are known factors in their likelihood to cooperate.  
Response propensity has two broad elements, the internal to the case and 
external to the case.  Those external have been covered, and in addition there 
are demographic characteristics of cases such as gender, age, education and 
others have known impacts on response propensity (Hoogendoorn 2008: 757).  
Their impact on survey results, bias, can be measured and acknowledged or 
corrected for. 
There is a third type of nonresponse which may hinder those who wish to take 
part in the survey, but cannot, such as on grounds of disability or language, and 
these can be potentially serious in research focussing on migration, for example 
(Hoogendoorn 2008: 757).  This is not a particularly major concern for this 
research in an area where nearly 98% of the population are white British, and 
nor were any disabilities known to cause any lowering of response rate.  The 
font and layout of the survey was checked and changed to make it the most 
readable format possible. 
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Given that the response rate is not going to be 100% for a survey and not every 
respondent will answer every question, despite the lengths gone to in testing 
the survey and so on, it may be necessary to adjust the results obtained to 
provide a representative outcome.  Taking these two issues separately – what 
to do about incomplete surveys, and what to do about skewed sample – there 
are solutions.  The simplest method of dealing with incomplete surveys is to 
remove that unit from the sample all together.  The obvious drawback being a 
reduced, potentially vastly, sample.  In the case of this research there were 31 
incomplete surveys returned, where two pages of questions were missed.  
These were the same pages on all 31, and were a result of the way the survey 
was printed and stapled by the printing contractor.  These were all discounted. 
A more general bias in the sample may emerge when certain ‘types’ of person 
are over- or under-represented i.e. the young, the well-off, the highly educated 
and so on.  In such cases it is desirable to know to what extent the data 
collected is representative of the population.  If those who have not responded 
are the same as those that have, there is not any issue as the sample is still 
representative, but as by definition non-respondents are not observed, this 
cannot be taken for granted (Littvy and Fazekas 2013: 569).  There are, 
therefore, methods available to predict and counter nonresponse in survey data.  
Prediction of nonresposne, or response propensity, is useful for dealing with 
both item nonresponse and unit nonresponse.  Knowing the characteristics of 
those most likely to respond and not respond to a survey is useful, as it should 
be considered when designing the survey to guide the selection of auxiliary 
variables, and also the sample frame.  Firstly, the sample frame can provide a 
significant amount of contextual data depending on the source (e.g. address 
correlating to affluence), which could be used to determine potential common 
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types of unit nonresponse (Littvy and Fazekas 2013: 573).  Secondly, by 
knowing what characteristics common responders and non-responders have 
should influence the selection of the auxiliary variables.  Auxiliary variables are 
those variables which are used in surveys to gather information about cases 
which can then be used to assess the characteristics of the sample and 
compare that against reliable sources of data elsewhere.  The “best auxiliary 
variables are those simultaneously correlated with response propensity and the 
key survey variables” (Groves 2006: 699), so for example age is known to be 
strongly associated with response propensity, as older people are less likely to 
respond to surveys (Kreuter and Olson 2011: 327) and it is known that change 
in identity is generational (Norris and Inglehart 2009).  This knowledge about 
what characteristics those nonresponders have is important for understanding 
how representative the sample is and thus how reliable any findings are, and for 
any post-survey weighting of the data if it is deemed necessary.  In some cases 
it may be necessary and useful to apply weighting (Umbach 2005: 99), indeed it 
is “an important obligation of survey designers is to identify and collect auxiliary 
variables useful for adjustment purposes” (Groves 2006: 699).  The survey can 
be seen in full in the appendices.  The auxiliary variables are in the final section, 
and include age, gender and education, all of which can be compared to the 
most recent (2011) census data for the two boroughs in West Cumbria. 
Survey delivery and return 
Once the development of the survey was complete, it was tested on a sample of 
100.  This sample was drawn from the main sample by taking the 58 from 
Allerdale and 42 from Copeland (as per the proportions of the total population in 
each borough) and then as for the stratification for the full 4000, stratifying the 
100 by electoral ward.  In the subsequent main mailing, these people were not 
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re-surveyed as there were only minor changes to the wording of three 
questions.  These changes which emerged fromt he pre-test sample were 
simply for clarity in questions which asked about occupational status.  It 
emerged that this was ambiguous for those who were retired, so the questions 
were altered to ask not only what people do, but what they did prior to 
retirement, for those for whom that would be applicable.  This meant asking “do, 
or did, you work in the nuclear industry?” instead of “do you work in the nuclear 
industry?”.  No other changes were made necessary following the test sample, 
and the survey was once again subjected to further ethical approval which was 
granted. 
The main sample was then prepared.  The logistical issues involved with a 
sample of 4000 were a challenge.  Envelopes were specifically purchased with 
the reply address printed by the supplier, instead of overprinting existing 
university reply envelopes.  4000 external mailing envelopes were also 
purchased specifically for the purpose.  Addresses were printed onto labels 
which were attached to the outgoing envelopes.  Unlike for the test sample for 
which the surveys were printed by the researcher, this was not feasible for 4000 
surveys which would have been 22,000 sheets of paper.  The time and 
inconvenience to others was not acceptable, and the decision was taken to 
have them printed by a local commercial printing form.  This, however, did alter 
the look and feel of the survey which may have detrimentally impacted 
response rates.  The test survey was printed on all standard paper and stapled 
in the top right corner once, which did feel like it was prepared by hand for the 
purpose.  The main survey however was in an A4 booklet form with the front 
and back pages being a silk paper and stapled twice.  The more professional 
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result may have made the survey feel less personal, although there is no 
evidence to support this. 
The main mailing was sent by second class post by the University of Central 
Lancashire mail room in the first week of April 2014, with all arriving at the 
sampled addressed by Tuesday 8th April 2014 and many slightly before.  The 
majority of surveys were returned within one month, and the bulk of those were 
in the first two weeks.  There were a large number of surveys returned as the 
person had moved or died.  This was in part due to the fact that the electoral 
register used was from March 2013, and in at least one case where the person 
was deceased it was due to them being wrongly re-registered to vote following 
their death by someone at the household.  Of those returned, 32 were rejected, 
of which 31 were due to large numbers of missing responses, and in all those 
cases it was the middle two pages of the booklet.  In one case their number of 
answers which were contradictory gave the impression that they were filled in a 
purposely deceitful way.  Some surveys were also returned completely blank.  
In total 430 surveys were deemed suitable and inputted into SPSS, which was 
six short of the desired number based on the census figure, but well above the 
383 required based on the 85,424 on the edited register. The reasons for the 
lower than expected response rate have been covered.  There were 462 
returned, which was above the lower 10% expected response rate, but as 
covered 32 were not included.  Given the time and resource constraints, it was 
decided to go forward with the 430 as a sufficiently large sample for the 
purposes of this study rather than undertake any resampling.  If this were 
aiming at being a commercial representative sample then the situation would 
perhaps be different.  
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APPENDIX C - SURVEY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
My name is Stephen, and I’m a postgraduate student with the University of Central 
Lancashire at the campus on the Westlakes Science Park near Whitehaven. My PhD 
is looking  how we see our place as citizens in a local, national and global society, 
and the things that might impact that, including the presence of the nuclear industry. 
 
This topic is of particular interest to me having grown-up and lived in the area all my 
life.  In that time many changes have taken place to a point where things we 
consider normal now would have been extraordinary not so long ago. 
 
It is your views, and those of others living in West Cumbria, which are vital to my 
research.  By completing this survey you will be not only helping me with my project, 
but the findings will also contribute to local policy making by helping us better 
understand and adapt to the changes going on around us. 
 
Completing the survey 
 
- Takes around 10 minutes 
- Questions are all multiple choice 
- All you need is a pen or pencil  
- Just answer every question you feel able to answer 
- Put in the pre-paid envelope provided and pop in a post box 
 
If you have any questions, don’t hesitate to get in touch with me on the details 
above. 
 
I’d like to thank you in advance for giving your time to complete this survey.   
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Stephen Haraldsen
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Volunteer information 
 
Please remember that you are under no obligation to complete the survey.  However, once 
you return it, the answers you give cannot be removed from the study.  Only those with a 
legitimate professional need will have access to these completed surveys.  In the thesis and 
any subsequent publications, participants will not be identifiable as no data is collected 
which allows for this to happen. 
 
If you wish to speak to the researcher’s academic school or supervisory team, please 
contact Dr Antonio Cerella, School of Education and Social Science, University of Central 
Lancashire, Preston, Lancashire, PR1 2HE or call 01772 201 201. 
 
Consent 
 
By completing this survey you agree to take part in the study.  No personal details are 
gathered, and consequently you are not identifiable in any way to the researcher or anyone 
else.  
 
 
 
Please begin the survey on the next page.
 SURVEY 
  
Page 1 PLEASE CONTINUE ON THE NEXT PAGE  
 
Section 1 - Rights and responsibilities 
 
1) As UK citizens we have certain rights, such as to a fair trial, protection by the 
police and armed forces, and to certain benefits, such as a pension.  There are 
also human rights, like a right to life, liberty and security of person.   
  
Below are some statements about rights.  Please state how much you agree or 
disagree with each: 
 
 a) The only rights a citizen has are in their own country. 
Disagree strongly Disagree   Agree Agree strongly 
 1  2  3  4  
   
 b) In an age when people can freely move around the world, we should grant 
citizenship rights to anyone who comes to the UK, pays tax and obeys the law. 
 1  2  3  4  
   
 c) There are basic, global human rights everyone is entitled to. 
 1  2  3  4  
 
2) Do you think that your actions can have global consequences? 
 
 Yes 1 No 2 Don’t know 3 
 
3) Do you think that global events have an impact on you? 
 
 Yes 1 No 2 Don’t know 3 
 
4) Below are some statements about the responsibilities that, as citizens, we may 
have towards others.   
 
Please state how much you agree or disagree with each: 
 
 a) My only responsibilities are to myself and my family. 
Disagree strongly Disagree   Agree Agree strongly 
 1  2  3  4  
   
 b) I have responsibilities towards people where I live and/or come from. 
 1  2  3  4  
   
 c) I have responsibilities towards other people from my country. 
 1  2  3  4  
   
 d) I have responsibilities towards people regardless of where they come from. 
 1  2  3  4  
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Section 2 - Volunteering, charity and politics 
 
5) 
 
Below are some statements about what sorts of causes, charities or voluntary 
organisations you might give money or time to.   
 
If you had to choose among the four statements about various causes to donate 
to, which would be your first choice? And which second? 
 
 a) Only benefits local people. 
 b) Only benefits my fellow countrymen and women. 
 c) Specific overseas disasters (e.g. famines, tsunami). 
 d) Long-term global causes (e.g. climate change, rainforests, poverty). 
  
 First choice 
 
  Second choice   
 
6) 
 
Do you, on purpose, do any of the following when shopping, rather than buy 
potentially cheaper alternatives? Choose as many as apply. 
 
 Buy fair-trade 1 Boycott  companies 2 Buy local 3 None 4 
 
7) How much interest do you take in issues which occur: 
 
 Locally? 
None at all Not much A little Quite a lot Very interested 
 1  2  3  4  5  
  
Nationally? 
 1  2  3  4  5  
  
In Europe? 
 1  2  3  4  5  
  
Globally? 
 1  2  3  4  5  
 
8) Politics operates at various levels.  Which level is the most important to you? 
And the second? 
 
 a) Local (e.g. borough or county council) 
 b) National (e.g. UK parliament) 
 c) European (e.g. European Parliament) 
 d) Global (e.g. United Nations) 
  
 First choice 
 
  Second choice   
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Section 3 - Identity and trust 
 
9) 
 
To which of these geographical areas do you feel you closest to?  Which is 
your first choice? And which second? 
 
 a) Town or locality where you live 
 b) Town or locality where you’re from (if not the same as above) 
 c) West Cumbria 
 d) United Kingdom/Great Britain 
 e) Europe 
 f) The World 
  
 First choice 
 
  Second choice   
 
10) 
 
Below there are some different groups.   
 
Could you state for each whether you trust people from this group completely, 
somewhat, not very much or not at all?  
 
 People of another culture 
 Trust  
completely 
1 Trust  
somewhat 
2 Do not trust  
very much 
3 Do not trust  
at all 
4 
    
  
People of another nationality 
 Trust  
completely 
1 Trust  
somewhat 
2 Do not trust  
very much 
3 Do not trust  
at all 
4 
    
  
People of another religion 
 Trust  
completely 
1 Trust  
somewhat 
2 Do not trust  
very much 
3 Do not trust  
at all 
4 
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Section 4 - Work and leisure 
 
11) Which of the following most closely describes your work status? 
 
 Employed 1 Self-employed 2 Homemaker 3 Unemployed 4 Retired 5 
 
12) What is your annual gross income (before tax and deductions)? 
 
£0-£19k 1 £20k-£39k 2 £40k-£59k 3 £60k-£79k 4 £80k-£99k 5 £100k+ 6 
 
13) Which of the following describes your current or former occupation? Please 
tick the one option which most closely applies. 
 
Manager, director & senior professional 1 Caring, leisure and other services 6 
 Professional 2 Sales and customer service 7 
Associate professional and technical 3 Process plant and machine operative 8 
 Administrative and secretarial 4 Elementary i.e. cleaners, labourers 9 
 Skilled trade 5 Student (full-time) 10 
 
14) In your work, do or did you communicate or collaborate with colleagues from 
overseas? 
 
 Regularly work/communicate overseas 1 
 Sometimes work/communicate overseas 2 
 Never or not applicable 3 
 
15) How often do you travel abroad for work and/or pleasure? 
 
 Never 1 Less than 
once per 
year 
2 Yearly 3 Several 
times per 
year 
4 Monthly 5 More 
than 
once per 
month 
6 
       
 
 
16) These days much of what was once done by British organisations has become 
international, like Sellafield now being run by a group of American, French and 
British companies.   
 
Do you believe that your rights in the workplace have been changed as a result 
of the internationalisation of ownership of firms? 
 
 Yes – positively 1 Yes – negatively 2 No 3 Don’t know 4 
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17) If you access the internet for personal reasons, please tick all of the uses 
below that apply. 
 
 
 Keep in touch with friends/family  1 Accessing council/government services 7 
 Keeping in touch with groups I’m a 
member of 
2 Supporting local and/or national 
campaigns 
8 
  
Social networking (facebook, twitter etc) 3 Supporting global campaigns 9 
 Gaming 4 Banking and bill-paying 10 
 News and current affairs 5 Music, films and TV 11 
 Shopping 6 Other 12 
 
18) 
 
Thinking about entertainment, such as television, films, books, theatre and so 
on, are what you prefer: 
 
 Mostly British 1 Mostly American 2 Other 3 A mixture 4 
 
19) 
 
When you go out to eat, what foods/dishes/cuisines do you tend to choose? 
 
 Mostly British 1 Mostly from overseas 2 Both/neither 3 
 
20) 
 
Other than your native language, how many additional languages do you 
speak? 
 
 Two or more 1 One 2 None 3 
 
21) 
 
Where do you most often holiday? 
 
 Locally in Cumbria 1 In Britain 2 Overseas 3 
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Section 5 – The nuclear industry 
 
22) Do or did you work in the nuclear industry? 
 
 Yes – at Sellafield 1 Yes – not at Sellafield 2 No 3 
 
23) Does or did anyone in your household work in the nuclear industry? 
 
 Yes – at Sellafield 1 Yes – not at Sellafield 2 No 3 
 
24) For those who don’t or didn’t work in the nuclear industry, does the company 
you work or worked for operate in countries other than the UK? 
 
 Yes  1 No 2 Don’t know 3 
 
25) 
 
For those who do consider themselves supporters of the nuclear industry, 
which of the following four statements most closely matches your opinion?  
And second most? 
 
 a) Supports jobs in West Cumbria 
 b) Helps Britain to be less reliant on foreign sources of energy 
 c) Is important in the fight against climate change 
 d) Is the only way to meet energy needs of a rising global population 
  
 First choice 
 
   Second choice   
 
26) 
 
For those who do not consider themselves supporters of the nuclear industry, 
which of the following four statements most closely matches your opinion?  
And second most? 
 
 a) Damages the local environment 
 b) Puts off other employers locating here 
 c) Accidents pose potentially global risks 
 d) Already harms the environment across huge areas 
  
 First choice 
 
  Second choice   
  
27) West Cumbria has hosted nuclear sites since the 1950s  – which of the 
following statements most closely matches your opinion: 
 
 West Cumbria deserves more from 
government than other areas for its service 
1 West Cumbria does well  
from the nuclear industry 
2 
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Section 6 - About you 
  
28) How old are you? 
 
 18-24 1 25-34 2 35-44 3 45-54 4 55-64 5 65+ 6 
 
29) What is your gender? 
 
 Male 1 Female 2 Other 3 
 
30) Where were you born? 
 
 West Cumbria 1 England 2 Rest of UK 3 
 
 
 
  
Europe 4 World  
(English speaking) 
5 World  
(non-English speaking) 
6 
   
31) Which of the following most closely describes where you live now? 
 
 A city 1 A town 2 A village 3 Rural 4 
 
32) What is the highest qualification you have? 
 
 No qualifications 1 University degree 4 
 GCSE/CSE/O-Levels 2 Postgraduate degree 5 
 A-Levels 3 Other (specify below) 6 
     
 
33)  How would you describe your class? 
 
 Working class 1 Lower middle class 2 Upper middle class 3 Upper class 4 
  
34)  Below there is a map of West Cumbria, divided into four areas –  
A, B, C and D.   
Please indicate below which of these four areas you live in. 
 
 A 1  
 B 2  
 C 3  
 D 4  
 None 5  
 
 
END OF SURVEY 
THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY 
PLEASE RETURN IN THE PRE-PAID ENVELOPE PROVIDED 
 
 SURVEY 
  
 Page 7   
PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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Volunteer Debriefing Sheet 
Thank you very much for your participation. The information you have provided will 
be used to contribute to research on citizenship, prepared as part of a PhD thesis at 
the University of Central Lancashire. 
Information you have provided will be used to examine how citizenship is impacted 
by what we think of as globalisation, and particularly how individual communities 
interpret economic, social and cultural changes associated with increasing global 
flows of physical and virtual resources, such as people, money and information. 
Only those with a legitimate professional need will have access to these completed 
surveys.  In the thesis and any subsequent publications, participants will not be 
identifiable as no data is collected which allows for this to happen. 
If you have any questions about the study at a later date please do not hesitate to 
contact the researcher - Stephen Haraldsen - based at the following address:  
University of Central Lancashire, Westlakes Science Park, Moor Row, Cumbria, 
CA24 3JZ.   
 
If you have any questions, please email SHaraldsen@uclan.ac.uk or call 01946 
517234. 
 
If you wish to speak to his academic school or supervisory team, please contact Dr 
Antonio Cerella, School of Education and Social Science, University of Central 
Lancashire, Preston, Lancashire, PR1 2HE or call 01772 201 201. 
 
Please feel free to keep this sheet in case you need to contact the researcher or his 
team at a later date. 
 
Once again, thank you for giving your time to complete this survey.
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www.thesamuellindowfoundation.com 
This project is supported by The Samuel Lindow Foundation, an independent  
educational charity established in 1992 to advance the education of the public.  
 
'The Samuel Lindow Foundation' is the trading name of 'Westlakes Research 
Limited', 
an exempt charity registered in England and Wales with Company No. 2699264.  
 
The University of Central Lancashire is the Member of the Charity. 
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APPENDIX D - FOCUS GROUP TOPIC GUIDE 
Opening questions and housekeeping (2 minutes) 
Welcome and thank you for giving up your time to take part in this focus group 
and research project on globalisation in west Cumbria. 
To start, I would like to cover various elements of housekeeping and reiterate 
some of the points which are on your volunteer information sheets and consent 
forms. 
You all know me, but probably not what I do day-to-day.  I gave up work in 2012 
to go back to university full-time as postgraduate research student at the 
University of Central Lancashire, but based on the Westlakes Science Park, 
where I’d worked since 2008. I’m carrying out research into the effects of 
globalisation upon west Cumbria.  I’m supervised by Dr Antonio Cerella, and a 
team of academics within the School of Education and Social Science.  Your 
volunteer information sheets have our contact details, should you need to 
contact any of us at any time. 
Housekeeping – there are no planned fire alarms, so if one sounds please 
leave by the nearest safe exit. 
Recording – the focus group is being recorded using the equipment on the 
table, but speak to each other, not the recorder.  It’s very good and will record 
you even if you aren’t facing it. 
Confidentiality – only those with a legitimate need will have access to the 
recordings and transcripts of this focus group, such as me, my supervisory 
team and a professional transcription company.   
Data protection – all materials relating to this focus group and your participation 
are stored securely on the UCLan network, or encrypted while in transit to the 
transcription company, and hard copies are storied in locked filing cupboards, to 
which only I have a password or key. 
Time – the focus group is restricted to 30 minutes 
Structure – the focus group will start with personal introductions, then move on 
to a structured discussion on the topics of globalisation and citizenship 
specifically rights, obligations, participation and identity.   
Personal introductions  - if we could go around the table and briefly introduce 
ourselves, and why we decided to take part in this research project.... 
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Globalisation (10 minutes) 
Do you feel you are affected by things happening elsewhere in the world?  
How? 
How do you interact with people, places and issues outside of Britain?   
Citizenship (45 minutes) 
 What comes to mind when you think of the word citizen? 
 What makes a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ citizen? 
 What does citizenship involve on the part of both individuals and governments? 
Rights (10 minutes) 
 What rights do you have?  How do you feel they have changed? 
Human rights – what do they mean to you? 
Is there a bare minimum standard for rights that all should enjoy, 
or is it a matter for individuals to secure their own rights?  If one 
does, what does it consist of? 
Are the rights of others outside your community or country as 
important as the rights for you and your fellow countrymen? 
Duties (10 minutes) 
Part of being a citizen is that rights come with obligations, such 
as to obey the law, pay your taxes and so on.  What obligations 
do you have to others and to the country? 
Do you feel you have obligations to citizens elsewhere in the 
world?  What are they? And if not, why?   
Are our obligations as citizens changed by globalisation and 
risks such as climate change, pollution and easy movement of 
people and things across borders? 
Participation (10 minutes) 
 Do you take part in voluntary activities in the community? 
Why/why not? 
Do you support international organisations, such as 
environmental campaigns (Greenpeace, friends of the earth etc), 
anti-poverty campaigns, or any other global organisation? 
 Do you see yourself as being able to affect or influence global 
issues, even in  a small way? 
 Can local action or local politics affect global issues? 
Identity (10 minutes) 
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There are many different ideas about what globalisation means, 
from borderless words and the Americanisation of our culture, to 
it not meaning much.  Do you think Britishness and other 
national identities are on the way out?  Is a global identity 
emerging? 
What do you feel closest to? Your town, west Cumbria, England, 
Britain, Europe, the world or other? 
Can you be close to more than one?  Are you?  Can you rank 
them in order of closeness? 
What does it mean to you to be west Cumbrian?   
Do you feel European or global?  
Close (5 minutes) 
Considering all we’ve talked about, I’d like to return again to what you think it 
means to be a citizen in west Cumbria in the current day, with our 
interconnected society and all the changes that implies. 
Do you feel the free movement of people, information, money and so on across 
international borders changes the meaning and status of citizenship?  Does it 
change your personal, day-to-day life? 
Is anything anyone wants to say, reflecting on the discussions we’ve had? 
Wrap-up (0 minutes) 
Thank you all very much for your time.  Please can I give you each a volunteer 
debrief sheet, which includes my details and those of the supervisory tam, 
should you need to contact either of us.  It also includes information we covered 
at the start regarding consent, confidentiality, data protection and so on. 
Once again, thank you very much for your time, and have a safe journey home. 
APPENDIX E – FOCUS GROUP HANDOUTS 
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Volunteer information 
 
This study sets out to examine the effect globalisation has upon West Cumbria, specifically 
focussing on the local government policy response, effects stemming from globalisation of the 
workplace, and wider community impacts. 
 
You have been invited to participate due to your living and/or working in West Cumbria.  
Information you provide will be used to understand how globalisation impacts communities 
and individuals.  Please remember that you are free to withdraw at any time without providing 
a reason for doing so and that you may refuse to answer any question put to you. 
 
Only those with a legitimate professional need will have access to recordings or transcripts of 
the focus group.  In the thesis and any subsequent publications, participants will not be 
identifiable.  Pseudonyms (made-up names) will be used in conjunction with either the town or 
profession to attribute direct quotations.  It is not envisaged that any sensitive material will 
emerge from the survey however in the event of any sensitive information emerging, 
measures the use of false names will ensure as far as possible confidentiality is maintained, 
with participants reserving the right to withdraw part or all of their consent. 
 
The researcher is Stephen Haraldsen and based at the following address:  
University of Central Lancashire, Westlakes Science Park, Moor Row, Cumbria, CA24 3JZ. 
If you have any questions, please email SHaraldsen@uclan.ac.uk or call 01946 517234. 
 
If you wish to speak to his academic school or supervisory team, please contact Dr Antonio 
Cerella, School of Education and Social Science, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, 
Lancashire, PR1 2HE or call 01772 201 201. 
 
Consent form 
 
The form below is to ensure that you are willing to take part in this study and to let you 
understand what it entails. Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do not wish 
to do.  Contact details are gathered to enable the researcher to contact participants in the 
unlikely event that there is a material change in the nature of the research which would 
necessitate reviewing the consent given.   Please indicate your response to the following 
questions by deleting as applicable. 
 
Have you read the volunteer information above? Yes No 
Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study? Yes No 
Have you received satisfactory answers to your questions? Yes No 
Do you understand that anonymity shall always be attempted but cannot be 
guaranteed? 
Yes No 
Do you understand that you are under no obligation to complete this survey? Yes No 
Do you agree to take part in the study? Yes No 
Name: 
Address:  
E-Mail address: Telephone number: 
Signed: Date: 
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Volunteer Debriefing Sheet 
 
Thank you very much for your participation. The information you have provided will be used to 
contribute to research on the impacts of globalisation, prepared as part of a PhD thesis at the 
University of Central Lancashire. 
 
Information you have provided will be used to examine how the impacts of globalisation are 
diverse, and particularly how individual communities interpret economic, social and cultural 
changes associated with increasing global flows of physical and virtual resources, such as 
people, money and information. 
 
Only those with a legitimate professional need will have access to recordings or transcripts of 
the interviews and focus groups.  .  In the thesis and any subsequent publications, participants 
will not be identifiable.  Pseudonyms (made-up names) will be used in conjunction with either 
the town or profession to attribute direct quotations.    It is not envisaged that any sensitive 
material will emerge from the interviews and focus groups, however their semi-structured 
nature means the researcher cannot guarantee the content.  In the event of any sensitive 
information emerging, measures such as the use of a false name will be discussed with the 
affected participant to ensure as far as possible confidentiality is maintained, at all times with 
the right to withdraw part or all of their consent. 
 
If you have any questions about the study at a later date please do not hesitate to contact the 
researcher: 
 
Stephen Haraldsen 
University of Central Lancashire 
Samuel Lindow Building 
Westlakes Science and Technology Park 
MOOR ROW 
Cumbria 
CA24 3JZ 
 
Email: SHaraldsen@uclan.ac.uk 
Telephone: 01946 517234. 
 
If you wish to contact his academic school or supervisory team, the address is: 
 
Dr Antonio Cerella, Lecturer in International Relations 
School of Education and Social Science 
University of Central Lancashire 
PRESTON 
Lancashire 
PR1 2HE   
 
Telephone: 01772 201 201 
 
Thank you once again for taking part in this research. 
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APPENDIX F – MEMBERSHIP OF THE WEST CUMBRIA 
STRATEGIC FORUM 
This list of membership of the West Cumbria Strategic Forum is drawn from the 
Memorandum of Understanding between government and west Cumbria (DTI 
2004: 21) 
WEST CUMBRIA STRATEGIC FORUM  
PROPOSED MEMBERSHIP  
 
National  
Secretary of State DTI (Chair)  
Treasury 
Cabinet Office  
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
Department for Transport 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport  
Department of Work and Pensions  
Department for Education and Skills  
Home Office  
Department of Health  
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority  
Number 10 (Geoffrey Norris)  
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Regional  
North West Development Agency X 2  
North West Regional Assembly  
Cumbria Vision  
West Lakes Renaissance  
Rural Regeneration Cumbria  
Cumbria Inward Investment Agency  
Cumbria Learning and Skills Council  
Business Link Cumbria  
Cumbria Tourist Board  
 
Local  
Cumbria County Council X 2  
Allerdale Borough Council X 2  
Copeland Borough Council X 2  
Business Sector X 2  
Trade Union X 2  
West Cumbria Strategic Partnership Chair  
Nuclear Opportunities Manager West Lakes Renaissance  
 
Other  
Tony Cunningham MP (Workington) 
Jack Cunningham MP (Copeland) 
 
Secretariat : Department of Trade and Industry / Government Office North West 
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11th April 2013  
 
 
Antonio Cerella & Stephen Haraldsen  
School of Education & Social Science  
University of Central Lancashire  
 
 
 
 
Dear Antonio & Stephen  
 
Re: BAHSS Ethics Committee Application 
Unique Reference Number: BAHSS 111  
 
The BAHSS ethics committee has granted approval of your proposal application ‘The Global 
and the ‘Glocal’: Exploring the relationship between space and place in West’. 
Please note that approval is granted up to the end of project date or for 5 years, which ever is 
the longer.  This is on the assumption that the project does not significantly change, in which 
case, you should check whether further ethical clearance is required 
 
We shall e-mail you a copy of the end-of-project report form to complete within a month of 
the anticipated date of project completion you specified on your application form.  This should 
be completed, within 3 months, to complete the ethics governance procedures or, 
alternatively, an amended end-of-project date forwarded to roffice@uclan.ac.uk quoting your 
unique reference number. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Colin Murrell 
Deputy Vice Chair 
BAHSS Ethics Committee 
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14th August 2013  
 
 
Antonio Cerella & Stephen Haraldsen  
School of Education & Social Science  
University of Central Lancashire  
 
 
 
 
Dear Antonio & Stephen  
 
Re: BAHSS Ethics Committee Application 
Unique Reference Number: BAHSS 111 Phase 2 
 
The BAHSS ethics committee has granted approval of your proposal application ‘The Global 
and the ‘Glocal’: Exploring the relationship between space and place in West’. 
Please note that approval is granted up to the end of project date or for 5 years, whichever is 
the longer.  This is on the assumption that the project does not significantly change, in which 
case, you should check whether further ethical clearance is required 
 
We shall e-mail you a copy of the end-of-project report form to complete within a month of 
the anticipated date of project completion you specified on your application form.  This should 
be completed, within 3 months, to complete the ethics governance procedures or, 
alternatively, an amended end-of-project date forwarded to roffice@uclan.ac.uk quoting your 
unique reference number. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Megan Knight 
Vice Chair 
BAHSS Ethics Committee  
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19th November 2013  
 
 
Antonio Cerella & Stephen Haraldsen  
School of Education & Social Science 
University of Central Lancashire  
 
 
 
 
Dear Antonio & Stephen  
 
Re: BAHSS Ethics Committee Application 
Unique Reference Number: BASHH 111 Amendment  
 
The BAHSS Ethics Committee has approved your proposed amendment to your application 
‘The Global and the ‘Glocal’: Exploring the relationship between space and place in West 
Cumbria’. 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Megan Knight 
Vice Chair  
BAHSS Ethics Committee  
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